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TRANSLATIONS ON USSR POLITICAL
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(FOUO 4/79)

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INTERNATIONAL

NEW BOOK DETAILS CAUSES, PROSPECTS OF NEAR EAST CONFLICT

Moscow ANATOMIYA BLIZHNEVOSTOCHNOGO KONFLIKTA (Anatomy of the Near East Conflict) in Russian 1978 pp 1, 3-5, 191-355, 375, 376

[Annotation and excerpts from book by Yevgeniy Maksimovich Primakov: Editorial Board Chief T. A. Voskresenskaya, Editor L. G. Solov'yeva, Map Editor L. D. Chel'tsova, Junior Editor N. V. Malinovskaya, artistic layout by Ye. V. Ratmirova, Artistic Editor T. V. Ivanshina, Technical Editor L. Ye. Pukhova, Proofreader T. M. Shpilenko, Mysl']

[Text] The book by Ye. M. Primakov, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, analyzes the causes of the Near East conflict--one of the most dangerous contemporary international conflicts. The confrontation between Israel, which is pursuing an expansionist policy, and the neighboring Arab states and also the Palestine resistance movement is traced on the basis of extensive historical material. U.S. Near East policy is analyzed. How the energy crisis is affecting the development of events in the Near East and influencing the policy of the United States and its Western partners in this region is examined, in particular.

This book is dedicated to Vadim Petrovich Rumyantsev of blessed memory

The Near East has long remained a hotbed of dangerous tension. The absence of a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict is reflected most negatively in the position of the peoples and states of this region and the status and development of peaceful economic relations, is threatening universal peace and is creating serious negative features for the process of the relaxation of international tension. The absence of a political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict has been the cause of or has created conditions conducive to the development of a number of "satellite conflicts" such as, for example, the bloody tragedy in Lebanon in 1975-1976.

What is the cause of the Near East conflict,* which is determining interstate relations in this region, engendering serious complications beyond its

*The term "Near East conflict" characterizes the main conflict in the Near East--the Arab-Israeli conflict. Both terms are of equal weight in the ensuing account. The author is aware here that neither the first nor second designation entirely reflects the nature of the conflict: the first represents merely a geographic concept, while the second limits the conflict to an Arab-Israeli framework, which is essentially wrong.

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confines and disrupting the normal development of a number of processes intended to improve the international organism, which was undermined by the "cold war"?

One of the most protracted and serious conflicts of the 20th century--the Near East conflict--has both internal and outside causes. The internal causes are the contradictions between Zionism and, subsequently, also Israel, which is pursuing an expansionist course, on the one hand, and the Arab people of Palestine and the Arab states on the other. The outside causes are the policies of the imperialist states since World War II, chiefly the United States, which is directly supporting Israel's expansionist policy and utilizing the Near East conflict in the interests of the struggle against the natural liberation forces in this region and world socialism.

The internal and outside causes of the conflict have proven interconnected. It is categorically wrong under these conditions to either confine the causes of the Near East conflict to "internal" Arab-Israeli contradictions or to transfer them entirely to a "global level"--as is frequently the case with bourgeois researchers.

The Near East conflict has been developed in the current system of international relations, whose main and determining contradiction is that between socialism and capitalism. This has left its direct imprint on the nature and course of the conflict. At the same time there is nothing more primitive and incorrect than to depict the effect of international relations on the Arab-Israeli confrontation in the form of the struggle of "superpowers" for influence in the Near East. The concern of the two opposite social-political systems for different results from this conflict is founded on a class basis. It is precisely from class standpoints that the two leading countries of these systems--the Soviet Union and the United States--are assisting and supporting the countries directly involved in the conflict: the USSR--the Arab national liberation movement and the Arab peoples, who have become the target of Israel's expansionist policy; the United States--the Israeli ruling circles, which are pursuing a course in the Near East which is, generally, coordinated with world imperialism.

This book reflects the intertwined nature of the causes of the Near East conflict. At the same time the author has considered it possible to successively examine them with the accent initially on the internal and, subsequently, on the outside factors.

Diagnostics should be constructed on the basis of a comprehensive analysis of the clearly highlighted and delimited causes of a phenomenon. It is important not to overlook either of them. And--this, possibly, does not need special emphasis--diagnostics has never been and cannot be an end in itself. It is designed to signpost the paths of recuperation and elimination of the illness both in the human organism and in relations between people, peoples and states. It was for this very purpose that man acquired such a method of cognition as anatomy.

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The author would like to express heartfelt gratitude to his comrades and colleagues for their assistance in the preparation of this book.

Fall, 1977.

Chapter 5. Stages of the United States' Near East Policy

The United States' aims and interests in the Near East examined earlier predetermined the high degree of U.S. involvement in the Near East conflict and its aspiration to utilize this conflict to accomplish the task confronting American foreign policy. The tactical line of the United States with respect to the Near East conflict has never been hard-set and immovable but has been modified from stage to stage of the implementation of the United States' Near East policy as a whole.

And, moreover, in addition to the correlation of forces on global level, the status, nature and immediate prospects of the United States' relations with the most populous and most industrially developed country of the Arab world--Egypt--which played under President al-Nasir, despite certain inter-Arab contradictions and difficulties, the generally recognized leading role in the Arab world, have exerted a principal influence on the evolution of American tactics. There are serious grounds for directly linking U.S. attempts to impart this impetus or the other to the development of the Near East conflict with its different political approaches to the Arab world, which has found concentrated expression in U.S. policy in respect of Egypt. It may, in particular, be concluded that the United States began to make active use of the Near East conflict in its own foreign policy interests after 1952, which was marked by the revolution in Egypt which brought the "Free Officers" organization to power.

U.S. policy in the Near East since that time may provisionally be split into a number of stages. The first, which began immediately after the 1952 Egyptian revolution, lasted until mid-1955. In this period the U.S. Administration hoped and attempted to establish contacts with the new Egyptian regime and control its domestic and foreign policy. "Positive" methods in respect of Egypt, including the extension of credit to Egypt and U.S. mediation between the "Free Officers" and Britain on the question of evacuation of the British military base in the Suez Canal Zone, prevailed during this stage. Throughout this stage Washington gambled on tying Egypt, as, equally, other Arab countries, to the United States either in the form of their direct incorporation in a bloc structure or by the granting to them of American military and economic "assistance." At that time the American leaders counted on the "Free Officers" taking as the basis of their development the model of the Latin American military-dictatorial regimes, which would have predetermined their ultimate and strict dependence on the United States, particularly under conditions where the traditional colonial powers in the Arab world--Britain and France--had manifestly forfeited both their prestige and their positions following World War II.

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This U.S. line was adequately reflected in the American attitude toward the Near East conflict. Throughout this stage the United States did not gamble directly on an intensification of Arab-Israeli confrontation. And, moreover, attempts were made to bring Israel and Egypt closer together, which was viewed as a means of the exertion of U.S. influence on both sides involved in the conflict.

The second stage of the United States' Near East policy encompasses the period from mid-1955 through 1957. Israel's military confrontation with Egypt began and Israel's armed clashes with Syria intensified in the spring of 1955. Egypt reached agreement with the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia on arms supplies in the middle of 1955. This undermined the imperialist West's monopoly on arms supplies to the Arab countries. In 1956 Egypt was the victim of tripartite aggression. But, under pressure from the peace-loving forces, Britain, France and Israel were forced in 1957 to withdraw their troops from Egyptian territory. Under these conditions the United States effected a clear turnabout in its Near East policy. The means and methods of U.S. actions in relation to al-Nasir's Egypt and other Arab national liberation forces began to acquire a subversive nature at this time. Together with this, the United States was unceasing in its attempts to also adopt a "constructive approach" toward Egypt for the purpose of taking advantage of the collapse of the positions of Britain and France, which became manifest particularly in the wake of the 1956 tripartite aggression against Egypt.

This line was expressed in the U.S. attitude toward the Arab-Israeli conflict: the United States began to strengthen Israel by degrees, not always with its own hands, but preferring to operate through its allies; the United States viewed Israel's confrontation with the Arab countries as a means of weakening the al-Nasir regime; efforts were made simultaneously to "pull" Egypt up to the Israeli terms of a settlement; and at the same time at this stage the United States was still leaving the doors open to attempts to improve relations with the Egyptian regime--the "flirting" with this country was not yet over, and this predetermined the absence of automatism in strict, unconditional support of any actions of Israel dictated by its confrontation with the Arab countries.

The third stage, which began with the U.S. proclamation of the Eisenhower doctrine, lasted until 1971. In this doctrine the United States formulated an independent course of its Near East policy, which was aimed at filling the "vacuum" which had allegedly been created in this region as the result of the collapse of the influence of the traditional colonial powers--Britain and France. In the wake of the proclamation of the Eisenhower doctrine there followed the armed intervention of the United States and Britain in Lebanon and Jordan in 1958, which was intended to create a "barrier" to the development of the national liberation process in the Arab world. As a whole, this stage of American policy was characterized by open U.S. hostility in respect of Egypt and attempts by any means to oust the al-Nasir regime and liquidate the progressive trends in the Arab world. The United

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States began to pay particular attention at this time to the use of inter-Arab conflicts and, following its failure, embarked firmly, as of the end of the 1950's, on the path of the direct use of Israeli expansionist circles in the Near East conflict.

The fourth stage of the United States' Near East policy began with the death of al-Nasir. It is characterized by a transition to greater "balance" and to attempts by the United States to make the maximum use in its own interests of the economic and political shifts which were revealed in Egypt and certain other Arab countries at the start of the 1970's.

In the period 1970-1972 the United States kept an eye on the situation, frequently engaged in "reconnaissance in force" and, following the 1973 October war, actively assumed the role of "mediator" in the business of a political settlement of the Near East conflict. It was prompted to this by the change in the correlation of forces between the parties involved in the conflict and also by the clearly unfavorable situation for the capitalist world which had arisen as a result of the connection between the development of the Near East conflict and the intensification of the energy crisis. Here the U.S. mission for a political settlement was undertaken chiefly in such directions and forms as would secure to the maximum U.S. interests in the Near East, neutralize the elements which had emerged in the situation in this region and internationally which were unfavorable to Israel's extremist plans and weaken the positions and influence of the Soviet Union. These aims being pursued by U.S. policy are not facilitating but, on the contrary, making more difficult the achievement of a lasting and just peaceful settlement of the Near East conflict.

Let us examine the stages of the United States' Near East policy in more detail.

1. The Task--Involvement in Blocs (1952-1955)

After the overthrow of King Faruq in 1952, the United States far from immediately began to pursue a policy hostile to the new Egyptian regime. At the time of the coup the "Free Officers"--Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir wrote and spoke about this repeatedly--attempted to establish relations with the United States. Ali Sabri, a former member of the leadership of the "Free Officers," was authorized by the Revolutionary Command Council to make contact with the Americans immediately after the overthrow of Faruq, and for this purpose he visited the U.S. Embassy in Cairo. Following the coup, Ali Mahir was appointed prime minister (albeit not a controlling position since power was actually in the hands of the Revolutionary Command Council, a very important position in the state, nevertheless) obviously not least in consideration of his pro-American sentiments. And it was no accident that this appointment was interpreted so positively in the United States that Dean Acheson, secretary of state at that time, even announced a "new era" in American-Egyptian relations.

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General Najib, who headed the Revolutionary Command Council following the coup, made a whole number of gestures which were evaluated as pro-American. He said in an interview on 8 August 1952 that Egypt attached great significance to the organization of a military pact in the Near East and intended to turn to the United States for military assistance. On 19 September 1952 Najib personally took part in a solemn ceremony on the occasion of the inauguration of the American Information Center in Alexandria and had complimentary words to say there about American policy in relation to Egypt. Najib openly advocated attracting American capital ventures in Egypt.

There is a dual explanation for this position of the new Egyptian leadership following June 1952: having concentrated on the struggle against Britain and its landowner-palace secret service in Egypt, the country's leaders were in need of outside support or, in any event, wished to neutralize as far as possible American support for London in the Egyptian-British confrontation which had begun, taking advantage of American-British contradictions in this region for this purpose. At the same time the forces representing the right wing of the new Egyptian leadership wished, with the assistance of Egypt's rapprochement with the United States, to weaken the tendency of the regime's leftward movement, which had been discerned immediately following the coup, and to blunt the anti-imperialist nature of the Egyptian revolution.

Washington also began its game in Egypt following the ouster of King Faruq. U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles arrived in Egypt in May 1953. American diplomacy simultaneously undertook "mediation activity," attempting to bring closer together under its "patronage" Britain's and Egypt's positions on the question of evacuation of the British base in the Suez Canal Zone. A start was made on the implementation of a program of American assistance to Egypt of the order of \$50 million. There was an outright pilgrimage of American officials, politicians and businessmen to Cairo.

Among all the aims of its Near East policy, the United States highlighted at the start of the 1950's, giving it priority, the task of the creation of a military bloc, with the unfailing involvement of Arab countries therein. Describing the mission which Dulles attempted to accomplish during his visit to Cairo, the well-known Egyptian journalist H. Haykal, being also the best informed as a result of his proximity to al-Nasir, wrote that the U.S. secretary of state attempted "to advance his plan to surround the USSR with military and political alliances, a plan which he implemented with religious fervor and which was the main driving force of all his actions in the Near East."

The first postwar idea of such an alliance was born 2 years prior to Dulles's arrival in Cairo. This was a plan involving Egypt's unfailing incorporation in a joint "Middle East Command," which the United States saw as a replacement for the entirely compromised military imperialist presence in the Suez Canal Zone. Formally the proposal for the creation of a "Middle East Command" was made on behalf of the United States, Britain, France and Turkey

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in the fall of 1951, but Washington was the initiator of and inspiration behind this idea. A U.S. State Department bulletin formulated the basic principles of Egypt's planned participation in this military alliance: in exchange for consenting to act as a founding member Egypt was promised a number of high posts in the command, special training for its army and arms supplies from its partners. But in exchange for all this Egypt was to have undertaken to afford the command "such strategic, defense and other facilities on its territory as would be necessary for the organization of the peacetime defense of the Near East." It also was to have afforded "everything necessary and its assistance in the event of war, the impending threat of war or in the event of a manifest international crisis." As the bulletin pointed out, the British military base in the Suez Canal Zone would be formally handed over to Egypt, but in fact the "Middle East Command" would take charge of it "with Egypt participating in the administration of the base."

The authors of the "Middle East Command" idea planned that Israel also would be associated with it. This was dictated not only by an aspiration to utilize Israel's military potential in the imperialist plans but also pursued two other aims: bringing Israel closer to the Arab countries under the conditions of the spread of American influence to both sides in the conflict (considering the nature of the regimes which existed in all the Near East countries involved in the conflict at that time, the United States could have counted on being successful in strengthening its positions "on both sides" and preventing the development of Israel's normal relations with the USSR and other socialist countries.

The "Middle East Command" idea, which represented an attempt to impose on the Near East a new form of colonial dependence, was rejected by the Arab countries. But this was not the end of American diplomacy's attempts to knock together a military bloc in the Near East under the aegis of the United States. Following U.S. Secretary of State Dulles' trip to the Near East in 1953, Washington put forward a new plan for the creation of a military bloc of Moslem countries alone--the Arab states, Turkey and Pakistan.

During the visit to the United States at the end of 1953 of an Egyptian delegation headed by Ali Sabri, which had been sent for the purpose of purchasing American arms, General Olmsted, the leader of the Pentagon's overseas military assistance program, took advantage of a meeting with the Egyptians to propagandize the idea of an Islamic pact. Making no secret of the anti-Soviet direction of this pact, the American general said that in addition to its role "in defense of the Middle East," the pact could exert great influence on the Moslems of the Soviet Union and China. "Everyone was shocked," H. Haykal writes, "when Olmsted began to talk about how it was necessary to create a fifth column in these countries."

Incidentally, it transpired later that, irrespective of the Egyptian delegation's reaction to the general's words, the United States had absolutely no intention of arming the Egyptian Army with modern weapons on a sufficiently large scale--this could only have occurred in the event of Egypt's

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reconciliation with Israel, in other words, in the event of Egypt refusing to support the Palestinian people's rights to self-determination and its signing of a separate peace agreement with Israel. U.S. diplomacy strove for this, but unsuccessfully. Consequently, on American diplomacy's scale of values Israel retained an even higher place than realization of the idea of Egypt's involvement in a military alliance without its simultaneous withdrawal from the confrontation with Israel.

After the impracticability of the idea of the creation of an Islamic pact became clear, Washington changed its tactics, acting as the actual initiator of a bilateral Turkish-Pakistan military alliance, counting on making it the "axis" of a broad military bloc with the condition of its obligatory expansion via the Arab states. A Turkish-Pakistan pact, arranged by American diplomacy, was concluded in 1954. On 24 February 1955 American diplomacy succeeded in putting together a Turkish-Iraqi military alliance, which was given the name of the Baghdad Pact (subsequently, CENTO). Great Britain joined it officially on 4 April, as did Pakistan and Iran in September-November 1955.

It is significant that the United States viewed Iraq's involvement in the military alliance as a means designed to disrupt the Soviet Union's relations with this country. Under direct pressure from the West the government of Nuri al-Sa'id broke off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in the period of the creation of the Baghdad Pact.

Attempting to accomplish the main aim at the first stage--incorporation of the Arab countries in a military bloc--the United States did much to prevent complication of the realization of this idea because of its close relations with Israel. While developing and strengthening relations with this state, in a number of instances Washington aspired to conceal them and sometimes even to refuse to acknowledge the one-sided orientation toward Israel which had been "ascribed" to it.

Primarily, the United States abandoned its initial plans for Israel's incorporation in a military bloc in the Near East. Moreover, in connection with the American aspiration to drag the Arab countries into a military alliance at all costs a number of statements were made by U.S. officials condemning Israeli policy. Thus in his report on his 3-week visit to the Near East Dulles recommended that Israel "become a part of Near East society and cease considering itself a foreign element in this society." Advocating the need for the creation of a Near East military bloc, Dulles concluded his report with the recommendation of "an impartial attitude toward the Arabs and Israelis." In July 1953 the United States refused to transfer its embassy to Jerusalem, which the Israeli leadership had declared the state's capital, contrary to UN resolutions. In the fall of 1953 the United States vigorously protested Israeli raids on the territory of Egypt, Jordan and Syria. After the Israeli attack on Qibya in Jordan on 18 October 1953, the U.S. State Department came out with a statement which said, in part: "The killings and robberies during this incident persuade us that the persons

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involved in this should have proceedings instituted against them and that effective measures should be adopted to prevent similar actions in the future."

Certain representatives of official Washington circles went even further, casting doubt in their public speeches on the policy of making Israel a "homeland" for all Jews. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Henry Biroade twice came out with an undisguised condemnation of Israel's aspiration to become "the nucleus of world Jewry." On the first occasion--on 9 April 1954 in Dayton, Ohio--and, in repetition, in a speech to the American Council for Judaism (the neo-Zionist Jewish organization in the United States) H. Biroade sharply opposed the Israeli leadership's aspiration to increase immigration into the country and essentially developed the thesis from Dulles' report on the need for Israelis "to regard themselves in the proper light as a Near East state and to see their future in connection with this region and not as the headquarters and nucleus, so to speak, of groups scattered around the world defined by religious belief."

Such speeches and official statements of the State Department manifested an aspiration "to play the Israel card" in an attempt to effect a rapprochement with the Arab countries and utilize this rapprochement for drawing them into a military alliance. At the same time metallic notes also sounded in the United States' voice in relation to Israel because Washington had begun to display nervousness in connection with the unbridled extremism of the Israeli ruling clique and its unwillingness to adapt and insert itself into a Near East context (failing which, in the opinion of Dulles and his entourage, Israel could not perform in full the role of outpost of American influence in the Near East), which could disrupt the U.S. maneuver, alienate the USSR and other socialist countries.

Here Washington was, naturally, far from sacrificing its relations with Israel for the sake of a policy of rapprochement with the Arab countries: it was a question of tactics, more precisely, of priorities in the accomplishment of this task or the other of American diplomacy. For this reason Washington did everything possible to "amortize" for Israel the results of this game and, in any event, to pass nowhere beyond its limited confines.

It is well known, for example, that on 20 October 1953 Dulles announced a suspension of aid to Israel insofar as the latter had refused to abide by an injunction of the UN Trusteeship Council concerning a cessation of operations to drain swamp land and build a hydropower station in the demilitarized zone between Israel and Syria. But as soon as 28 October the United States announced the resumption of aid, satisfied by a statement of the Israeli UN representative concerning an agreement not to cease but simply suspend the work.

At the same time President Eisenhower appointed a mission headed by Eric Johnston for carrying out a project to divert the waters of the River Jordan and create irrigation systems. The Arab states, which rejected this project, not unreasonably termed it pro-Israeli since the United States had

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linked with its implementation a solution of the refugee problem by means of their new settlement predominantly on Jordanian territory, without their return to the lands from which they had been expelled.

The aspiration to draw the Arab countries into a military bloc gave rise to the need for the United States to propose military assistance to a number of Arab regimes either as a means of pulling them toward a bloc or as a reward for their consenting to join it. Immediately following the conclusion of the military pact between Turkey and Pakistan in 1954, the United States granted Iraq military assistance for the purpose of stimulating this Arab country's entry into the planned broad bloc. The agreement provided for supplies of American arms to Iraq, the establishment of a U.S. military mission in the country and the dispatch of Iraqi officers for training in the United States.

Proceeding precisely from the task of reinforcing the West's aggregate military positions in the Arab world, Washington, as already said, displayed diplomatic activeness in the conclusion of the Anglo-Egyptian agreement on the evacuation of the British base from the Suez Canal Zone. President Eisenhower wrote on 15 July 1954 in his message to President al-Nasir that "simultaneously with the conclusion of a Suez agreement with Great Britain the United States will be able to enter into direct relations with Egypt in the field of economic assistance and the strengthening of its armed forces." "After it had facilitated through unusually effective diplomacy the conclusion of an agreement between Egypt and Britain on the evacuation of the Suez base, the United States aspired more than ever before to draw al-Nasir into a Western defense agreement and change his behavior in relation to Israel. Arms were to be the main means of accomplishing this, is how William Quandt comments on the aims of American participation in the Egyptian-British accord.

2. The Reasons for the Turnabout in Policy (1955-1957)

Despite the flexibility it had shown, the United States did not succeed in realizing its idea of the incorporation of leading Arab countries in a military bloc. Iraq was the sole exception. Egypt, where by this time the elements which had formed a group around al-Nasir and which possessed far greater revolutionary potential than the supporters of General Najib had conclusively gained the upper hand, not only sharply opposed the Baghdad Pact but also directed its policy and its influence in the rest of the Arab world against this bloc. As a counterweight to the Baghdad Pact, Egypt signed military agreements with Syria and Saudi Arabia. A government headed by Sabri al-'Asali, leader of the National Party, was in power in Syria at this time. Saudi Arabia agreed to a military alliance with Egypt obviously motivated by its traditional hostility toward and rivalry with the Hashemite dynasty in Iraq: King Sa'ud feared that Iraq's inclusion in the Baghdad Pact would make this state the West's principal protege among the Arab monarchies. There was also, obviously, considerable significance in the fact that in 1955 there had been a sharp deterioration of Saudi Arabia's

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relations with another member of the Baghdad Pact--Britain--on account of the al-Buraymi oasis, to which the British protege the sultan of Muscat had advanced claims.

The United States attempted to prevent Egypt's conclusion of military agreements with other Arab countries, particularly Syria, realizing that this would put an end to the American plans for the creation of its "own" military alliances in the Near East controlled or directly commanded by the United States and could also strengthen the Arabs' positions in the confrontation with Israel. On 26 February the U.S. ambassador in Damascus handed the Syrian Government a memorandum which proposed that Syria decline to subscribe to the defense alliances. Syria interpreted this memorandum as interference in its internal affairs and rejected it. In response Washington began a campaign of pressure on this country unprecedented in American-Syrian relations. Elements of this pressure were a sharp exacerbation of Turkey and Iraq's relations with Syria, Israeli attacks and, finally, the murder of 'Adnan al-Maliki, the patriotically-minded assistant chief of the Syrian Army General Staff, which was connected with plans for the restoration of al-Shishakli's pro-American dictatorial regime. Despite this pressure, on 20 October 1955 Syria subscribed to a defensive alliance with Egypt and, a week later, with Saudi Arabia.

The pressure on Syria was intended to put pressure on Egypt also. But this did not stop al-Nasir, who called the Baghdad Pact "a prison for the peoples" and stepped up the struggle against it.

A whole number of researchers in the field of American-Egyptian relations believe that this very struggle, Egypt's turning to the socialist states for weapons in mid-1955 and, finally, Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company in July 1956--all this also predetermined the turnabout in American policy in relation to al-Nasir's regime. It is said that al-Nasir himself, with his own hands, forced the United States to alter its position. This conclusion, which was assiduously disseminated even in post-al-Nasir Egypt, particularly in the attempts to "argue" the policy of rapprochement with the United States under the conditions of its continuation of rigid support for Israel, is seen as incorrect and not corresponding to historical reality. These measures on the part of the Egyptian leadership undoubtedly hardened the American course, but the policy of the United States itself predetermined the development which led to Egypt's implementation of all these measures.

It is obvious that we should dwell on this in more detail, and not so much for polemical purposes as for the restoration of the true picture, which testified that, first, the United States began to pursue its anti-Egypt policy on its own initiative and not in response to al-Nasir's actions directed against U.S. interests and, second, that this anti-Egypt course of the United States was entirely linked with the strategic position which Washington had occupied in relation to the parties directly involved in the Near East conflict.

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Struggling against the anti-imperialist trends in the policy of Egypt and certain other Arab countries, the American leadership began to utilize these countries' confrontation with Israel in its own interests. It was gambled that the military pressure of a "strong" Israel would compel these countries to be more pliant in relations with the United States and prevent the development of the process of their rapprochement. Israel's importance to the United States in the protection of its interests in the Near East grew under the conditions of the failure to enlist the Arab world in imperialist alliances.

A result of this was the United States' removal of a number of restrictions on the development of the Near East conflict which it had put up in the foregoing period of its flirtation with the Egyptian "Free Officers." In certain instances the United States even resorted to supporting the policy of Israeli "reprisals," which, naturally, aggravated the Near East conflict. Meanwhile this aggravation also acquired a logic of its own.

The United States made a strategic choice in favor of Israel, which was in conflict with the Arabs. The development of the conflict required of the United States a more clearly negative approach to the Arab side, particularly in all questions connected with the possibility of the growth of its defense capability. It was possible for this negativism to be of a "selective nature" in this period: essentially only three Arab countries were in active confrontation with Israel--Egypt, Syria and Jordan. The "oil factor" had not at that time exerted a limiting influence on U.S. policy, which was anti-Egyptian and, in relation to the conflict, anti-Arab, which had taken shape under the conditions of the growth of anti-imperialism in the Near East. American oil interests in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq seemed reliably protected with the help of the local authorities, who maintained close relations with the United States. All the regimes in the Arab countries where American oil companies operated were overtly or covertly anti-Nasir.

The chronology of the United States' anti-Egypt actions is significant in the plane of what has been said. The United States began to put into effect its perfectly definite turnabout in its policy toward Egypt not following the purchase of Czechoslovak arms and, even less, following the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company but earlier than all this--back in the spring of 1955. There was a gradual buildup of the United States' oblique and direct anti-Egypt actions, which reached their culmination in July 1956 in the withdrawal of the original proposal to grant Egypt financial assistance for the construction of the Aswan hydrocomplex, which was important to it.

Certain Western authors assert that Dulles' "sudden" withdrawal of previously promised assistance was dictated by purely subjective considerations: Dulles--a complex personality who had an extremely big influence on the course of American policy in the Near East--was considerably irritated by the Egyptian propaganda campaign against the Baghdad Pact and its initiators and participants. The majority ascribes the withdrawal of assistance in

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the Aswan construction to Dulles' reaction to the agreement with Czechoslovakia on arms supplies to Egypt which Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir announced on 27 September 1955.

In speaking of the "fatal" nature of Dulles' refusal, which, indeed, played an exceptionally big role in the further development of events (for it was followed by Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, which, in turn, gave rise to the tripartite aggression against Egypt in October 1956) a number of researchers in the West considers the motives and driving forces of the American decision altogether "inexplicable" and "unexplained."

Yet this withdrawal by Dulles was the logical consequence of the changes in American policy toward Egypt which lay chiefly in the plane of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

True, as has been said, internal changes had occurred in Egypt by the time of the turnabout in American policy: General Najib had resigned, al-Nasir had finally gained the upper hand in the leadership and victory had gone to the most dynamic forces advocating the country's independent course of development. But this was not enough in itself to change the American attitude toward Egypt. According to Haykal, Dulles was generally satisfied with his meeting with al-Nasir which had taken place on 11 May 1953 in Cairo. Al-Nasir did not take up Dulles' proposal concerning Egypt joining the MITO (Middle East Defense Organization), but Dulles could still detect in a number of his arguments the possibility of "constructive" discussions with the Egyptian leader in the future (resolute anti-imperialism became al-Nasir's policy after a certain time, but in 1953 he was chiefly guided by a purely pragmatic approach to the choice of partners and allies). "Al-Nasir proved," H. Haykal writes, "that if Egypt joined the pact prior to the departure of the British from the Suez Canal Zone, this would appear that it had done this under pressure from the 8,000 British soldiers on the Suez Canal base. This was an argument which gave Dulles hope. He felt that after the departure of the British from the base, it would be possible to talk with al-Nasir about joining the pact. Al-Nasir also acknowledged the need to protect the country against communism."

Thus the United States did not lose hope that it would be successful in reaching at least a modus vivendi in relations with the Nasirite leadership. It is known, for example, that Washington succeeded--this was its "service," basically--in furnishing the agreement on the withdrawal of British troops from the Suez Canal Zone, which was signed in 1954, with clauses in accordance with which the British armed forces could return to the Canal Zone in the event of an attack on Egypt and on other members of the Arab League or Turkey. These clauses were viewed as being directed against the Soviet Union and their purpose was to compensate for Egypt's refusal to participate in a military alliance under the aegis of the Western powers.

Nor was Cairo's sharply negative reaction to the creation of the Baghdad Pact a surprise to Washington. Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir had repeatedly warned

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the U.S. leadership that he would oppose any military alliance in the Near East in which an Arab country participated. However, simultaneously with these warnings he repeatedly emphasized, and in a number of his public speeches also, his interest in relations with the West, if such relations were not conditioned by commitments to participate in military alliances.

Nor could the withdrawal of American assistance for the Aswan construction have been the U.S. reaction to al-Nasir's agreement with the socialist countries on arms supplies. More than 2 months after the signing of the Egyptian-Czechoslovak agreement on arms purchases, in November 1955, Dulles met in Washington with Egyptian Finance Minister A. M. al-Qaysuni and charged him with conveying to al-Nasir that "the Soviet Union is helping Egypt with weapons, but the United States intends to help Egypt in the construction of the high dam."

Further, Dulles asked al-Nasir to ponder "the difference in the nature of the assistance of the two countries and decide who Egypt's real friends are." Leaving on one side the Pharisaic methods of Dulles' diplomacy, let us turn our attention here to the fact that during his meeting with al-Qaysuni the U.S. secretary of state had not only not removed the question of American assistance for the Aswan construction in connection with Egypt's obtaining arms from the socialist countries but, on the contrary, opted for this U.S. assistance in the form of a bridgehead for "competition" with the USSR for influence in Egypt.

And, indeed, in December 1955 the United States declared its readiness to grant Egypt assistance in the construction of the high dam in Aswan. The United States and Britain assured Cairo that they would grant it \$70 million, while the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development declared its readiness to grant Egypt a loan of \$200 million.

Nor, obviously, could withdrawal of the assistance on the part of the United States have been predetermined by the policy of Egypt's neutralism which had been proclaimed and confirmed by al-Nasir's active participation in the Bandung Conference of nonaligned countries in April 1955. It is known that in the middle of June Dulles sharply opposed the policy of neutralism, which he termed amoral. However, all this was before the United States had agreed to grant assistance for the Aswan construction and not in the time between this agreement and the subsequent withdrawal.

Nor does the theory of Dulles' "impulsive" decision withstand criticism. U.S. intentions were fully revealed at a secret meeting of Baghdad Pact foreign ministers back in March 1956, that is, 4 months prior to his announcement of the withdrawal of assistance for the Aswan construction. The totally secret protocol of this meeting was photographed by an Iraqi minister and handed over in Beirut to Egyptian intelligence officials. Upon receipt of the document, al-Nasir doubted its authenticity; events, however, confirmed its accuracy.

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What, then, at that time were the main motives for such an extraordinary measure as the United States' demonstrative retreat from its previously promised assistance, a retreat which had been prepared in advance, which could not fail to have attested the complete reorganization of American policy in relation to Egypt?

Since the start of 1955 there had been a sharp reduction in American imperialism's opportunities for maneuver, which had assisted previous attempts to reconcile two mutually contradictory aims of its Near East policy: on the one hand the strengthening of Israel as a strategic base of American control over the Near East and, on the other, the reinforcement of U.S. positions and influence directly in Egypt and other Arab countries. This occurred under the conditions of a sharp galvanization of Israel's anti-Arab policy which was formulated by Ben-Gurion, who had returned to power, and which resulted in the attack on Gaza. Naturally, even under the new conditions the United States did not rule out a policy of flirting with Egypt, but the United States' opportunities for maneuver in this plane had distinctly narrowed.

The problem of military reinforcement in the face of a real danger of Israel's armed actions confronted Egypt in all its magnitude. Cairo realized that not only the fate of the "Free Officers" regime in Cairo but also Egypt's authority and positions throughout the Arab world would largely depend on the extent of the opposition to these Israeli actions. Following Israel's February attack on Gaza, Egypt immediately began to look for sources of arms supplies. It was in vital need of such. According to its military representative, at that time Egypt had six operational military aircraft and ammunition for tanks for one hour of battle.

Initially Egypt turned to its "traditional" arms sources--Britain and France. However, this request for the sale of weapons had negative results for Egypt. The government of Anthony Eden, which had come to power in Great Britain in April 1955, sharply increased the anti-Egyptian element in this country's policy, particularly under the conditions wherein Britain had joined the Baghdad Pact. The January 1955 election in France had brought to power the government of Guy Mollet, which also, from the very first, occupied an extremely negative position in relation to the Nasirite regime. This government adopted a policy of resolute suppression of the national liberation movement in Algeria, and the weakening or even removal of al-Nasir was considered an important condition for this. One month after Guy Mollet had become premier, France declined to sell 300 mortars on the grounds that they could be passed on to the Algerian insurgents. But simultaneously with its refusal of Egypt France sold Israel a consignment of Mystere aircraft and other arms. France obtained the direct consent of the United States in accordance with the "Tripartite Declaration" for Mystere supplies to Israel.

Under these circumstances J. al-Nasir even requested the United States itself that it sell Egypt arms to the tune of \$27 million. The State Department

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"justifiably assumed" that al-Nasir had no money and proposed that he pay in cash. Another demand was advanced simultaneously--that he take a group of American military advisers which was to observe how the supplied weapons would be used. Al-Nasir could not accept the Pentagon's demand, which threatened to put the Egyptian armed forces under the control of the United States, which had close relations with the other side of the conflict--Israel. Washington immediately declared that Egypt's position did not allow it to sell it weapons. It was right after all this that al-Nasir turned to the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia with a request for arms sales. His request was satisfied.

Two days after this became known in Washington (it had learned officially of Egypt's agreement with Czechoslovakia from al-Nasir's 27 September speech), J. Allen, U.S. assistant secretary of state, flew to Cairo for talks with the Egyptian president. A day later the British ambassador called on al-Nasir and expressed, on behalf of his government, "profound anxiety." The Western press carried a whole series of anti-Nasir articles. It was perfectly clear that the United States and the West European countries had hastily coordinated their actions to put pressure on al-Nasir for him to renounce the concluded agreement, which impinged on the West's possibilities of controlling the Near East conflict in its own interests. This pressure had no effect. The first consignments of the purchased weapons began to arrive in Egypt.

A few months prior to al-Nasir's request for the sale of arms, the United States itself had proposed military assistance to Egypt: American representatives were constantly informing the Egyptian leaders that it could be a question of a supply of various types of arms to the tune of \$40 million to \$100 million. Now, a few months later, the United States was refusing Egypt--why? The point was that at the end of 1954 the specific purpose of proposed American military assistance was totally different. The United States believed that assistance "would make al-Nasir sufficiently strong" inside the country for him to be able to adopt decisions on the appropriate form of military cooperation with the West (albeit in the form of the stationing of a permanent U.S. military mission in Egypt inspecting the Egyptian Army) and on a separate settlement with Israel with a solution of the question of the Palestine refugees. As far as the request by al-Nasir himself for military assistance was concerned, it was made at a time when it had become clear that Egypt needed the weapons to reinforce its positions in the confrontation with Israel. It was precisely this which predetermined Washington's negative response.

There are grounds for believing that Dulles' subsequent refusal to grant Egypt financial assistance for the Aswan construction was also chiefly connected with the fact that Egypt had embarked on a period of active confrontation with Israel, which was initiated by the Israeli attack on Gaza.

The U.S. Congress was perfectly distinct in its opposition to the idea of assistance to Egypt. A number of congressmen initiated a campaign against

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proposed U.S. assistance on the grounds that it was being granted to "Israel's enemy." As a supplement to this, Knowland, leader of the Republican minority in the Senate, told Dulles that the Senate would not approve U.S. assistance for the construction in Aswan, putting forward as a reason for this negative attitude the fear of competition on the part of Egypt for American cotton producers.

The very terms of the United States granting a loan for the Aswan construction were linked with the advancement of the idea of Egypt making a separate peace with Israel. Prior to his departure from Washington for Cairo, at the end of May 1956 Ahmad Husayn, Egyptian ambassador to the United States, was received by Undersecretary of State Herbert Hoover Jr, who was at that time standing in for Dulles, to be given information to be conveyed to his leaders. Hoover put forward the conditions whose adoption by Egypt was to precede an American decision concerning the financing of the Aswan construction. The first part of them contained purely financial and economic requirements. The second part contained U.S. requirements of a political nature. Egypt, according to Hoover, was to assume two commitments: declare that in the future it would not conclude agreements on arms supplies with the Soviet Union and reach a peace agreement with Israel. The motive for the renunciation of new agreements with the USSR was allegedly dictated by a concern to insure that Egypt would be able to pay off its debts without mortgaging its cotton for arms; the peace agreement with Israel, naturally, on terms close to those dictated by Tel Aviv, was presented as a means of eliminating tension essential for the Aswan construction. The American position was perfectly clear: in exchange for assistance in the construction of the dam Egypt had to adopt a policy geared toward a separate peace with Israel. While a renunciation of the development of its relations with the USSR was to contribute to Egypt's greater tractability in the face of the diktat of Israel, where by this time the "hawks" were firmly at the helm.

Judging by everything (this was mentioned earlier), Egypt had not occupied a nihilistic position on the question of the possibility of a settlement with Israel, but al-Nasir was thinking of a general and not a separate settlement, with the obligatory solution of the Palestinian problem, and considered the 1947 UN plan of the partition of Palestine the basis thereof. At the same time, after Ben-Gurion's return to the government, the Israelis adopted a policy not of the search for compromise but for the overthrow of al-Nasir. And under these conditions the American proposals resembled a diplomatic cover designed to promote this aim.

When it became clear to the United States that al-Nasir would not agree to a separate agreement on Israeli terms or terms close to them, the White House and, particularly at that time, the State Department began to seek more effective measures intended to break al-Nasir's resistance and bring his policy under American control. A means was needed for this which was capable of having an even greater impact on Egypt than the refusal of arms supplies. The United States attempted to make its withdrawal of its previously

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promised assistance for the Aswan construction just such a means. Dulles obviously calculated that such a turnabout could have the maximum impact since it directly called in question the feasibility of a project of vital importance for Egypt.

The United States was not nor could it have been in any doubt as to the strength of the painful method which it intended to adopt in respect of Egypt. It deliberately decided on concentrated strategic pressure on al-Nasir's regime. In his report to the Congress for the second half of 1955 U.S. President Eisenhower wrote that the construction of the Aswan High Dam was "the key to Egypt's capability of providing for its growing population in the future." Eisenhower explained the agreement of the United States, Britain and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development "to join efforts" in the offer to finance the construction by the "extraordinary importance of the project." And the United States also decided to play on precisely the fact that the Aswan construction was of such importance for the new regime in Egypt. The American politicians counted on the surefire nature of their maneuver. Dulles believed that after he had received the United States' refusal to approach him with outstretched hand, al-Nasir would be forced to agree to all the American terms. Even if the Soviet Union did supply Egypt with weapons, it would not be in a position to create a source of economic assistance as an alternative to the West, Dulles hoped.

The calculations that the U.S. maneuver would break al-Nasir were also based on the fact that in December 1955 Washington had not merely agreed to finance the start of the construction in Aswan but had also announced its readiness to provide, in conjunction with Britain, assistance and financing for "subsequent stages" of the project.

Following the withdrawal of the United States, there immediately followed withdrawals from the financing of the Aswan construction by Britain and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Thus by his withdrawal of his offer of assistance to Egypt Dulles was not responding to al-Nasir but acting on his own initiative. The fact that the import of these actions of Dulles amounted directly to blackmail of Egypt is emphasized by many authors even in the West. One of them, Maxim Rodinson, wrote the following in this connection: "Having assumed that the USSR was not in a position to finance the Aswan Dam, Dulles announced on 18 July that the United States was canceling its offer of assistance, adding certain disparaging remarks by the way of explanation.... For the Western powers capitulation (of Egypt--Ye. P.) seemed entirely certain."

Speaking in Alexandria on 26 July, in response to Dulles' maneuver al-Nasir announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. The United States sharply condemned this decision of Egypt's. Immediately following al-Nasir's declaration, Dulles met in London with the British and French foreign

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ministers, and, following this, it was officially announced that the United States had "temporarily" frozen all the Suez Canal Company's bank deposits abroad. The United States simultaneously cut back on supplies of a number of most important commodities to Egypt which had been delivered in accordance with the aid program which was in effect and refused it sales of foodstuffs in the immediate future. The United States thus actively joined in the economic blockade of Egypt.

The U.S. secretary of state was the initiator of the advancement of a plan for the establishment of international control over the Suez Canal--a neocolonialist form of depriving Egypt of sovereignty over a seaway situated in its territory. This plan of an international consortium to administer the Suez Canal came to be called the "Dulles Plan." At a meeting with his British and French colleagues Dulles proposed the convening in London of a conference of Suez Canal user-countries intended to establish "international control" "on a legal basis." In a joint statement of the three powers the convening of a conference of user-countries was set for 16 August 1956.

The speeches of the U.S. secretary of state at the London Conference, which ended on 25 August since the Western states' neocolonialist position had brought it to the point of deadlock; the "Committee of Five" mission, inspired by the United States and headed by Australian Prime Minister Menzies, which was intended to impose the "Dulles Plan" on al-Nasir; a new separate London conference, which had adopted, in spite of the most widespread protests throughout the world, a decision on the setting up of the Suez Canal Users Association--all this was aimed at taking away from Egypt its sovereign rights to the canal. Western politicians did everything they could to doom to failure the Egyptian initiative concerning nationalization of the company. The West feared the success of this step not only because it had struck at their positions in Egypt itself but also because it had created an extraordinarily dangerous precedent for them: other countries might follow the Egyptian example. It might lead to the end of the era of the "inevitable failure" of such actions which had been proclaimed by imperialist politicians following the failure of the nationalization of oil in Iran by Mossadeq.

Behind all the measures designed at all costs and in any form to return the Suez Canal to Western control stood the United States--a country which, incidentally, was far less interested in navigation along the canal than many other states. At the same time the United States did not take part and did not support the armed triple aggression of Britain, France and Israel aimed at restoring by force the Suez Canal to foreign domination.

Completely different and sometimes diametrically opposed assessments are expressed concerning the American position in connection with the triple aggression against Egypt. The British press has written of a "sobbing Prime Minister Eden" during a telephone conversation with President Eisenhower, who "refused" to support the allies at the decisive moment. Eden's memoirs are bestrewn with reproaches leveled at the United States. A number of

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Western researchers even believes that the U.S. position at the time of the events was manifestly "pro-Arab": the United States failed to support its allies which had made the attack on Egypt and voted in the UN General Assembly for the resolution calling for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of Israeli troops. There is also an opposite viewpoint--it was a matter of a "division of roles": while Britain, France and Israel were the direct participants in the attack, the United States undertook to secure the "international rear" of the operation and for this purpose did not participate directly in the Suez adventure.

What, then, were the motives for the American position in respect of the triple aggression against Egypt? Where do we find the meaning of the American statements and actions?

The explanation of the American position by Prof John Badeau, former U.S. ambassador to Egypt, who headed Columbia University's Middle East Institute after his retirement from the diplomatic service, merits attention. J. Badeau emphasizes that the U.S. refusal to support the armed attack on Egypt was caused not by fundamental contradictions in the aims pursued by the United States on the one hand and the states which perpetrated the aggression on the other and not by the fact that the United States rejected in principle the methods of operation of its allies but by the fact that in the opinion of American politicians the moment had already been lost and that the new conditions did not allow them to act with military methods. "What was possible a week after the nationalization," Badeau wrote, "was not possible 3 months after." In reaching this conclusion the United States at the same time gave its approval for France to supply Israel with an additional three squadrons of Mystere aircraft.

There is reason to believe that even after the attack of Israel and then of Britain and France on Egypt the U.S. position was far from simple and straightforward. In his study, which was published by the Rand Corporation, W. Quandt terms it, for example, an "open" question whether Dulles aspired "to postpone adoption of the UN resolution calling for a cease-fire, at least until the British were through with al-Nasir." In any event the United States did much behind the scenes to defer the adoption of this resolution in the United Nations, and it was only on the fifth day of the aggression, 2 November, that it was passed by an emergency session of the UN General Assembly and, moreover, in the absence of Dulles, who reported sick. "Despite the serious split in policy with the allies, the fundamental American assessment of al-Nasir remained as before," the study "U.S. Interests in the Middle East," which was published under the editorship of Prof G. Lenczowski, says. "He (al-Nasir--Ye.P.) was an obstacle to the reinforcement of the United States' system of allies and too friendly toward the Soviet Union." Haykal is even more categorical on this score in his book "Cairo Documents": "It should not be thought that Dulles' far-reaching aims differed from Eden's aims. He also wished for al-Nasir's fall, but his brother (Allen Dulles--director of the CIA--Ye.P.) had assured him that this could be achieved cautiously, by means of a coup in the country itself and not by an attack from outside. This would not have caused resentment either among the Arabs or the Russians."

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When, on 3 November, Britain and, subsequently, France rejected the General Assembly resolution and 2 days later dropped assault-landing units in the Suez Canal Zone, the United States condemned these actions, but nothing more. The following complex of circumstances apparently predetermined the American position at the time of an immediately after the Suez crisis.

First, the United States was forced to reckon with the policy of the Soviet Union, which resolutely supported the victim of the aggression--Egypt. After the landing of the British and French troops in the region of Port Said, the Soviet Government demanded the immediate convening of a UN Security Council session to discuss the question "The Noncompliance by Britain, France and Israel of the General Assembly Decision of 2 November and Immediate Measures To Halt the Aggression of the Said States Against Egypt." In a draft resolution the Soviet Union proposed that a time of 12 hours be given for the withdrawal of all interventionist troops and, should Britain, France and Israel not cease the aggression, that Egypt be granted military assistance by the forces of the UN Security Council members.

The global correlation of forces which had already come about by the time of the triple aggression had led to the point where the export of counterrevolution had become very dangerous. The British and French leaders were ready to shift responsibility to the United States in this case, leaving to it, as leader of the capitalist world, the adoption of a decision on actions aimed at protecting its allies. Eden and Guy Mollet put their trust in the automatism of the American reaction when the United States' closest and most important partners happened to be threatened. In pursuing by their action against Egypt chiefly not all-imperialist (although there were these also) but their own specific aims and thinking of the strengthening of their own positions in Egypt after the liquidation of the al-Nasir regime (perhaps even hatching plans for a kind of revanche for the withdrawal under the conditions of the galvanization of American influence in Egypt following the ouster of King Faruq Britain and France were at the same time counting; on the fact that the United States would be absolutely automatically forced to protect them in the event of global complications.

The American leaders wished to reserve the right to a free choice of decision. The more so in that they were indignant that their allies, whose plans they had, naturally, suspected and known in general outline, had not deemed it necessary to notify Washington of the details that had been worked out and the date of and the procedure for the attack on al-Nasir's Egypt. The day before Israel's attack on Egypt, the British foreign secretary had assured the American ambassador in London that he still did not have any data on Israel's intention of striking at Egypt. At the same time, as became perfectly obvious, and from Eden's memoirs also, the coordination of Israel's actions with Britain and France had been elaborated and accomplished in advance in all details.

Second, Washington understood that the action of Britain and France against Egypt, which was undertaken without consideration of the time and circumstances, would lead to the ultimate weakening and, possibly, the liquidation

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of their positions in the Arab world. If the American politicians had thought that such a weakening or liquidation would have been identical to the loss of "overall" Western influence, they would undoubtedly have acted far more energetically in support of their partners. However, the viewpoint that the firmest guarantee of the interests of the entire imperialist West lay in the plane of the introduction and strengthening of purely American positions had gradually gained the upper hand in Washington by that time.

It was precisely at this time that the "vacuum theory" had become quite widespread in the United States, and, moreover, the United States understood the irreversibility of the process of the formation of this "vacuum" in Western influence through the collapse of the positions of the traditional colonial powers. Given their understanding of the inevitability of this process, the American politicians gambled on filling in the developing "vacuum." The actions of Britain and France, which were dangerous for the entire West and for its aggregate positions in the Arab world, were carried out in a form of which Washington did not approve at that time. The United States saw in this not only its partners' irritating blunder and the possible danger in this connection of the growth of revolutionary forces in the Arab world but also a good opportunity to strengthen its own positions and, through this--on a new, higher level--strengthen the influence of the whole imperialist West in the Arab countries.

The new understanding of the situation and the United States' role in the Arab countries, which were viewed as a part of the so-called third world, was reflected in, for example, the following conclusion, at which J. Badeau arrived in his analysis of American policy at the time of and after the Suez crisis: "The United States has completely irreversibly become the custodian of general Western positions. As a consequence of this, the American role has simultaneously become both independent and limited. It has become independent in that it has ceased to be chiefly a supplement to the traditional positions of the European powers, but is now based on an American determination of interests and political aims. No single Western power could successfully pursue a policy in the Arab world which would conflict with U.S. policy. European policy has become the supplement, while American policy has become the foundation."

Third, following the failure of Dulles' trick of withdrawal of the original consent to finance the Aswan construction and after American diplomacy at the time of and after the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company had impaired even further the positions which the United States had won in Egypt with great difficulty in the first 2 years following the overthrow of Faruq, the Suez crisis had created a favorable opportunity for Washington to attempt to restore its prestige in Cairo. "Many Arabs were grateful for American opposition to the Suez aggression. Under such conditions it could have been assumed that a new U.S. initiative materialized in strengthening of its positions in the Middle East would prevent subsequent Soviet penetration," W. Quandt wrote. Thus with the aid of its policy at the time of

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the Suez crisis the United States also gambled on counteracting the growth of the authority of the USSR and Soviet influence (all this was called "penetration").

Fourth, Washington expected that the United States would have sufficient possibilities of securing Israel's interests, including even those that were manifestly incompatible with the interests of the neighboring Arab states, by methods which would not create a risk either of a global clash or an undue weakening of imperialist positions in the Arab world. Having occupied a definite position at the time of the Suez crisis, the United States simultaneously promised Israel that the U.S. delegation in the United Nations would address all its efforts in its favor. "Confidence in this fact," Dulles wrote in a memorandum to A. Eban, Israeli ambassador in Washington, "is best capable of securing the future for Israel, and not occupation, with its challenge to the overwhelming part of the world public."

Having defined its position, the United States even applied certain pressure on Israel to compel it to lower the level of the crisis--implement the General Assembly resolution and withdraw its troops. But this pressure was strictly limited--it did not go beyond the economic framework. The United States froze a loan to Israel.

This in itself could not have played the determining role in compelling Israel to ultimately evacuate its occupation forces from Sinai. Even a day before the attack on Egypt, Ben-Gurion declared at a session of the Israeli Cabinet that the United States, which had opposed this military action, would not send its troops to force Israel to withdraw from Sinai. The upper limit of its pressure, according to Ben-Gurion, was the threat to break off diplomatic relations, a ban on private collections for Israel and the blocking of the American loan. Practice showed that the United States did not even go so far as to threaten Israel with a break in diplomatic relations.

At the same time a clearly outlined and very decisive Soviet policy had arisen on Israel's path. Israel was compelled to withdraw its troops from Sinai. The only thing the American politicians' managed to achieve was the introduction of UN troops on Egyptian territory and in the region of Sharm al-Shaykh, which controlled the entrance to the Strait of Tiran. UN troops were also stationed in the Gaza region.

3. From Utilization of Inter-Arab Conflicts to the Direct Gamble on Israel (1957-1970)

A fundamentally new situation had come about in the Arab world as a result of the Suez crisis. The forced withdrawal of the Israeli Army from Sinai served the development of the national liberation processes in many Arab countries. Tremendous revolutionizing influence was exerted by the fact that the Egyptian leadership had succeeded not only in nationalizing the Suez Canal Company--not only foreign property but a key facility which largely secured the system of foreign domination and control over Egypt--

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but also in defending its right to nationalization despite all the efforts of states incomparably more powerful than Egypt militarily and economically. A basic factor, which became an obstacle on the path of the export of counter-revolution--the alliance of the national liberation movement with world socialism--manifested itself clearly at the time of the Suez crisis.

A patriotic government came to power in Jordan in October 1956. It was extremely important that this was preceded by elections which even American authors consider "the most democratic in this country's history." At the time of the Suez crisis the new Jordanian Government broke off diplomatic relations with Britain and France. The situation in the Arab world had become so cardinaly different from everything which it had been in preceding years that even the states which were traditionally considered the West's "reliable partners" were forced to engage in actions of an objectively anti-imperialist nature. In the wake of Egypt and Syria, at the start of November 1956 Saudi Arabia also broke off diplomatic relations with Britain and France, while Iraq broke off relations with France. Al-Nasir's political popularity assumed tremendous proportions. The entire Arab world paid heed to his speeches, addresses and actions.

It had become perfectly clear that the prestige of the old colonial powers--Britain and France--in the Arab world and, even more important from the American politicians' viewpoint, their capacity for successful actions were close to zero. At the same time there was a rapid growth in the authority and influence of the Soviet Union in the Arab countries, which realized increasingly clearly the tremendous significance of friendship and cooperation with the USSR for insuring their capacity for independent development.

Nor were Washington's hopes that the public disagreement with Britain, France and Israel at the time of the Suez crisis would automatically lead to a sharp increase in U.S. possibilities in the Arab world justified. This disagreement was not enough, especially since the American leadership and, to an even greater extent, the American press continued to emphasize the limited nature of the disagreements among the allies, reducing them to purely tactical factors.

The Eisenhower doctrine was born under these conditions. On 5 January 1957 the U.S. President submitted for congressional approval a document which said that "the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any nation or group of nations requesting assistance against armed aggression perpetrated by any country controlled by international communism...." The Congress approved this document and proposed that the President act on the basis of its principles.

The Eisenhower doctrine signified fundamental changes in the United States' Near East policy both in form and in content. For the first time the United States had appeared before the Arab world with an independent document defining the main direction of its policy. Prior to this, the United States

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had been able to participate and did participate in the formulation of joint documents with its allies. Such, for example, was the 1950 "Tripartite Declaration" of the United States, Britain and France, according to which these powers undertook to guarantee the 1949 Israeli borders and "control" the armament of the Near East countries.

Attempting to prove the need for the pursuit of the foreign policy course reflected in the Eisenhower doctrine, American politicians resorted, as already mentioned, to the "vacuum theory." The first premise of this theory was the inevitability of the formation of a "void" as a result of the weakening or collapse of the positions of this imperialist power or the other in the East, while the second premise was the need for this "void" to be filled in with the influence of another imperialist power. This "need" was deduced from the struggle of the two systems in the world arena.

The authors of the "vacuum theory" offered the following outline: a struggle is underway between the so-called free world and the socialist countries. Therefore everything which is outside the framework of this struggle, including the national liberation movement of the peoples of the East, has no right to independent existence. Proceeding from this outline, the authors of the "vacuum theory" asserted: either the influence of the "free world" (the imperialist West) or the influence of "international communism." In other words, if the influence of a "free world" country comes to an end, it is essential to activate the influence of another country, namely, the United States. This thought, for example, was emphasized by Dulles in his speech at the opening of the UN General Assembly 12th Session, in which he actually denied the possibility of the existence of Arab nationalism as an independent movement.

The "vacuum theory" served, first, as substantiation of the United States' expansionist plans and, second, as a justification for its policy aimed at the liquidation of the independent countries of the East championing the principle of positive neutrality.

Although the U.S. President's message to the Congress contained no direct references to the "vacuum theory," the American press nevertheless assiduously propagandized the Eisenhower doctrine, proceeding precisely from this theory. One of the doctrine's principal authors--John Foster Dulles--also provided the appropriate clarifications. On 15 January 1957, to a question from Senator Mansfield as to whether the Eisenhower doctrine could be considered the culminating point of American foreign policy after which there would remain no single "vacuum" with the exception, perhaps, of the "vacuums" in India and Burma, Dulles replied: "Possibly, yes!"

However, literally 2 months after the adoption of the doctrine, American politicians were forced to hush up the "vacuum theory." Moreover, phrases to the effect that the United States was not attempting to fill any "vacuum" became routine in joint communiques signed by J. Richards, special representative of the U.S. President, and the governments of certain Near East

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countries. This American political figure, whose mission was to persuade the Near East states to adopt the Eisenhower doctrine, publicly rejected the "vacuum theory" even in his interviews. Frank discussion of the "vacuum theory" also became extremely unpopular in the American press.

In proclaiming the doctrine American politicians had failed to take into consideration the strength and scale of negative reaction in the Arab countries. The "vacuum theory," which was an insult to the Arab people's national dignity, elicited the strongest opposition. Statesmen and public figures of the majority of Arab states spoke out against it. "We do not agree with the West's idea of the existence of a 'vacuum' in the Near and Middle East," Egyptian President Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir declared. "This idea presupposes that such a 'vacuum' should be filled by the Western countries. But we will fill it ourselves. Or, rather, we have filled it ourselves."

A characteristic peculiarity of the Eisenhower doctrine was its distinction from the military commitments which the United States had assumed or proposed that its European allies assume in connection with the various plans of the creation of military blocs in the Near East. It was then a question of "defending" the region against the threat allegedly emanating from the Soviet Union. Now, according to the Eisenhower doctrine, the United States had announced its guarantees of the security of "all nations" of this region against attack by countries under "the control of international communism." It was perfectly clear that there had been a tilt toward the direct use of inter-Arab conflicts as grounds for American armed intervention. In this plane the Eisenhower doctrine was the first time that the United States had formulated a means of the exploitation in American interests not only of the Arab-Israeli but also of all other local conflicts in the Near East. This also became apparent from the explanations made by American official bodies, particularly in the countries which by that time had already been incorporated in military blocs.

On 23 January 1957, for example, the Information Bureau of the American Embassy in Tehran published in the local press replies to questions concerning the Eisenhower doctrine. To a question as to why the U.S. Administration did not act directly the bureau declared that direct actions "would possibly not be successful": "the measures of the British and the French directed against Egypt did not lead to the fall of al-Nasir's government."

The new American tactics of struggle against sovereign states in the Arab East amounted to the following: an independent Arab country is accused of becoming a "Soviet satellite"; a version is spread to the effect that this country is threatening its neighbors. The next step was to be geared to the organization of a request to the United States for armed protection of the neighbors of this "aggressive" state, "which has come under the influence of international communism."

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A distinctive feature of the American line reflected in the Eisenhower doctrine was also the stress put on the utilization against revolutionary trends in the Arab world not only and, possibly, at this stage not so much of Israel as of the Arab and other Moslem regimes dependent on the United States. Israel, which had compromised itself with its unsuccessful attack on Egypt and having been compelled to release occupied Egyptian land, had to withdraw for a time, albeit a brief one, from the role of main force in the struggle against the al-Nasir regime and the anti-imperialist elements in other Arab countries which were gravitating toward it. A new anti-Arab activation of Israel immediately after the failure of the Suez adventure--and American politicians could not have failed to have been aware of this--was fraught with the danger of a strengthening and consolidation of all the anti-imperialist forces in the Arab world as a whole.

It may be considered that in 1957 Syria became the first "proving ground" in which the United States put its new Near East tactics to the test. Two days after the Eisenhower doctrine was made public, a UPI correspondent transmitted from Washington: "Syria is a fine example explaining why President Eisenhower has put forward his new doctrine," and the observer H. Baldwin, who was well known at that time, termed Syria a political, economic, military and psychological "'vacuum' which should be filled" in an article published in the NEW YORK TIMES magazine a month after the adoption of the doctrine.

Now, when many years have elapsed since that time, it is still interesting to elicit which of the processes in Syria's internal life were evaluated by American politicians as a threat to U.S. interests.

At the time of the Suez aggression the Syrians blew up the oil pipeline from Kirkuk to the Mediterranean, along which flowed oil produced in Iraq by the American-Anglo-French Iraq Petroleum Company. But this occurred at a time of an exacerbation of the Arab-Israeli conflict, when this had reached the crisis stage. The United States attempted to change the regime in Syria some time after this. It was thus not a question of "forced actions" dictated by "a need to maintain the system of the supply of oil to the allies in West Europe": the oil pipeline from Kirkuk had been restored by this time, and only a comparatively small proportion of the oil exported from the Near East countries flowed along it; there were no actions against the pipeline belonging to the American Tapline Company, along which oil from Saudi Arabia was carried to the Mediterranean. The blowing up of the pipeline strained American policy toward Syria, in our opinion, but was not the main reason for its extreme aggravation.

The United States could not have been pleased by the decisiveness with which the Syrian authorities reacted to the conspiratorial activity of the American Embassy in Damascus. On 22 August 1957 the chief of the Syrian Army General Staff called a press conference at which he accused U.S. Embassy officials H. Stone, [A. Klouz] and F. Jetton of having connections with circles of the ousted dictator al-Shishakli and of conspiring for the purpose of changing the nature of the Syrian regime by force. But all this was a reaction to American policy and not the reason for it.

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Washington had publicly declared that "communist elements" had gained the upper hand in the Syrian regime and, in order to appear more convincing (this is still done at the present time in many American studies of that period), claimed that the "communist" who occupied the post of chief of the Syrian Army General Staff had actually brought it under "communist control." The Syrian regime in 1956-1957 was and remained bourgeois. A. Bizri, chief of the General Staff of the Syrian Army, was never a member of the Communist Party. Moreover, in a number of its actions both the government and the army command occupied a position opposed to the Syrian Communist Party, which, given its possibilities, was unable to influence the country's policy to any definite extent. Certain of those in the Syrian Government at that time like Foreign Minister S. al-Bitar, for example, then held openly anti-communist positions.

Finally, the American press wrote that Washington feared Syria's rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Such a rapprochement as the objective result of Syria's anti-imperialist struggle undoubtedly occurred. But it did not go beyond the traditional framework of relations which the Soviet Union had with many other nonsocialist countries. In any event, nothing gave grounds for the provocative report which appeared in the NEW YORK TIMES on 10 December 1956: "The United States is worried by the movement of communist troops through the straits and their landing in Syrian ports."

The real reason which forced the American politicians to sharpen their Near East policy against Syria at the very end of 1957 was the considerable apprehensions which had been aroused in Washington by the processes which had begun in inter-Arab relations. Egypt, which had emerged in practice from the Suez trials as the victor and which, as a result of this, had won enormous authority in the Arab people's masses, even in itself represented a great anti-imperialist force in the Near East. The circles formulating U.S. policy saw an even greater danger in the revolutionary dynamism of al-Nasir and, naturally, in the fact that Egypt was becoming a center of attraction for other Arab states. Arab unity in that period acquired a clearly expressed anti-imperialist nature. Egypt's closest partner in spirit, in the domestic policy it was pursuing and in its attitude toward outside forces was Syria. A bridge was built between Cairo and Damascus. This bridge, in the event of its builders relying more on objective processes and taking better account of local specifics in these two Arab countries, could also have been extended to certain other Arab capitals. This threatened to change the appearance of the entire Arab world. The United States resolved to undermine the Damascus foundation of the bridge of Arab unity that was being erected immediately after events had shown the stability of President al-Nasir's regime.

It is significant that at the culminating point of the tension in American-Syrian relations the United States slackened its pressure on Egypt. Everything was being done to slow down the trend toward unity between them on the basis of common struggle against the West's imperialist policy. The United States resumed the payment of a loan to Egypt on the basis of American

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technical assistance which had been broken off in November 1956 and released some of the Egyptian bank deposits which had been frozen at the time of Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. The president of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development traveled to Cairo, where talks were resumed on the granting of a loan to Egypt for construction of the Aswan Dam. However, as might have been expected, this trend of American policy in relation to Egypt proved temporary: it had purely tactical functions and, moreover, failed to elicit "steps to meet the United States half-way" on the part of al-Nasir.

Thus Syria became the first victim of the new American policy proclaimed in the Eisenhower doctrine. The actions against Syria were carried out in accordance with the "scenario" contained in the doctrine itself.

In the wake of a loud propaganda campaign, whose purpose was to convince public opinion that an independent Syria was a threat to its neighbors, a special emissary--U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Loy Henderson--left for the Near East. Judging by American press reports, he was entrusted with preparing the ground for application of the Eisenhower doctrine against independent Syria. L. Henderson visited Syria's neighboring countries and had talks with the leaders of Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey and representatives of Iraq. The gamble was that the neighboring countries would officially attest to the danger threatening them on the part of Syria, which had allegedly become a "Soviet satellite." This would serve as grounds for extensive U.S. intervention on the basis of the doctrine.

It is perfectly clear that the United States wished to obtain a request for assistance primarily from the Arab countries bordering Syria. Appeals for protection emanating precisely from the Arab countries would have been more convincing. At the same time the organization of such a declaration would be a serious blow to the trend of rapprochement among the Arab states, which would afford the United States an opportunity to directly weaken the anti-imperialist forces throughout the Arab world, which had been utilizing the objective process leading to Arab unity in the interests of the struggle for liberation from foreign control.

The American politicians' assessments were manifestly unjustified. King Sa'ud and Iraqi Premier al-Ayyubi visited Damascus, where the officially dispelled the rumors concerning the danger allegedly emanating from Syria which had been exaggerated by the United States. Moreover, King Sa'ud and the Iraqi premier declared that they were ready to assist "fraternal Syria" in the event of aggression against it. Official figures in Lebanon and Jordan associated themselves with these declarations. Thus those who, according to the plans of the American politicians, were to have helped in carrying out the anti-Syrian plans came out against the United States at the most decisive moment. This position of the state leaders of all these countries was predetermined by the profound process of state leaders of all these countries was predetermined by the profound process of the consolidation

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of the Arab peoples which had developed particularly following the successes of the anti-imperialist forces in Egypt and which had not been properly taken into consideration by the authors of the doctrine.

It was precisely as the result of the development of this process that the United States failed to achieve even formal approval of the Eisenhower doctrine by any significant number of Arab states. Only three Arab countries--Iraq, Lebanon and Libya--with a total population at that time of 7.3 million, which was less than 10 percent of the population of the entire Arab world, officially adopted the Eisenhower doctrine. It is significant that the American politicians failed to impose the doctrine even on those Arab countries which were usually called the United States' friends. It is perfectly obvious, for example, that the transmitters of the doctrine were counting on success in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, J. Richards, the U.S. President's special representative, who was sent to the Arab states with the assignment of signing joint statements on consent to the doctrine, regarded (as, moreover, did the overwhelming part of the Western press) the Saudi-American communique signed in Riyadh as a document which legalized this country's adoption of the Eisenhower doctrine. This viewpoint was officially repudiated by a 5 October 1957 statement of the Saudi Arabian Government categorically denying the fact of adoption of the Eisenhower doctrine.

In addition, the events surrounding Syria showed that even the Arab countries which had officially agreed with the American doctrine could not, under the conditions of the growth of Arab national self-awareness, be the local foundation whose presence was essential for a struggle against independent Arab states in accordance with the Eisenhower doctrine. In Iraq, in Lebanon, in Libya the positions of the supporters of the doctrine were highly unstable. It was opposed by a strong opposition, which was winning increasing support among the population. The Beirut correspondent of THE TIMES wrote that doubts were increasing in Lebanon with respect to the advisability of government support for the Eisenhower doctrine. "The reference to international communism and the absence of any guarantees against Israel in the joint statement" (the American-Lebanese communique signed at the time of Richards' visit--Ye. P.), THE TIME emphasized, "have provided the opposition with an opportunity to persuade many people that the government has involved them in an undesirable foreign pact."

"The Eisenhower doctrine is approaching its sunset," was the conclusion drawn by the British DAILY TELEGRAPH AND MORNING POST. "King Sa'ud, who gave it a cordial reception when it was explained to him by the President in Washington, is now making it understood that he will never associate himself with it. Lebanon, which did this openly, now wishes to alter the wording, removing the reference to communism.... Iraq, although it has remained solid with the West against communism, is attempting to reassure...Syria." It is interesting to note that this statement came from a paper which had written back on 26 July 1957 that "the main success of the Eisenhower doctrine lies in Egypt's isolation."

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At the time of the Syrian events the United States also attempted to use non-Arab countries in its own interests--Turkish aggressive circles were assigned a big role here. However, yet another serious obstacle, which had been underestimated by the creators of the doctrine, had arisen on the path of implementation of the plans connected with Turkey.

In proclaiming the Eisenhower doctrine U.S. leading figures knew from the experience of the Suez crisis that the Soviet Union and other socialist countries would not remain on the sidelines in the event of the colonial powers' direct aggression against independent Arab countries. However, the authors of the doctrine evidently imagined that they would succeed in neutralizing the actions of the Soviet Union under the new conditions, when the gamble in the struggle against the independent Arab countries had been made chiefly on a strike on the part of their neighbors, which were also Near East countries. These calculations were not justified. The Soviet warning to Turkey's aggressive circles left no doubt that they would not succeed in imparting a local nature to an anti-Syrian action, while the commitment of American troops to Syria would threaten an escalation of the conflict.

The failure of the employment of the new American tactics in relation to Syria in 1957 predetermined the shifting of certain accents in the policy of implementation of the Eisenhower doctrine. This became particularly clear in connection with the U.S. reaction of the creation in February 1958 of the United Arab Republic [UAR], which incorporated Egypt and Syria. The United States made its aim that of surrounding this new state, which had sharply increased the centripetal tendencies in the Arab world, with a kind of "cordon sanitaire."

Attempts to change the nature of power in both regions of the new state and liquidate the anti-imperialist direction in its foreign policy were, of course, maintained here. But in connection with the Syrian failure the United States still concentrated chiefly on strengthening those Arab regimes which at that time were actual or potential allies for the West. Here the United States considered the forces advocating various forms of alliance with the UAR the most dangerous opponent of these regimes.

Back in April 1957 the patriotic government headed by al-Nabulsi had been removed from power in Jordan with all-around U.S. support, including a show of strength by the 6th Fleet, the direct participation of Mallory, the U.S. ambassador in Amman, and Military Attache Sweeney in the plot and the granting of big funds in the form of "aid."

Even the reactionary regime in Iraq became an object of American concern. The dynastic disagreements between Iraq and Saudi Arabia were largely relaxed with the participation of American diplomacy. A big role in the rapprochement of the two monarchies was played by the U.S. State Department's organization of simultaneous visit to the United States by King Sa'ud and the "strongman" in Iraq--'Abd al-Ilah--the king's uncle. At the start of December 1957 Iraq's King Faysal visited Saudi Arabia accompanied by 'Abd al-Ilah.

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The United States' official joining of the Baghdad Pact's Military Committee served the purpose of strengthening the royal regime in Iraq. As has already been said, the United States had declined to associate itself with this bloc, which had actually emerged on its initiative. Washington had turned down numerous requests from both Baghdad and London for direct U.S. participation: the Americans had no chance of "combining" Israel with Arab countries in one military bloc, but U.S. entry into a unified military alliance with one of the parties to the conflict would, as American politicians emphasized, have tied their hands and diminished their opportunities for maneuver. However, at the new stage, when the accent was being put on utilizing inter-Arab contradictions in the interests of American policy, the United States, despite Israel's negative position and, in consideration of this position, still declining to formally join the pact, nevertheless officially joined the bloc's military organization--the Baghdad Pact Military Committee.

In mid-1958 the United States closed the circle of utilization of the mechanism of the Eisenhower doctrine for the first time--U.S. marines were landed in Lebanon, where at that time a civil war was underway between nationalist forces and elements which gravitated toward an alliance with the West.

The situation in Lebanon became extremely exacerbated following the murder on 7 May 1958 of the prominent Lebanese journalist-patriot Nasib al-Metni, who had edited the newspaper TELEGRAPH, which had carried strongly-worded exposures of American policy in the Near East. The Nationalist forces, which were attempting to bar the path to pro-imperialist reaction, which aspired, operating with any means, to impose Sham'un's presidency on the country for a second term, called for a general strike on 10 May. The strike grew into a broad insurrection against the National Liberal Party, the Phalangists and the Dashnaks, which had formed a group around Sham'un-Malik. A substantial part of Lebanon was under the control of the rebels. The army observed neutrality to all intents and purposes. The situation had developed to the point where the Sham'un-Malik grouping, which had close ties to the West, was on the verge of bankruptcy.

But the landing of American troops in Lebanon was not only connected with internal Lebanese events. It occurred simultaneously with a British airborne assault landing in another Arab country--Jordan. The intervention was connected with the victory of the anti-imperialist revolution in Iraq, which had put an end to the pro-West monarchical regime in this country. The fall of the "Near East Bastille" was a most powerful blow to the imperialist positions in the region. The prospect of the solidarity and rapprochement of Iraq, Egypt and Syria could be clearly discerned; this did not come about not because of the absence of an objective basis for rapprochement (this basis was formed following the victory of the July revolution in Iraq) but because of the subjective sentiments and mistakes of both Qasim, who led Iraq, and the leadership of the UAR. But the disagreements, which were adroitly exaggerated by Western politicians and local reaction and which grew into outright hostility between Iraq and Egypt, were manifested later. As far as the fact of the accomplishment of the revolution in Iraq was concerned, the United

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States felt considerable apprehension about the possibility of the unification of the anti-imperialist forces in the region. The more so in that such a unification could now include Iraq, which possessed vast oil resources and sufficient financial means, which had been obtained in the form of concessionary withholdings for oil extraction. In addition, the nationalist forces in Lebanon, which leaned toward the UAR, had manifestly gained the upper hand. Under the conditions that had been created the United States applied the provisions of the Eisenhower doctrine and landed marines from the ships of the 6th Fleet in Beirut. The assault landing force of 17,000 was a very considerable military force by Lebanese standards and was 2.5 times as big as the Lebanese Army.

As also in respect of Syria in 1957, the first stage of American actions in Lebanon was a propaganda campaign designed to show that Lebanon was threatened by danger from outside on the part of a state "which had been exposed to the influence of international communism." The UAR was named as this state. This concept of a threat to Lebanon from outside had nothing in common with reality. Now, in retrospect, this fact is acknowledged by very many authors who are coming out with studies in the sphere of American policy of that period. "The conflict (in Lebanon--Ye. P.) basically concerned personal relations and rivalry of an internal nature unrelated to international issues," Robert Murphy, one of the most active U.S. State Department figures connected with the formulation of Near East policy in that period, wrote subsequently. "Communism did not play a direct or appreciable role in the insurrection...."

A work on American policy in the Near East which appeared in the United States in 1968 also stresses the internal nature of the Lebanese events: "There was one basic cause of the crisis, and that was the differences in the cultural and political orientation of different sections of Lebanese society." The above work, like, incidentally, the majority of such studies, concludes that the United States, unaware of the real situation, still "proceeded from the assessment that Lebanon was threatened by international communism."

Yet American politicians were excellently informed about the nature of the internal Lebanese events and about the fact that no external threat to Lebanon existed in practice. The UN observation mission, which was stationed on the Syrian-Lebanese border, and UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold confirmed that the charge that the UAR was interfering in Lebanon's internal affairs did not correspond to reality. There was also something else which the persons who formulated U.S. policy understood perfectly well: the insurrectionists in Lebanon had nothing in common with the international communist movement either in the nature of the leadership of the movement or in its links. The insurrectionists were headed by the big businessmen and landowners Sa'ib Salam, 'Abdallah al-Yafi, Ahmad As'ad, Rashid Karami and others, who belonged to the nationalist camp, against which the United States launched active operations, taking cover behind slogans of protection against a communist attack.

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The American operations in Lebanon in July 1958 bore a number of particular features which showed the evolution of American policy not only following the perpetration of the Suez tripartite aggression but also following the unsuccessful attempt to deal with the patriotic regime in Syria.

After the Suez events, Washington again returned to joint actions with its allies, "sharing responsibility" with Britain and coming to an understanding with it concerning simultaneous and coordinated operations in the landing of troops in Lebanon and Jordan. Of course, the priority of the United States and its role as first fiddle in these joint operations were indisputable.

The action which was carried out contained one important feature which also distinguished it from the planned actions against Syria in 1957. The 1957 anti-Syria operation envisaged the possibility of interventionist actions against an Arab country in which a patriotic national regime had already been established. Events showed that this could actually have led to a rising of the level of the crisis and to its globalization. In respect of Lebanon in July 1958 U.S. actions were undertaken in accordance with a different plan: a request was organized for the withdrawal of troops on the part of the local government formally in power. Thus intervention was undertaken in a country (the British, who carried out an airborne assault landing in Jordan, acted the same) which already had a pro-West regime for the purpose of strengthening this regime and protecting it against internal nationalist forces. According to R. Murphy, President Eisenhower, who had entrusted him--his former colleague of the time of World War II in North Africa--with a special diplomatic mission in Lebanon, "wished to demonstrate in good time and in practical fashion that the United States was capable of supporting its friends."

The assault landings in Lebanon and Jordan inflamed the atmosphere exceedingly throughout the world, causing profound anger and calling forth a protest from the progressive public of many countries. This was one of the main reasons why, 3 months after the invasion, on 25 October 1958, the United States completed the withdrawal of its troops from Lebanese territory, leaving, moreover, a far from ideal situation for itself in Lebanon. Shihab became president of this country. He entrusted R. Karami, one of the leaders of the insurrectionists, with forming a cabinet. True, pro-West leaders also jointed this cabinet, but the new government was able to implement a number of measures in Lebanon's national interests. Prime Minister R. Karami and Foreign Minister H. al-'Uwayni, another leader of the anti-imperialist opposition, declared that the Eisenhower doctrine no longer existed for Lebanon.

The actions of the United States and Britain were unsuccessful. "By the end of the year " (1958--Ye.P.), M. Howard and R. Hunter write in the book "Israel and the Arab World. The 1967 Crisis," "it had become perfectly clear both in Washington and in London that the security of those Arab governments which relied on Western bayonets could not longer be insured."

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Finally, the intervention in Lebanon and Jordan only changed for the worse the situation for the West throughout the Arab and in the so-called third world.

After the perfectly obvious failure of the tactics connected with the utilization of inter-Arab conflicts for the strengthening of its positions and the creation of obstacles on the path of the development of revolutionary processes in the Arab countries, Washington again gradually returned to the idea of reliance on Israel as the principal force capable, in its opinion, of crushing "Nasirism" and holding back anti-imperialist movements throughout the Arab world.

But the return to this policy was not smooth and unilinear. Following the withdrawal of American forces from Lebanon and the British forces from Jordan in the fall of 1958, there was a brief period when a resumption of the "flirtation" with Egypt and, through the latter, with the entire Arab world seemed possible to the United States. The disagreements between Egypt and the Soviet Union which had manifested themselves predisposed it to this idea. Syrian Communist Party activity had been banned following the creation of the UAR. There were arrests of communists in both areas of the UAR. The growth of contradictions between Cairo and Baghdad also led to the spread of anticommunist sentiments in the UAR. Anticommunist articles in the press, in which, as always in such cases in Egypt, there immediately and readily resounded the voices of certain journalists known not only for their reactionary views but, at times, also for their links with Western intelligence, began to develop into an anticommunist campaign. However, al-Nasir understood the strategic significance for the Arab national liberation movement of friendship and cooperation with the socialist countries. This was the main reason why the period of strain in relations between the UAR and the USSR was overcome and replaced by a period of relations characterized right up until al-Nasir's last days by mutual understanding, confidentiality and friendship.

Naturally, the period of the cooling in Egypt's relations with the socialist countries was recorded by the American leadership. Under such conditions--in the future this was to be repeated frequently both in relation to Egypt and other Arab countries--the United States attempted to isolate Cairo to the greatest extent from the Soviet Union and the other socialist states. The United States delivered wheat to Egypt in accordance with Federal Law 480. The American Embassy in Cairo was highly active. J. Kennedy, who had taken office as U.S. President in January 1961, frequently sent al-Nasir lengthy messages which were friendly in form and which commented on various U.S. foreign policy actions and expressed the United States' wish to "turn the page" in relations with Egypt.

But all this referred to tactics, while American policy's strategic line remained unchanged. The following were the main parameters by which the United States' Near East policy was measured at this stage: 1) the start of the policy of the intensive armament of Israel--first, by West Germany, and, under President Johnson, by the United States directly; 2) active opposition to

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to the Egyptian mission in Yemen; and 3) coordination of policy with Saudi Arabia for splitting the UAR and supporting the anti-Nasir forces in Syria. All these measures may be viewed on two levels: utilization of inter-Arab conflicts in U.S. interests and attempts to "regulate" in its interests the development of the Arab-Israeli conflict. And there is reason to believe, moreover, that the utilization of inter-Arab contradictions, along with having a certain independent significance for U.S. policy, came to play an increasingly big role in the implementation of this "regulation."

"Regulation," "control" or "management" of international conflict situations in the latter half of the 1960's and the 1970's was not only an important part of American "crisis-reaction" policy but was also correspondingly reflected in the theory of conflicts which was developing extremely rapidly in the United States at that time. Together with the problem of their solution, Western concepts and theories of international conflicts examine an "intermediate" stage--the "controlling" or "management" of conflict situations. Two special purposes of U.S. policy are amalgamated at this stage: preventing the escalation of the conflict to the point of a threatening global clash and aspiring to insure a development of the conflict situation which is advantageous to itself. In other words, this "control" is designed to secure the realization of imperialist goals with the utilization of international conflicts, but in a time of the sharply changed correlation of forces in favor of world socialism.

In its attempts to purposefully influence the development of a conflict situation between different countries the United States envisaged the employment of a whole number of measures:

implementation of its policy directly through the leaders of a puppet regime or allied country participating in the conflict;

the threat of its own intervention;

its own intervention;

utilization of the fact of the dependence of the countries party to the conflict on arms supplies from American sources; and

utilization of the United States' economic relations with the parties to the conflict in order to influence their adoption of certain decisions.

All the enumerated measures constituting the arsenal of means of American interference are not, naturally, of equal significance. The possibilities of their employment are limited by the specific conditions of the development of the international conflict or situation in the countries directly participating in it. At the same time it should be emphasized that in both theory and the practical activity of the United States the means of "managing" conflict situations include intervention on the part of the United States

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itself. The report "Controlling Conflicts in the 1970's," which was submitted by a study group of the American UN Assistance Association composed of 26 prominent American figures (these included Yale University President K. Brewster, L. Bloomfield, professor of political sciences at MIT, C. Yost, former U.S. representative in the United Nations, General Ridgway and others), examines the war of American imperialism in Vietnam and U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic as a means of control of the development of the corresponding crises. These aggressive interventionist actions are shown as measures aimed at the "preservation of peace." "It is not at all surprising, considering the weakness of the United Nations, that in many situations a decision has been adopted in the form of unilateral operations," the report says. If anything did actually trouble its compilers, it was the fact that the United States undertook such "operations" in isolation, without the appropriate camouflage of "multilateral actions" allegedly aimed at maintaining peace.

Together with attempts to utilize the UN mechanism to "manage" conflict situations, American theoreticians and politicians devoted and are now devoting increasingly great attention to the idea of the creation of "special international bodies" for such "control." The U.S. aspiration to circumvent the UN Security Council, which the UN Charter invests with special functions and powers, is connected with the idea of the creation of an "international mechanism" for "controlling" crisis situations. More than anything, the principle of the unanimity of the great powers in the Security Council in the adoption of decisions is not to the liking of American politicians. This position conceals the American politicians' aspiration to clear their path of a serious obstacle which is to a certain extent preventing them from playing their game in conflict situations.

The theory and practice of "controlling" conflicts is completely unacceptable as it is conceived by American politicians, despite the interest of all states of the world in preventing crisis situations growing into a world thermonuclear war. The point being that the United States ties into one the two ideas which it invests in the process of "controlling" conflicts--prevention of its escalation into a global clash and defense of its imperialist interests.

There is also another point: the United States and other imperialist states understand by conflicts the revelation of contradictions which are completely different in nature and assign revolutionary transformations within the "third world" states to this category. Naturally, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries cannot participate with the United States in "controlling" such "situations."

However, let us return to American policy in relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict and to the means and methods which the United States has employed or attempted to employ to "regulate" it. The account to follow will show that in this case American policy has employed the sheaf of means envisaged by the theory of "controlling" conflict situations, from the trade weapon

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through the threat of its own armed intervention. As has been said, the methods of the utilization of inter-Arab contradictions also had their place among these means. The American position with respect to the Egyptian expedition in Yemen is an example of this.

On 9 September 1962 four shots killed Ahmed, the king (imam) of Yemen, and Ahmed's son, Prince Muhammad al-Badr, who had ascended to the throne, was overthrown on 26 September. Col Abdallah al-Sallal, chief of al-Badr's guard, who led the coup, proclaimed a republic and became its first president. Yemen was a typical island of the Middle Ages in the modern world. Perhaps nothing enables us to judge the appearance of this country under King Ahmed in such concentrated form as the appointments of his palace in San'a' or, more correctly, the contents of his private room, where the king had lived shortly before his death. In 1965 your author was among the few who were shown Ahmed's room in the state in which it was left by its owner.

Photographs had been pasted on the walls of the room, including such as those where the imam was observing with interest how at the gates of San'a' the latest convict was being beheaded--not simply, as the Yemenis accompanying us explained, but by a certain number of blows of the sword, the number of which was determined by the royal court. Alongside on a hook dangled "kala-bushi"--irons in which Ahmed ordered to be clapped there and then, during his report, a minister who had committed an offense. Incidentally, al-Sallal, Yemen's first president, spent 5 years in a dungeon in chains on the orders of the imam. A regular starting pistol lay on Ahmed's writing table. The imam liked to perform miracles: he would shoot himself in the chest with this pistol so that the guard might believe that no "bullet" would take him. Here on the wall hung a portrait of the first cosmonaut--Yuriy Gagarin--which had been neatly cut out of a magazine. The imam sincerely admired the exploit of the conquest of space. In a corner stood a movie camera. This room was Yemen's sole movie theater. The imam delighted in watching films (the first time he met al-Nasir, Ahmed squeezed the president's hand until it hurt--this was how he shook hands with tribal leaders to show them his strength--and inquired whether Omar Sharif had married some actress or other), while throughout the country the showing of any films was banned on pain of imprisonment.

But even such a preserve of the Middle Ages as Yemen was exposed to the spirit of the times. This country's isolation from the outside world which had been built up over the centuries was gradually broken down. Foreign specialists arrived in Yemen, and Soviet workers and engineers built the port in al-Hudaydah. Several dozen Yemeni students received instruction in Cairo and in Europe. The refreshing gusts of revolutionary winds which had begun to blow in the Arab world had begun to reach Arabia.

After the coup in Yemen, Imam al-Badr was arrested by al-Sallal, but when the guard absented himself to eat supper, he, changing into a woman's clothes, escaped from custody without anyone noticing. His uncle, Prince Hassan, who was Yemen's chief representative in the United Nations, immediately

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flew to Saudi Arabia and enlisted King Sa'ud's help. The tribes which he succeeded in rousing to the struggle against the republic were armed and financed by Saudi Arabia. Al-Badr emerged from the underground. Armed struggle was launched against the republic. Under these conditions representatives of President al-Sallal arrived in Egypt, and al-Nasir decided to send in support of the Yemen Republic initially a battalion and, later, several additional military subunits. Thus began the Egyptian expedition in Yemen. The stony Yemeni desert sucked in more and more Egyptian soldiers. Al-Nasir once joked bitterly: "I sent a battalion to lift the siege of San'a' and then I sent a division to reinforce the battalion."

The United States immediately joined fully in the Yemen events on the side of King Sa'ud. When, instead of ferrying weapons and money to royalist tribes in Yemen, several Saudi pilots flew to Cairo and requested political asylum, crates bearing the emblem of the American "aid" program--two hands clasped in a handshake--were unloaded from their aircraft. These crates contained weapons and ammunition. Sa'ud banned flights by his pilots to Yemen and asked Jordanian aviation to make the flights to supply the rebel Yemeni tribes. The following day three Jordanian Air Force planes flew to Cairo, and again they proved to have the same freight in the same packaging--crates on which were depicted two hands clasped in a handshake.

President al-Nasir delivered a firm protest to the American ambassador in Cairo, saying that the American practice was not bringing Arabia assistance and friendship but death. The purpose of the Saudi and American actions in Yemen was perfectly clear. Both the Saudi rulers and the American oil companies feared that republican Yemen would be too "agitational" a neighbor for Saudi Arabia and feared the influence of the Yemen events on the structure of Saudi society, which had remained untouched for centuries. Saudi Arabia and the United States wished to nip the Yemen experiment in the bud. They were particularly worried by the fact that the Egyptian troops which, at the request of the government of the Yemen Arab Republic, had assisted it in the struggle against the rebellious royalist tribes inspired and supported by Saudi Arabia had drawn close to the Saudi Arabian border.

There is reason to believe that the United States was pursuing one further aim in Yemen in addition to the aspiration to nip the Yemen revolution in the bud. It wished to drag Egypt as deeply as possible into the Yemen events, believing, not without reason, that Egypt's activeness in its resistance to Israeli expansionist policy would thus be neutralized. Yemen sucked in thousands of Egyptian soldiers and millions of Egyptian pounds. Yemen took away forces and resources of which Egypt was acutely in need both to strengthen its defense capability and for economic development. Naturally, "dragging al-Nasir into Yemen" was only one side of the coin for the United States; the other consisted of an aspiration to limit the Egyptian possibilities in Yemen and prevent the development of a real force capable in time of exerting a revolutionizing influence on other parts of the Arabian peninsula. The United States needed an Egypt which was up to its neck in the Yemen business, but which was, however, incapable of getting a grip on the situation there,

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winning a decisive victory over the royalist tribes and really strengthening the republican system in what was only yesterday a country entirely out of the Middle Ages.

Al-Nasir had adopted a clear position in relation to the events in Yemen. This position was known to the Americans from the correspondence which al-Nasir conducted with U.S. President Kennedy. Al-Nasir emphasized in his letters that he was ready to give the order for the immediate withdrawal of Egyptian soldiers from Yemen if the Saudis ceased to assist the royalists. This intention was perfectly sincere since Egypt was really concerned to wind up its mission in Yemen on conditions of a halt to outside support for the opponents of the republican regime.

Meanwhile the United States on the one hand insisted on the withdrawal of Egyptian troops and even proposed certain compromises (as mentioned, for example, in a letter from Kennedy to al-Nasir, where the U.S. President displayed a readiness to link the withdrawal of Egyptian troops with the cessation of Saudi Arabian interference in Yemen's affairs), but, on the other, Washington stepped up assistance to the Yemeni royalists through the same Saudi Arabia. This assistance was not confined to the dispatch of American weapons. A special committee was set up in the United States under the leadership of Robert Komer, a former intelligence officer, which organized the dispatch of mercenaries to Yemen. This committee's activity soon came to be known in Yemen as "Komer's war."

A few years later--this was at the start of 1967--at the time of a skirmish in San'a' it was discovered that republican soldiers were being fired on from the headquarters of the American "four-point aid" program. On the orders of the Yemeni Government the house was taken, and the four men in it were arrested. Safes were opened, and a large number of papers was found in them testifying that the headquarters of the American aid program was a screen covering CIA activity. At the demand of the Americans the papers were returned, but their secrets became known to Egypt. All this was in 1967, but a few years before this--in 1963--President al-Nasir realized, according to Haykal, that the United States was playing a double game in Yemen and "that a part of the American plan was to drag him deeper and deeper into the Yemen campaign and tie down the Egyptian Army in the lifeless desert. Egypt's participation in this campaign suited the Israelis very well for a large and ever increasing number of Egyptian soldiers was fighting the Saudis and not them."

The United States had also played a largely similar role in relation to the Syrian-Egyptian disagreements which led to the breakup of the UAR in 1961. Of course, the defeat of the first "unifying" experiment--the creation of the UAR consisting of Egypt and Syria--was a result of objective causes and many subjective mistakes, chiefly on the part of the Egyptian leadership. However, the interference of Saudi Arabia and direct CIA activity were important factors. Reports had spread throughout the Arab world to the effect that King Sa'ud had allocated 7 million pounds sterling for a coup d'etat

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In the Syrian area of the UAR. According to Haykal, this figure proved to have been understated. When Sa'ud, who had already abdicated in favor of his brother Faysal, arrived in Cairo, al-Nasir reproached him, saying: "How could you have paid these people 7 million pounds"? Sa'ud replied: "I am ashamed to confess to you that 12 million were paid, not 7 million."

The trial of separatists from the first Syrian Government after the split of the UAR showed that the U.S. CIA had operated hand in hand with King Sa'ud. Pursuing a policy of splitting the UAR, the United States thereby wished to weaken al-Nasir and reduce his influence in the Arab world. Simultaneously everything was being done to prevent the creation of a strong state capable of offering serious resistance to Israeli expansion in the Near East.

The biggest watershed signifying the demarcation line between Egypt and the United States was the question of the U.S. attitude toward arms supplied to Israel.

As has already been said, at the start of the 1960's the United States gambled on strengthening Israel in the Near East conflict. In 1961, during an official visit to Washington, Adenauer, under pressure from President Kennedy, agreed to grant Israel credit for arms purchases. This moment marked the United States' intention to give this state arms, however, under the conditions of the continuing American flirtation with Egypt and the hopes that there still entertained that it would be successful the United States aspired to operate through the hands of others. A deal involving the supply of weapons to Israel was possible with the formal nonparticipation of the United States therein. Israel obtained credit from West Germany with which it could make purchases in any country. The arms acquired with this credit from Britain, France, the United States and Italy were two submarines, six motor torpedo boats, 200 tanks, 200 armored personnel carriers, jet fighters, transport aircraft and helicopters. For its part, the FRG concluded a contract for the purchase from the Israelis of submachineguns and uniforms for the German Army. The details of this deal, which was not only approved but also carried through under U.S. pressure, were described to President al-Nasir by an emissary of Erhard who had traveled to Cairo specially at the end of 1964.

At the start of the 1960's the United States had begun to hold talks with Israel on independent arms supplies also. Naturally, these talks were held in an atmosphere of total secrecy, but on 27 September the American authorities officially announced that an agreement had been concluded for supplies of Skyhawk fighters to Israel. It is significant that on the eve of this announcement the U.S. ambassador in Cairo called on al-Nasir and conveyed to him a verbal message from Kennedy which notified him of the agreement. Al-Nasir believed that American diplomacy needed this maneuver in order to tie his hands and not to afford him an opportunity of actively opposing the deal. His fears were confirmed when articles appeared in the U.S. papers to the effect that President al-Nasir had been "consulted" in advance concerning supplies of American fighters to Israel. By that time the United

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States' positions on arms supplies to the countries involved in the Near East conflict had become completely clear. Formally the United States was supplying weapons both to Israel and, in small quantities, to certain Arab countries--Jordan, Saudi Arabia. But the lion's share of the supplies was going to Israel.

It was officially declared that the United States was attempting through its supplies to maintain a "balance" in the Near East and bring matters to the point where no one side in the conflict could achieve military superiority. In actual fact it was a question of the creation of the military superiority of Israel--a state pursuing an expansionist policy. By "balance" the United States understood the possibility of Israel withstanding militarily the efforts of all the Arab states. In reality this created the considerable advantage of Israel militarily over one, two or three Arab countries which could realistically have formed a coalition against it. At the same time, considering Israel's scientific-technical superiority over the Arab countries which had evolved, the American-style "equalization" of its armament with the armament of the Arab countries naturally resulted in Israel having the military advantage over the Arab world.

Simultaneously with supplies of weapons to Israel, the United States did everything to prevent supplies of weapons to Egypt and the other Arab countries involved in the confrontation with Israel from the socialist countries. Every conceivable effort was made to frustrate Egypt's own defensive measures. When Egypt (this was a year after the creation in Israel of its own "Gabriel" missile on the basis of a French missile) successfully tested a locally developed missile, in September 1962 the American ambassador conveyed to President al-Nasir a further verbal message from Kennedy which expressed strongly-worded displeasure in this connection and demanded that the American be given the right to inspect the Egyptian nuclear reactor which had been built with the help of the Soviet Union. The United States had never issued a similar demand in respect of Israel, although Israel, as is known, had at that time made progress in the field of research geared to the creation of nuclear weapons.

The United States simultaneously proposed the establishment of agreed limits for offensive armed forces both for Egypt and Israel, but under the inspection of the United States. Naturally, such an inspection could have been utilized in favor of Israel. Through its ambassador in Egypt the United States repeatedly made representations apropos Soviet arms supplies to the UAR.

The American position combined the widely publicized declaration of the United States' aspiration to curb the arms race in the Near East with an active policy aimed at Israel's armament under the conditions of its leadership's pursuit of an expansionist policy. Typical of this position was a demarche of Johnson, who had become U.S. President following Kennedy's death. On 18 March 1965 the American ambassador requested a meeting with al-Nasir and handed him two documents. The first was a personal message from President

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Johnson marked "secret." It said that the United States would avoid arms sales to the principal parties to the Arab-Israel conflict and would under no circumstances sell weapons which would give one side a military advantage over the other. "This is the policy we have followed and will continue to follow," the letter declared. Simultaneously, however, al-Nasir was handed a note which bluntly said that the United States was selling Skyhawk aircraft to Israel to "lessen Israel's fears regarding UAR bombers." The note also proclaimed the United States' readiness to also sell Israel other types of weapons allegedly essential for its defense. It was downright blackmail of Egypt: it was essentially stated that the United States would sharply increase military assistance to Israel if the Arabs instituted a campaign against the present supplies of American arms to this country. Al-Nasir termed this note an "ultimatum."

It was clear that Washington had come fully into the open as the principal supplier of arms to Israel. Having lost their monopoly in the sphere of arms supplies to the countries involved in the Near East conflict, the Western states, primarily the United States, were making efforts to acquire the right to control arms supplies. And, moreover, they wished to use this right to create an actual preponderance of armaments on Israel's side.

The United States was in parallel doing everything to neutralize the reciprocating anti-American reaction on the part of the Arab world, chiefly Egypt. Together with various diplomatic actions, other means were also employed for this--such as pressure on the al-Nasir government on the question of American wheat supplies. As has already been said, after the withdrawal of its troops from Lebanon, on the basis of Law 480 the Americans resumed food aid to Egypt. However, the implementation of this aid was constantly maintained in an uncertain state in order to obtain the maximum concessions from Egypt in various spheres. Threats were made periodically to cut off this aid, and it was ultimately limited to 1-month supplies and then canceled altogether.

American policy on the threshold of and during the 1967 Near East crisis was subordinated to the ideas of "controlling" and "managing" the Near East conflict in the interests of Israel. The U.S. position in this period may with complete justification be termed anti-Arab.

In March and April 1967 relations between Israel and Syria deteriorated sharply. Israeli troop movements, border skirmishes and air battles had their effect. Not shy in their expressions, Israel's leaders threatened to take Damascus. Official statements and inspired articles in the United States contained unconcealed support for Israel. Moreover, in a burst of candor during a conversation with a correspondent of the American magazine U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT Prime Minister of Israel L. Eshkol said that his government was proceeding from the guarantees promised by Washington in the form of ships of the U.S. 6th Fleet. "We have obtained these promises," Eshkol said. "When we appealed to the United States, they answered us: 'We are here. The 6th Fleet is here'."

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The situation got hotter, and under these conditions Egypt moved its troops up to the Sinai peninsula. On 16 May Gen Mahmud Fawzi, chief of staff of the Egyptian Army, wrote the following to the Indian general, Rikhye, commander of the UN forces: "I have given the order to the UAR armed forces to be ready to take action should Israel initiate aggression against any Arab state. For the purpose of carrying out these instructions part of our troops on the eastern front in Sinai have been fully mobilized. To insure the safety of the UN forces concentrated at the checkpoints I request that you withdraw these forces from these checkpoints. I have given instructions to the commander of the eastern front in this regard. I hope to receive reciprocal information."

This letter from Fawzi contained a request for the withdrawal of UN forces from the checkpoints where Egypt opposed Israel--on the border between Gaza and Eilat--in order to avoid clashes between the UN forces and the Egyptian Army. M. Fawzi had not requested the withdrawal of forces stationed at other points, for example, at Sharm al-Shaykh. Moreover, Charles Yost, former U.S. UN representative, even wrote that the text of the appeal of the Egyptian Command to U Thant had not been approved in advance by Cairo. Al-Nasir, according to Yost, did not wish the UN Emergency Force to be withdrawn from Sharm ash-Shaykh.

The Egyptian Army heading for Sinai passed in front of the windows of the U.S. Embassy in Cairo. This was not done secretly but deliberately openly and noisily. Al-Nasir wished by this military-political demarche to change the situation in his favor, having prevented an attack on Syria and again emphasized his leadership role in the Arab world. There is a complete lack of proof that, having begun mobilization of its forces and dispatched them to Sinai, Egypt was pursuing actual offensive aims against Israel. However, there was an escalation of the conflict, and the single-minded policy of Israel, which was supported by the United States and which had been, in the main, coordinated with U.S. policy, also led to this.

It is possible that the United States was not in this period directly concerned to see the conflict pass to the stage of armed confrontation. However, on the scale of its policy priorities an even higher place was occupied by the goal of preventing a strengthening of Egypt's positions as leader of the Arab world.

Events developed thus. Fawzi received a reply to his letter from U Thant. The UN Secretary General's letter proposed either the withdrawal of all UN forces, including those at Sharm al-Shaykh, or no withdrawals at all. This reply, which had perfectly obviously been coordinated with the United States, drove Egypt into a corner. It either had to go back on its word and appear before the Arab world as the side which had suffered a crushing defeat or it had to agree to an exacerbation of the situation, demanding the withdrawal of the UN forces from Sharm al-Shaykh also, which in practice posed the question of the possibility of a direct armed confrontation with Israel. The point was that Egypt, having demanded the withdrawal of UN forces from

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Sharm al-Shaykh, that is, having said "A," could not help but say "B," that is, not commit its own troops to this point in their place. It was not a question of Egypt's legal right to this action--Sharm al-Shaykh was Egyptian territory. As is known, UN troops were stationed here after the 1956 tripartite aggression, and Egypt had been forced to agree to the unilateral stationing of these troops on its territory, in this way paying for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Sinai. But this is one side of the coin. The other is that the very commitment of Egyptian troops to Sharm al-Shaykh was undertaken under indirect pressure from U Thant and also, possibly, the United States, which was attempting to force al-Nasir to capitulate by political means or to do this by military methods with the help of Israel.

President al-Nasir agreed to the withdrawal of all UN troops, and Egyptian troops entered Sharm al-Shaykh. Cairo declared that it would close the Strait of Tiran to Israeli navigation and ships carrying strategic cargo for Israel. However, there is reason to believe that after this Egypt wished to stop the conflict on the basis of compromise. There were real possibilities for this. U Thant flew to Cairo with a plan which, it was said, had U.S. support. This plan consisted of three parts: the first was a request to Israel not to send any ships through the Gulf of Aqaba to "test" Egypt's decision to close it; the second was a request to other states using the Strait of Tiran to refrain from transporting strategic material for Israel on their ships; and the third was a request to the UAR to refrain from inspecting ships crossing the Strait of Tiran.

U Thant's plan, which provided an opportunity for the preparation of a settlement on a compromise basis (al-Nasir particularly wanted such a settlement after his actions had elevated him to an unprecedented height in the Arab world), was accepted by Cairo. Egypt was doing everything at this time to prevent war. President al-Nasir delivered speeches on 27 and 29 May in which he repeated: "We do not intend to shoot first, we are not about to launch an attack." It is known that 24 hours before the Israeli attack, the Egyptian High Command convened a meeting attended by the country's political and military leaders. Certain generals believed that under conditions where Israel was clearly prepared in the next few hours to launch an attack on Egypt it was necessary to have recourse to a preventive strike. Al-Nasir was absolutely firm in his reply: "I will not be the first to start the war because under those conditions I would leave myself exposed before my allies and before other countries of the world."

However, all this failed to halt the development of events, which inexorably led to an armed confrontation. At the rudder of this development stood Israel, and behind it--the United States.

Naturally, for the Israeli leadership, which by this time had been supplemented with manifest "hawks" (General Dayan had become defense minister, and M. Begin, leader of the Herut, had joined the government), the position of the United States was an extremely important factor when it came to making a decision. The Israeli foreign minister and chief of Israeli intelligence flew to

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Washington. Foreign Minister Abba Eban was immediately received by President Johnson. What U.S. position did he encounter? Let us turn to Lyndon Johnson's memoirs for this.

1. The U.S. Administration assured the Israeli Government of its full support for the idea of the lifting of the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba, including the use of force against al-Nasir. "You can assure the Israeli Cabinet," U.S. President L. Johnson said to Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban on 26 May 1967 in the White House, "that we will energetically proceed along the path of implementing /any/ and /all/ [words in slantlines in bold face] possible measures to keep the strait open." Choosing his words carefully, Eban inquired at the end of the meeting: "I would not be mistaken if I were to tell my prime minister that your position is that of making every possible effort for the purpose of guaranteeing that the strait and the gulf remain open for free and safe passage"? "I assured him," L. Johnson writes, "that he would not be mistaken" (our emphases in all cases--Ye. P.).

2. While not ruling out the use of extreme measures against Egypt, the United States initially aspired to insure the study of all political-diplomatic and military-political means of putting pressure on al-Nasir in order to force him to retreat "with a loss of face." Nothing was actually done (with the exception of U Thant's plan, which was mentioned earlier and which hung in the air as only Egypt had agreed to it) to find for al-Nasir a "prestigious" way out of the situation. Under these conditions the United States did not stop short at a military demonstration--2 days prior to the Israelis' attack, a U.S. aircraft carrier with uncovered combat aircraft on board which were ready for action sailed through the Suez Canal.

At the same time the United States--this can also be clearly seen from Johnson's memoirs--was attempting to create a coalition for the use of military force against Egypt. It did not wish to act in isolation. Immediately after the evacuation of the UN Emergency Force from Sinai, on the U.S. President's instructions Secretary of State D. Rusk got in touch with France and Great Britain and proposed the preparation of joint actions on the basis of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950. U.S. Ambassador C. Bohlen sent a cable from Paris saying that the French authorities did not consider it opportune to resurrect the Tripartite Declaration and that they were "altogether changing their position." C. Bohlen came to the conclusions that the French authorities "attach corresponding importance to the Soviet approach and have decided to play a waiting, cautious game." As far as Britain was concerned, G. Thompson, its minister of state for foreign affairs, conveyed to D. Rusk during a meeting in Washington a communication on its readiness to create a special naval detachment "under a flag of many nations" to break through Egypt's blockade of the Strait of Tiran by force. According to President Johnson, the United States "made a thorough and complete study of the British proposal together with leading congressmen and interested governments." Israel was notified of this U.S. position.

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However, matters were not confined to theoretical developments. The navy's special forces had embarked on the preparation of four special-purpose detachments. The first detachment included two of the biggest aircraft carriers--the "America" and the "Saratoga"--and the cruiser "Little Rock." The second detachment was made up of landing craft. The third consisted of subunits of marines ready to make an assault landing at any time. The fourth consisted of auxiliary ships, including oil tenders which carried hundreds of thousands of tons of fuel in their tanks. Admiral Martin, the same who had led the assault landing of U.S. marines in Lebanon in 1958, received a secret order according to which he was instructed to put on full alert in the Eastern Mediterranean 50 warships, 200 jet bombers and fighters and 25,000 soldiers and seamen of the Marine Corps.

The United States aspired to avoid a situation wherein it would have to openly employ its armed forces in conjunction with Israel: recollections of the colossal "losses" which a similar situation had created for Britain and France in the Arab world in 1956 were still fresh in the American politicians' memory. At the same time the United States did not oppose independent Israeli armed operations. It merely asked the Israelis to "wait a little" in order to give other anti-Egypt measures a chance to work in the beginning.

What is more--and it is very important to emphasize this--the United States had formulated its position under conditions where it additionally knew that Egypt was not about to be the first to begin armed operations against Israel. U.S. intelligence reports repudiated Egypt's intention to attack Israel. During the 26 May 1967 meeting in the White House with A. Eban U.S. Defense Secretary McNamara divulged the findings independently arrived at by each of the three U.S. intelligence services. These findings may be summarized in the following assessment: Egypt does not intend to be the first to begin military operations, which did not prevent the American leadership from again manipulating the traditional indictment of al-Nasir for aspiring to "throw the Israelis into the sea."*

U.S. Defense Secretary McNamara also familiarized A. Eban with another conclusion of the American special services: "All the officers of our intelligence organs are unanimous that if Egypt does launch an attack, the Israelis will crush it." This information, which contained for this period an assessment of the correlation of the information, which contained for this period an assessment of the correlation of the forces of the two sides involved in the Near East conflict, was conveyed to the Israeli leadership by the United States at a time when the former was formulating a decision on which the fate

*Following a talk with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 23 May 1967, Secretary of State D. Rusk reported to the President that "there is general agreement in Congress that the Arabs cannot be allowed to throw the Israelis into the sea." It can be imagined how this talk went!

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of war and peace in the region directly depended. The American information undoubtedly could have prompted and obviously did prompt the decision on Israel's so-called preventive strike against the neighboring Arab countries. In any event, having settled on this decision, the Israeli leaders realized that it was not a question of protecting the Israelis against "impending extermination," as they frequently attempted to portray it subsequently.

The thesis of U.S. "neutrality" in 1967, which is also propagandized by the U.S. State Department, does not bear comparison with the facts of real life. At the time of the military operations the American representative in the UN Security Council stood in the way of the adoption of a resolution condemning Israel's aggression and conducted matters such as to delay a ceasefire, aspiring to give the Israeli military the opportunity, after the defeat of the Egyptian Army in Sinai, of solving the "task" on the eastern front, in other words, occupying the Golan Heights--part of Syrian territory. The aims of American policy were just the same: the use of Israel to oust or, in any event, sharply weaken the Arab anti-imperialist regimes and strengthen the position of the United States in the global confrontation with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.

"The Americans realized that the results of the war were a victory not only for Israel but also for they themselves. The new situation which had taken shape in the Near East by mid-June was ideal for them," David Kimche and Dan Bawly wrote in the book "Samum." They adduce the following argument in confirmation of this conclusion: when the United States' "failures" in Vietnam had been revealed, "the Americans needed a counterbalance, and they found this in the Near East." According to these two well-informed Israeli authors, the United States supported all Israel's demands, proceeding from the fact that, otherwise, "the other side would win, not only Egypt but also the Soviet Union." Thus David Kimche and Dan Bawly conclude, "an almost complete identity of interests had been created between the United States and Israel, and this fact swept away all disagreements and created an opportunity for Israel to firmly insist on its demands." The Israeli authors mean by these "demands" basically the refusal to release the occupied Arab territories.

To maintain this occupation and engage in its attempts to bottle up the "no war, no peace" situation until the time when the Arab countries agreed to submit to Tel Aviv's diktat after 1967 the Israeli leadership needed constant inflows of American weapons and constant U.S. political and diplomatic support. And the Israeli leadership obtained both in full. Even in 1968 President Johnson had made the decision to supply Israel with 50 Phantom supersonic fighter-bombers. Supplies of American weapons to Israel, including aircraft, missiles and various electronic equipment, increased from year to year. Israel was frequently sent models of armaments which the U.S. Army had only just begun to receive.

As far as U.S. political-diplomatic support for Israel was concerned, its main direction in that period was actual assistance to the Israeli leadership in frustrating the attempts to prepare the ground for implementation

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of UN Security Council Resolution 242, which was adopted on 22 November 1967 and which provided for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all occupied territories (the problem of rectification--minor changes in the borders of 4 June 1967--was left to be decided by the parties to the conflict in their mutual interests and with consideration of the obligatory consent of each side), cessation of the state of war in the Near East, generally recognized borders of all the states in this region, guarantees of these borders, freedom of passage along the region's seaways and solution of the Palestinian refugee problem.

The compromise Resolution 242 was at this stage the sole possible basis of a political settlement. All its provisions were accepted in full in Cairo and Amman. In an interview on American television on 14 June 1970 Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir expressed a readiness to recognize as the definitive borders of Israel those which had existed up to the 1967 war. He responded positively to the question as to whether Egypt was ready to promise would not be used for an attack on Israel after the Israelis had quit the occupied lands.

Simultaneously the mechanism of preparation of the ground for the implementation of Resolution 242 had been formulated in detail. At the request of the UN secretary general the Swedish diplomat Gunnar Jarring began his mission for this purpose.

Tel Aviv did not conceal its negative attitude toward either Gunnar Jarring or his mission. At the same time the Israeli leadership was making particularly intensive use of the formula of "direct negotiations at which Israel's position would be set out" and, moreover, even hinted at the possibility of "steps toward the Arabs." However, the true value of these promises, hints and half-hints was not very high--simultaneously with these the Israeli leadership had outlined distinctly and publicly the parameters of a settlement to which it "could agree": continued occupation of the Golan Heights, the Gaza region, a number of areas of Sinai and the West Bank and the annexation of Jerusalem. Under these conditions G. Jarring prevented Tel Aviv's maneuver aimed at completely burying for a given period of time the idea of a political settlement and putting responsibility here on the Arab side, which, you see, is opposed to "promising direct negotiations."

Israel did not accept UN Security Council Resolution 242. It is significant that, presenting a "peace plan" at the UN General Assembly 22d Session, Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban mentioned not one word about this resolution, which was the sole acceptable and sufficiently balanced basis in this period for a political settlement. It is not fortuitous that under these conditions Tel Aviv did not agree at all with the mission of G. Jarring, who, receiving the corresponding powers from the UN secretary general, ultimately began consultations in the capitals of the states party to the Near East conflict to prepare the practical implementation of Resolution 242. Even agreeing to meetings with the UN secretary general's representative through forced assent, since any other decision would have confronted Israel most seriously with world public opinion, this state's leaders emphasized

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that they did not interpret Jarring's mission as one of mediation but viewed it merely as a channel along which Israel could remain informed about the position of the Arab countries. Tel Aviv completely rejected any counter-traffic--information for Egypt, Syria and Jordan via Jarring concerning specific details of the Israeli position. It did not need a neutral, mediating mission. And here also Israel essentially obtained the tacit approval of the United States.

As a result of this position of Israel, which it would not have been able to maintain without U.S. support, the Jarring mission came to a standstill.

This was particularly dangerous under conditions where the curve of tension in the Near East had again taken an upward turn. At the start of 1970 Israel increased military pressure on the neighboring Arab countries for the purpose of achieving their capitulation and consent to terms dictated by Tel Aviv. The Israeli Air Force flew missions in depth over Egyptian territory. The bombers' targets were not only and not so much military as civilian. These raid were aimed at creating the right "psychological" atmosphere in which, in the opinion of Israeli politicians, it would have been possible to activate Egyptian antigovernment forces.

But this gamble failed. As the West German journal EUROPA ARCHIV (No 19, 1970) wrote, the attempt of the American-Israeli side "to bomb out" the al-Nasir government, which was to have brought a pro-American government to power, failed. By mid-April 1970 the Soviet Union had assisted in the considerable strengthening of Egypt's air defense forces, and the Israeli Air Force could no longer make raids in depth with impunity. Egyptian air defense's missile installations demonstrated considerably increased efficiency. The loss of several Phantoms had a sharply negative psychological impact in the Israeli Army. The illusion of the preservation of "open skies" over Egypt for a long time to come was shattered. Under these conditions Tel Aviv preferred to abandon the raids in depth.

Since the end of April the Israeli politicians had been laying the main stress on the confrontation in the Suez Canal Zone. Every day the reports carried information on artillery duels, the landing of patrols and air battles. It soon became clear that a force was fighting the Israeli troops in the Suez Canal Zone which was quite different from the army of the time of the "6-day war." On 24 March 1970 Drew Middleton, correspondent of the NEW YORK TIMES, who had visited Israel and who had talked with military representatives there, wrote: "Artillery is the most effective arm of the Egyptian forces in the Suez front. The Israelis are speaking about the accuracy of the artillery fire."

The changing correlation of military forces between Israel and Egypt, in which, although no cardinal shifts had yet occurred, a corresponding trend had been discerned, the actions of the Palestinian guerrillas--all this began to have its effect on the mood in various Israeli circles. Simultaneously changes in public opinion in the West in favor of the Arab countries

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became more noticeable. During the "6-day war" and in the months immediately following it public opinion in the West was, in the main, with the help of the pro-Zionist press, oriented toward support for Israel. However, after Israel's declared territorial claims, the situation gradually began to change. The constructive policy of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and certain other Arab countries aimed at the search for a compromise peace settlement contributed to these changes.

In this situation the United States could not appear to be completely linked with Israel's position. Some kind of initiative--albeit of an outward nature--was needed on the part of the United States itself. What was needed was some kind of step or action, as long as there was some apparent active-ness in the political plane ultimately intended to secure American interests when the inflexible Israeli policy had ended up in deadlock. In addition, even in the United States the dissatisfaction of certain circles, chiefly connected with the oil business in the Arab countries, with the country's one-sided orientation in the Arab-Israeli conflict had begun to show. Commenting on this mood, the magazine BUSINESS WEEK wrote: "Not only the investments of the oil companies but also the strategic interests of the United States and its allies are at risk in the Near East and the Arab countries of North Africa. The discontinuance of oil supplies from these areas for a lengthy period would sharply reduce industrial production in Japan and West Europe. Japan obtains 90 percent of its consumed oil from the Near East, Britain 70 percent, France 80 percent, West Germany approximately 90 percent and Italy almost 95 percent." Speaking of the galvanization of the supporters of a "more flexible" U.S. policy in the Near East, the NEW YORK TIMES was even more to the point: "The Nixon Administration has begun to fear that the United States will forfeit its influence on the Arabs entirely and ultimately find itself in complete isolation in its support of Israel."

It was precisely under these conditions that the United States undertook a diplomatic demarche. On 25 June 1970 Secretary of State W. Rogers announced a so-called U.S. Near East peace initiative. He declined to reveal the details of the "plan," but it became clear from further press reports that this "plan" amounted to a proposal for the resumption of the G. Jarring mission. The second feature of the United States' so-called peace initiative was an appeal to the parties to agree to a temporary cease-fire on the forces' boundaries.

The American proposal, which came to be called the "Rogers Plan," is viewed by a number of researchers as the United States' transition to a "more even-handed policy" in relation to the Near East conflict. Such evaluations appear groundless. Subsequently the United States did indeed make a number of gestures toward Egypt, attempting to win positions in this country to the detriment of Soviet-Egyptian relations, but this occurred after the death of President al-Nasir. As far as the "Rogers Plan" was concerned, it was, to all appearances, subordinated to a single aim--putting American

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policy in the Near East on an active footing under conditions where Israeli policy was deadlocked. There was essentially nothing new in this plan. It is known that the USSR repeatedly submitted proposals aimed at the practical implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution of 22 November 1967, insisting on resumption of the Jarring mission. At the same time a declaration on the possibility of a temporary cease-fire for the resumption of the Jarring mission was made before Rogers' speech by none other than President al-Nasir. Nevertheless, the plan was served up as a "new initiative" of the United States, and the corresponding proposals were directed both at Israel and also Egypt and other Arab countries.

Egypt agreed to the resumption of the Jarring mission and to a cease-fire. Israel far from immediately made an analogous decision. A struggle had developed in the country between different political groupings, as a result of which the Gahal bloc of extreme-right parties, which opposed resumption of the Jarring mission and the very talks on the question of the return of occupied Arab territories, withdrew its representatives from the government. Under the influence of the concrete situation which had taken shape in the Near East and also under pressure from world public opinion Israel was ultimately forced to agree to a resumption of talks via G. Jarring.

There was a cessation of fire in the Suez Canal Zone on 7 August 1970.* However, the Israeli representatives made no haste to make contact with Jarring. It soon became clear that the declaration of readiness to participate in these contacts had not been forced but was regarded by the Israeli leadership as a tactical maneuver. Accusing Egypt of having brought missile installations into the Suez Canal Zone during the truce, at the start of September Israel officially turned down contacts with Jarring.

This position of Israel's was not condemned by the United States. On the contrary, official American statements and, to a even greater extent, inspired articles in the American press emphasized "understanding" of Israel's "motives." This "understanding" was expressed in spite of the fact that the U.S. Administration could not in fact confirm Israel's accusation.

The incessant supplies of American arms may with every justification be assessed as encouragement of Israel in its "firm" policy, in other words, one hostile to a political settlement. In September 1970 Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir went to the United States for talks with the U.S. Administration on increased military assistance to Israel. The American press observed that on this occasion also the U.S. leadership agreed to the maximum satisfaction of Israel's requirements.

If the United States, forced to reckon with clearly changing public opinion, sometimes permitted itself statements about "neutrality" and "objectiveness," in the main question--arms supplies to Israel--it pursued an invariable policy.

*Cairo time--from 0100 hours on 8 August.

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Statements about U.S. "neutrality" could not have exerted any serious restraining influence on the Israeli leadership while supplies of modern American weapons to Israel, which were not being interrupted or cut back under any conditions, had given the Israeli extremists a completely free hand.

However, taking heed of the situation which had evolved, these extremist elements sometimes played up to the United States, attempting to "lighten the load" of those who under all circumstances had remained loyal to the policy of support for the Israeli military. Thus, addressing students of Israel's higher educational institutions on 6 January 1971, Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan revealed certain reasons why Israel, while in practice unwilling, had, all the same, agreed in the summer of 1970 to a resumption of the Jarring mission. He stated the following: "It was better to resume negotiations than to refuse. It is easier for the Americans to supply us with weapons now that we have returned to the talks than if we had refused." The motives by which the United States itself was guided in insisting on Israel's consent to the resumption of the Jarring mission, which was envisaged in the so-called Rogers Plan, possibly also show through in this statement by M. Dayan.

Mention should also be made of the fact that, having formally consented to negotiations via Jarring, Israel took advantage of certain extremist actions by individual detachments of the Palestinian movement which had diverted public attention from Israel's provocative political maneuvering. At the start of September the Palestinian group Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine hijacked several civilian aircraft belonging to various world airline companies. One plane was blown up in Cairo, the others were put down on a desert airfield in Jordan. One of the leaders of Fatah declared in an interview with the Cairo newspaper AL-JUMHURIYAH that "the theft of civil aircraft of three Western airline companies had seriously harmed the Arab cause: this incident had diverted world attention from Israel's refusal to continue contacts with G. Jarring, representative of the UN secretary general, for a peaceful settlement of the Near East crisis and from a resumption of supplies of American weapons and aircraft to Israel."

It was at this very time in Jordan that the dangerous events began to develop which led to the fratricidal clash between the Jordanian Army and the Palestinian organizations. The position occupied by the United States in connection with these events was also of fundamental significance for an appreciation of the United States' entire Near East policy in this period.

Let us begin with the fact that imperialist agents, who had been able to take advantage of both the reactionary, pro-West sentiments of certain elements of the Jordanian Army Command and also the extremism and irresponsibility of individual guerrilla groups, had participated directly in provoking the clashes in Jordan. The Western press described in detail the shelling of the Palestinian camps on the outskirts of Amman, the Jordanian Army's storming of the PLO headquarters situated on one of the hills of the Jordanian

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capital, the firing from the windows of houses and battles, during which thousands of people were killed and wounded. The imperialist West was perfectly content: two forces which had previously proclaimed as their aim struggle against Israeli aggression had clashed between themselves.

However, it was more than a matter of mere satisfaction. The United States made skillful use of the events in Jordan to demonstrate its solidarity with Israel and even readiness--"if necessary"--to fan the Near East conflict. It is perfectly obvious that in this context the United States deliberately exaggerated the danger "threatening" the Jordanian regime "from outside." All this was done to put pressure on the Palestine resistance movement, Syria and Egypt to force them into an awareness of the U.S. resolve to act "most effectively" in the event of the conflict developing into the crisis stage, even the direct participation therein of American armed forces.

American politicians displayed exceptional zeal at that time to maintain the status quo in the Near East, that is, the "no war, no peace" situation, which was advantageous to Israel. The outward motives of the American "reaction" were presented as an aspiration to prevent the Near East "sliding" into a new war and even...stand in the way of Israel's intervention in Jordan, which would have been inevitable and allegedly justified in the event of the success of the Palestine resistance movement in this country. In actual fact it was a question of something else--the creation of the best conditions for Israel's struggle against the Arab resistance forces, which were preventing it from consolidating the results of its expansionist policy. We are persuaded of this also by the fact that at the time of the Jordanian Army's clashes with detachments of the Palestine resistance movement the United States was acting in coordination with Israel, and in questions of the formulation of a unified military policy, moreover. In the situation which had been created "Nixon ordered Kissinger to be the key American figure for coordinating American-Israeli actions with Rabin,"* the Kalb brothers write in their book "Kissinger," which caused a sensation in the United States thanks to the most interesting facts which it cited. "The eyes of the public were, as before, trained on Rogers and Sisco, but the task of coming to an agreement on an unprecedented and secret American-Israeli understanding of joint military operations in the Jordanian crisis was entrusted quietly, without the vivid glare of publicity and without full notification of the State Department, to Kissinger and Rabin." The same two journalists, who had worked with Kissinger for many years and were familiar with the machinations of the U.S. Administration, subsequently describe this "unprecedented" coordination: "Kissinger immediately called Rabin, and they got to work (Rabin subsequently proudly joked that he now knows more secret entrances to and exits from the private residence of executive power than the secret services). With Dayan's authorization Rabin familiarized Kissinger in full with the Israeli military plans and twice a day gave him a summary prepared by Israeli intelligence." In accordance with these plans, according to the Kalb brothers, an Israeli strike was planned against Syrian tanks on Jordanian territory in the Irbid region. Rabin informed Kissinger of Israel's

*Rabin was at that time Israeli ambassador in the United States.

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intention of "sending" its armed forces to Jordanian territory. Israeli ground and air force operations directly against Syria also were coordinated, "but not in detail."

For its part, the United States put its naval forces in the Mediterranean on alert.

The situation in Jordan soon eased. This was not, naturally, a result of the "crisis reaction" measures taken jointly by the United States and Israel but thanks to the efforts of President al-Nasir and a number of other Arab figures, who at a conference of heads of Arab states urgently convened in Cairo were able to come to an agreement on the terms of a cease-fire in Jordan. The decisions of the Cairo summit were accepted by Yasir 'Arafat, chairman of the PLO Executive Committee, and Jordan's King Husayn.

As far as the formulation of a joint American-Israeli position was concerned, this was a typical example illustrating U.S. attempts to actively "manage" the Near East conflict and to "control" its development in its own interests. At the same time the formulation of this position of the United States and Israel was a qualitative shift testifying that the relations of the United States and Israel were becoming increasingly organic and close. "Kissinger and Rabin shook hands," M. and B. Kalb write. "Together with the Jordanian crisis their unpublicized mutual understanding had passed into history, although they both understood that the precedent had been set."

4. The "Even-Handed" Course--Anti-Arab Policy by Other Means

The Cairo summit convened to discuss the events in Jordan was the last in which President al-Nasir was to take part. During the conference al-Nasir had no sleep for several days on end. Without sparing his health, which had been undermined by the heavy workload, he did much to lead the Arab world out of the dangerous Jordanian crisis. President al-Nasir's life came to end on 28 September 1970. With his death Egypt and the entire Arab world had lost an outstanding statesman who had won widespread fame and popularity, a fighter against imperialism and for the happiness and progress of his people and a sincere and great friend of the Soviet Union.

After the death of the Egyptian president, the United States gambled on making the maximum use of certain trends and processes in Egypt which did not at that time signify a departure from the al-Nasir line but which were, nevertheless, fraught with individual elements of such a departure or deviation. There were also other factors preparing an activation of American policy in the Near East. As has already been said, during the Jordanian crisis there was a manifestation of the unity of the United States and Israel, but this occurred at a time when the conflict was developing into the crisis stage. As far as another stage--a "smoother" stage--which the conflict entered after the cessation of the Jordanian crisis, was concerned, here Israel's inflexible, uncompromising extremist line was beginning to hinder the United States. The United States simultaneously realized that this line would lead their ally up a blind alley.

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Under the pressure of the world public Israel was forced at the end of December 1970 to consent to a resumption of the mission of the UN secretary general's representative. The Israeli leaders obviously calculated here that this mission would be of no practical significance and that consent to its resumption would not occasion the need for Israel's position to be defined in detail. However, on 8 February 1971 G. Jarring sent Egypt and Israel, unexpectedly for the Israeli leadership, judging by Tel Aviv's reaction, identical memoranda requesting certain prior commitments on the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution of 22 November 1967. As UN Secretary General U Thant subsequently explained in his report on the Near East, "Ambassador Jarring's initiative was based on the fact that these commitments were to have been given simultaneously and on a reciprocal basis.... Israel was to have given an undertaking to withdraw its forces from the occupied territory of the UAR.... The UAR was to have given the undertaking to enter into a peace agreement with Israel."

On 15 February G. Jarring received a reply from Egypt which indicated that, on condition of the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories, Egypt agreed to implement all the measures listed in Jarring's memorandum, including: cessation of the state of war with Israel; agreement to the creation of demilitarized zones along both sides of the border; agreement to the commitment of UN troops to a number of points; acceptance of guarantees of the borders of all states in this region, including Israel, on the part of the great powers; implementation of measures to insure that Egyptian territory not be used for purposes hostile to other states; and freedom of passage for ships of all countries along all seaways of the region, including the Suez Canal.

As far as Israel was concerned, it did not give an official reply to the questions put by Jarring. A simple comparison of the positions of Egypt and Israel showed in all clarity who was hindering a settlement in the Near East. "I would like to note with satisfaction the positive reply given by the UAR to Ambassador Jarring's initiative," UN Secretary General U Thant emphasized in his report on the Near East. "But the Israeli Government has not yet responded to Ambassador Jarring's request for certain commitments regarding the withdrawal of troops."

Almost simultaneously Israel demonstrated its unconditional negativism and unwillingness to solve the questions by political methods by torpedoing Egypt's 4 February proposal that Israeli troops be withdrawn a certain distance from the Suez Canal and that a start be made on clearing this important seaway within the framework of a general settlement of the Near East problem on the basis of the 22 November 1967 Security Council Resolution. At this time Egypt's policy of interim measures did not contradict the interests of the Arab countries. It was not a question of partial but of interim solutions within the framework of an overall coordinated plan of the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab territories. Egypt's 4 February 1971 proposal was cardinally different from the partial solutions to which Egypt agreed in 1973-1974.

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Meir at first bluntly and categorically rejected Egypt's proposal on opening the Suez Canal. But after the mood of the world public had shown itself to be manifestly in favor of the opening of the canal, the Israeli leaders attempted to create the illusion of their positive approach to this idea. However, the "review of positions" was effected such as to liquidate Egypt's peace initiative. The Israeli leaders declared that there could only be an "interim settlement" in the event of it being regarded as an independent agreement not connected with an overall agreement providing for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the territories occupied at the time of the June 1967 war. Simultaneously the Israeli leadership flatly refused to examine the question of the possibility of the Egyptian Army crossing the Suez Canal. Thus in practice Israel blocked the possibility of an agreement with Egypt on an interim settlement. Its implementation on Israeli terms--and the Egyptian leadership understood this full well at that time--would have contributed to the preservation of Israeli occupation of a considerable part of Sinai and the West Bank of the River Jordan.

Thus Tel Aviv's obstructionist policy led on the one hand to the practical cessation of the Jarring mission, who declared that, failing a positive response from Israel to his memorandum, he could not continue his activity as mediator for a peace settlement in the Near East, and, on the other, to the frustration of Egypt's peace initiative for the opening of the Suez Canal.

It was precisely under these conditions that Washington announced at the end of April 1971 that the U.S. secretary of state would make a trip to the countries of this region and visit Egypt and Israel. The visits of U.S. Secretary of State W. Rogers and his assistant J. Sisco took place in May of the same year. They held meetings and talks with the leaders of Egypt and Israel. Simultaneously there was an exchange of messages between President Nixon and Golda Meir and President Nixon and President Anwar al-Sadat. The world began to talk about a new U.S. "mediation mission." What was the purpose of it?

First, the United States had stepped up its political activity in the Near East when Israel's obstructionist policy had become the target of decisive condemnation by various circles of the world public, including those which at previous stages of the development of the Near East crisis had been distinguished by their one-sidedly pro-Israeli sympathies. Following Israel's refusal to respond positively to Jarring's memorandum, demands were put forward, particularly by certain Asian and African states, for sanctions to be applied against Israel. In this connection many unprejudiced observers believed that the United States had begun a "mediation mission" for the purpose of averting the complete international isolation of its Israeli ally and pulling it from the fire.

Second, the purpose of the American "good offices" mission was to put pressure on Egypt in favor of a partial settlement.

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Third, the United States was obviously thinking of galvanizing its supporters in a number of Arab countries. One the eve of Rogers' trip to the Near East articles appeared in certain Cairo newspapers whose authors wrote that the "key" to a Near East settlement was in the hands of the United States. These articles pursued the idea of the need for the Arab countries' "more flexible" policy in relation to the United States. In proclaiming its "mediation mission" Washington attempted to create the illusion that it was abandoning its pro-Israeli one-sidedness in an approach to the Near East conflict. It was obvious that the United States aspired by this path to help the pro-Western elements in a number of Arab countries gain the upper hand and move matters toward a change in these countries' political course.

Fourth, American politicians aspired to weaken the relations between the Arab countries and the Soviet Union. Big hopes in this connection were invested in the development of events in Egypt after May 1971. As is known, a whole number of figures accused of conspiring against President al-Sadat was removed from leading positions in the state apparatus and leading organs of the Arab Socialist Union at this time. A clear attempt was made to take advantage of these internal events to sow dissension between Egypt and the Soviet Union.

At the time these efforts were not crowned with success. A government delegation of the Soviet Union flew to Cairo. A friendship and cooperation treaty between the Soviet Union and Cairo was signed on 27 May 1971 which not only summed up the long and diverse relations between the two countries which had been developing successfully for many years but also outlined wide-ranging prospects of such cooperation in the future.

An attempt to isolate the Arab countries from the socialist states and the international workers and communist movement was also made in connection with the July 1971 events in Sudan, where a bloody anticommunist campaign had been unleashed. This imperialist attempt was rebuffed by progressive Arab circles. A communique issued in connection with the stay in Egypt of a CPSU delegation headed by CPSU Central Committee Secretary B. N. Ponomarev (July 1971), which had been attending the National Congress of the Arab Socialist Union, emphasized that any manifestations of anticommunism only serve the accomplishment of imperialist aims in this region of the Near East. The inclusion of this clause in the joint Soviet-Egyptian document at this time was of great significance since it restructured the opportunities for maneuver of intra-Egyptian and foreign reactionary forces interested in weakening Egyptian-Soviet relations.

Subsequently, as is known, the trend toward a deterioration in relations with the USSR and their relegation to a considerably lower level than had been the case under President al-Nasir was developed in Egypt's policy. The result was President al-Sadat's unilateral denunciation of the Soviet-Egyptian cooperation treaty. But the Arab rightists and their patrons only succeeded in achieving this later. Immediately after the demise of al-Nasir, they lacked sufficient possibilities of effecting such a turnabout.

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Nor could American policy, despite its manifest activization, in the immediate aftermath of the death of the outstanding Egyptian leader straightaway score successes in imposing a capitulationist position on the Arab side. This was expressed, in particular, in the Egyptian leadership's undisputed desire to expand multifaceted cooperation with the USSR expressed after al-Nasir's death. In the course of Soviet-Egyptian negotiations in October 1970 al-Sadat declared: "As acting president of the republic, I wish to state the following: we have persistently requested that Soviet military personnel remain in the country. On the basis of the wish and will of our people, the armed forces and the leadership of the Arab Socialist Union and the government I will even request an increase in this personnel." Under these conditions the leadership of the U.S. State Department was forced, in order to create the appropriate "background" for political maneuvering in the Arab world, to drop certain hints as to the possibility of a restriction on U.S. arms supplies to Israel. However, in practice there was no halt to the flow of Phantom and Skyhawk fighter-bombers, spares for them, air-to-ground missiles and other arms to Israel. Moreover, it was precisely in 1971 that there was intensive elaboration of plans of U.S. aid to Israel with the object of "guaranteeing" it all essential arms. At the start of 1972 the United States officially announced that Israel would be supplied with a new consignment of Phantoms.

This reluctance and, probably, impossibility, considering its traditional ties to Israeli expansionist circles and the considerable influence of the "Israel lobby" within the United States, of Washington stopping supplies of offensive weapons to Israel played a big role in exposing the essence of the United States' Near East position and created a serious obstacle on the path of implementation of "renewed" American tactics in relation to the Near East conflict. The more so in that American supplies of arms to Israel were being unwrapped when disagreements on this question had come to light in the West. The policy of France, whose government once again confirmed the decisions adopted by the deceased President de Gaulle on a halt to supplies of all types of arms to Israel, primarily Mirage aircraft, differed appreciable from American policy. The deal involving the supply of 50 such aircraft was definitively canceled by Paris, and an agreement was signed on 15 February 1972 on the return of the advance payment to Israel.

Renouncing the armament of Israel neither in principle nor in practice, the United States at the same time continued to pursue its line aimed chiefly at weakening the ties binding the Arab countries, primarily Egypt, to the Soviet Union. Washington understood sufficiently well that only along this path would the United States acquire the opportunity for maneuver for the purpose of "controlling" the Near East conflict in a direction advantageous to itself and Israel.

One of the tasks being accomplished here was the weakening of the anti-imperialist, progressive and the strengthening of the pro-West, conservative Arab regimes. Perhaps Henry Kissinger, assistant to the President for national

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security, spoke with the greatest candor about these motives of the United States' Near East policy on 26 July 1970 at a closed meeting with American press representatives: "We are attempting to achieve a settlement (of the Near East conflict--Ye. P.) by such a path as would strengthen the moderate regimes and not the radical ones. We are attempting to put an end to the Soviet military presence...." It is significant that Kissinger made direct mention of Soviet military advisers here, and this was, obviously, correspondingly evaluated in rightwing circles in Cairo, which, while not at that time in power, had nevertheless, by degrees, begun to increase their activeness.

This motive--and in approximately the same terms--was sounded in several of Kissinger's statements in succession. M. and B. Kalb were to write later: "The heart of the matter for Kissinger was that he saw in his mind's eye the time when the Egyptians would read certain signals in the international atmosphere and would themselves decide to end the Russian presence." It is difficult to agree with the portrayal of the "miraculous intuition" of a Kissinger who back in al-Nasir's lifetime, several months before his unexpected death, could foresee the peripeteia of the internal political struggle and the shifts in Egyptian leadership and policy engendered by its results. At the same time Kissinger did indeed wish to send a "signal" to those who in Egypt had by this time already begun to propagandize the thesis that "the keys to a Near East settlement are exclusively in the hands of the United States."

After al-Nasir's death, such "signals" came to be sent directly to the new Egyptian leadership.

There is reason to believe that a concrete discussion of the "price" for al-Sadat's unilateral decision to end the mission of Soviet military advisers in Egypt had already begun by this time. In his book "The Road to Ramadan" Haykal, who attaches great significance to this fact, writes of the arrival in Cairo (in the first half of November 1970) shortly after al-Nasir's death of one of Saudi Arabia's King Faysal's "powerful" and most trusted people--his son-in-law and counselor Kamal Adham, who exercised general supervision of the activity of the Saudi secret services. In his talks with al-Sadat "he spoke of the presence of the Russians in Egypt," Haykal writes, "emphasizing how much this was worrying the Americans." President al-Sadat replied to K. Adham that he "depended on the Soviet Union insofar as the Americans were supplying Israel with everything it asked for," but added that "in the event of the completion of the first stage of the withdrawal of Israeli troops, he could promise to get rid of the Russians. Kamal Adham asked President al-Sadat if he could pass this on to the Americans, and the president said that he could."

This conversation was undoubtedly passed on as intended, and it is natural to suppose that subsequently talks on this question proceeded along two channels--via the Saudis and directly along the American-Egyptian channel.

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At the start of 1976 a sensational article was published in the United States by Edward Sheehan, professor at Harvard University, in Kissinger's Near East mission. According to the NEW YORK TIMES, "State Department officials stated that Sheehan had had a multitude of talks with Kissinger's chief assistants who had participated in the diplomatic transactions in the Near East. They reported that these contacts had taken place with Kissinger's approval, although he denied that he approved Sheehan's access to secret material-- transcripts of conversations with Near East leaders." Those who did this, Kissinger declared in a brief interview, "committed a flagrant violation of secrecy and a serious mistake," adding that he was "staggered" to see this material in the press. There is also another version: Sheehan's article and, subsequently, book, which was developed from the article and entitled "The Arabs, Israelis and Kissinger," were the result of "leaks" of information organized by the secretary of state with the intention of self-advertisement. However, in any event, the accuracy of the information cited by Sheehan was not called in question in the least either by the U.S. State Department or the secretary of state himself.

Rogers informed al-Sadat in Cairo, E. Sheehan writes, "that Nixon would possibly meet him half-way if al-Sadat were to reduce the Soviet presence in Egypt, while Kissinger, with a certain indiscretion, had already declared before this that the American aim was to 'expel' the Russians.... Whatever his immediate motives might have been (al-Sadat--Ye.P.), he must have known that the expulsion of the Soviets would be evaluated as a further appeal for granting of American aid."

The day before al-Sadat made the decision to end the mission of the Soviet military advisers, he had a further meeting with a special emissary of the King of Saudi Arabia--Defense Minister Prince Sultan. At a closed meeting with editors of Cairo newspapers al-Sadat later related that Prince Sultan had conveyed to him news from the Americans, recalling that "the key to the situation is in their hands." Prince Sultan had gone to him directly from Washington. Kamal Adham was also "by chance" in Cairo at the same time. Reporting these facts, Haykal supplied them with a more than definite comment: "Whether there was a connection between these facts (the meeting with the Saudis and al-Sadat's decision concerning a "pause" in relations with the Soviet Union, which he had declared for all to hear--Ye.P.) and whether King Faysal was notified of the measures which the president intended to implement I do not know, and perhaps, none of us will learn, until President al-Sadat decides to say so himself."

No open, official reaction followed on the part of the United States to this "gesture" of al-Sadat's, which had manifestly been made with the intention of going a considerable part of the route to meet Washington half-way. But Kissinger had prepared several secret messages to be signed by Nixon which, as E. Sheehan attests, were subsequently sent along intelligence channels directly to al-Sadat via Hafiz Is'mail--adviser to the Egyptian president for national security affairs. The messages stated that the removal of the advisers was an important act and contained the assurance that the U.S.

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Administration would involve itself in the Near East as soon as the presidential elections were over and the talks on Vietnam completed."

The version was spread in the American press that Kissinger was "extremely surprised" at al-Sadat's sudden decision. "Why has al-Sadat done me this kindness"? he inquired of his colleagues. "Why did he not first demand any concessions from me"?

This reaction to the allegedly "sudden" and "disinterested" decision to end the mission of Soviet military advisers in Egypt appears absolutely artificial and improbable. In its entire policy, both indirectly and directly, Washington was nudging the Egyptian leadership toward this direction.

A little more than a year after al-Nasir's death the United States had established two channels of communication with the top Egyptian leadership. "There was a normal channel from one foreign ministry to the other and, together with this, there were also secret communications--through our own intelligence service and the CIA (always particularly active in the Near East)," Haykal writes. Both these channels were in constant operation.

Together with these, there were one-time-only high-level meetings. Perhaps the most important of these contacts (prior to al-Sadat's personal meeting with Kissinger in November 1973) was during Hafiz Is'mail's visit to the United States 23-25 February 1973. The brief protocol part of this visit--H. Is'mail's visit to the White House and his meeting with President Nixon--was extensively illustrated on American television and in the press; H. Is'mail's long secret talks with H. Kissinger were naturally not publicized. The two goals which American policy had set itself emerged during Kissinger's talks with Is'mail: a weakening of the USSR's positions in the Near East and the preparation of conditions for an independent mediation mission. "The United States was ready to hold a general discussion on Near East problems with the Soviet Union, but when it was a question of specific problems, it preferred to deal exclusively with the parties directly concerned," this was the conclusion drawn by Haykal in evaluating H. Is'mail's dispatches to Cairo.

These two goals, being unified, merged into a single U.S. aspiration to utilize its mediation mission to impose on the Arabs the terms of a settlement unacceptable to them and to strengthen Israel's positions.

During H. Is'mail's trip to the United States it was decided that, together with open contacts through the U.S. State Department, a completely privy, top-secret line of communication of the Egyptian Government would be established personally with H. Kissinger, to whom, as President Nixon told H. Is'mail, he would entrust the process of a settlement of the Near East conflict. R. Nixon added, according to H. Haykal, that not even the State Department would know of this line of communication.

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At this time various efforts were made on the part of the Egyptian leadership, which, in turn, had set a course toward increased relations with the West, aimed at under no circumstances aggravating relations with the United States. Even in the event of U.S. actions in Egypt being in contradiction with its sovereignty or if it was necessary to sacrifice the interests of friendship with the USSR on the altar of the process of an improvement in Egyptian-American relations.

Thus it was, for example, in connection with the so-called Randopolo affair at the end of 1971. An Egyptian subject of Greek parentage named Randopolo, the manager of a large estate situated near an airbase, was spying for the United States. He was connected with a CIA operative called Miss Swain, who was officially a junior secretary in the visa section of the American Consulate in Cairo. The Egyptian security organs arrested Randopolo and Swain. According to H. Haykal, a certain Eugene Trone, leader of the CIA network in Egypt, who had diplomatic cover as a member of the mission looking after American interests in this country following Egypt's rupture of diplomatic relations with the United States, wrote an "extraordinarily frank letter" to the director of the Arab Republic of Egypt's [ARE] General Intelligence Service, who at that time was Gen Ahmed Is'mail 'Ali. "I want you to understand," the CIA resident wrote, "that Egypt is not the target of this intelligence affair.... There are Russians on the base (military specialists--Ye. P.), and we were interested in what they were doing there. We were spying on them, not on you." The explanations were accepted. The American spy was released at the start of 1972, and Randopolo died in prison of a heart attack. The incident was closed: it was not to hinder the general "flirtation" between the two countries--Egypt and the United States. The United States, for its part, also did everything to "close" the "Randopolo affair"--in September 1971 the American diplomatic representative Bergun, together with E. Trone, called on the director of Egyptian intelligence and offered him his apologies.

The "flirtation" with Egypt was only one side in the American game in the Near East. Its other side, the determining one, moreover, remained close confidential relations with Israel and a policy geared to the continuous provision of its army with the most modern weapons. It is significant that Hafiz Is'mail, who had been treated with affection by Nixon and Kissinger and who had not had time to return from Washington to Cairo, read in Paris in February 1973 a NEW YORK TIMES' report that the U.S. President had decided to supply Israel with 48 Phantoms and 36 Skyhawks. "Kissinger hastened to assure al-Sadat through his secret channels," E. Sheehan writes, "that the report was false and that the Israeli request (awaiting an answer) was still in the process of being 'examined.'" Kissinger was angry at the leaked information because it had undermined his talks with Is'mail. However, the report was not false, only premature; Nixon confirmed it in the spring."

The fourth Arab-Israeli war erupted in October 1973. The following account shows the specific causes which led to the Near East conflict again growing

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in October into the crisis stage. The long-standing policy of the United States in relation to the Near East conflict was not the least of them.

The position of the United States during the war could not under any circumstances be defined as a manifestation of "even-handedness" in the approach to the two sides involved in the conflict. In spite of everything, including the real threat of an oil embargo with very serious consequences for the economies of the United States and its allies, the United States decided to support Israel. Washington instituted an "air bridge" for supplying Israel with arms and ammunition. The delay of several days in the opening of this bridge gave rise to many arguments and various judgments. Certain people are inclined to blame the Pentagon "technocrats" for this, others believe that Kissinger was "playing his own game," attempting to create the most propitious conditions possible for the start of the U.S. "mediation mission" and not afraid that this delay would create difficulties for Israel. "Even if the Israelis had not received the weapons we sent them, they would not have been in a position of impotence. They had prepared their counterattack across the Suez Canal before they received our assistance," Kissinger told Haykal. One way or another, one thing is clear: the United States, as always in critical situations, took Israel's side completely.

This was also manifested in all clearness in the United States' diplomatic steps during and after the October war. It was also discernible in the message concerning the appropriation of \$2.2 billion for urgent military aid to Israel which the U.S. President sent to Congress. Everyone understood that the allocation of the huge sum which had been requested had no direct relation to the military operations (insofar as it could not have been realized immediately) but was designed to support Israel psychologically, put psychological pressure on the Arabs and, what, probably, was even more important, provide Tel Aviv with a guarantee of the reinforcement of its military potential to be used by the Israeli leadership to hold on to the captured Arab lands after a cease-fire in the October war has been put into effect. Simultaneously with this and, obviously, also "for psychological purposes" the United States moved its 6th Fleet, reinforced with several aircraft carriers, into the Eastern Mediterranean.

The American position on the question of a cease-fire during the war in October 1973 leaves no doubt as to the true direction of U.S. policy. The talks which the U.S. secretary of state had in this connection with the Israeli leaders are, naturally, of particular interest. Matti Golan, chief diplomatic correspondent of the Israeli newspaper HA'ARETZ, writes about the content of these talks in the book "Henry Kissinger's Secret Talks," which was published in the United States in 1976. The first version of the book was banned by the Israeli military censor. The chief censor gave as the reason for the ban on the book in an official letter to the author the fact that "that book is based almost entirely on secret and top-secret information and quotes from sealed documents." M. Golan himself makes no secret of the source of his information. According to him, he obtained the material for

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his book in the form of an "authentic text" from "a certain high-ranking person," and he had the impression that "someone in the Israeli Government was interested in the publication of the material." This obviously coincided with the period when not everyone in the top Israeli leadership was satisfied with the United States' flirting with President al-Sadat. An Israeli Cabinet session subsequently studied the question of M. Golan's book and, "guided by considerations of state security," interpreted as "fear" lest damage be done to Israel's relations with the United States, made the decision not to publish the book. The second version of the book was written in a considerably toned-down form for publication abroad, but even it contains information, perfectly authentic, moreover, to judge by the entire prehistory of the publication and the absence of a reaction from the U.S. State Department, which throws light on the motives for and nature of many American diplomatic actions during and after the 1973 October war.

So, how did the United States react to the need for a cease-fire in the Near East in October 1973? As is known, the cease-fire proposal was first incorporated in UN Security Council Resolution 338, the draft of which was drawn up during Kissinger's visit to Moscow. The appeal for an immediate cease-fire in this resolution, which was adopted by the Security Council on 22 October, was not immediately put into effect. The Israeli troops stepped up military operations, attempting to complete the encirclement of and hit the Egyptian Third Army on the east bank of the Suez Canal, in the Sinai desert. The version appeared in the American press and, later, in literature devoted to the October war according to which the American leaders "put pressure on Israel" to force it to cease fire. This explanation of events has proved far from accurate.

On 22 October, a few hours after the Security Council's adoption of Resolution 338, the aircraft of the U.S. secretary of state landed at Lod Airport in Israel. He immediately had a meeting first with the group which was a part of G. Meir's "kitchen cabinet" (several top leaders who usually gathered in the kitchen of Meir's home to solve the most important questions) and then invited the chief of the Israeli Army General Staff and certain other generals to a meeting to brief the secretary of state on the military situation. "Kissinger ultimately inquired," M. Golan writes, "how many days it would take to complete the encirclement of the two Egyptian armies on the east bank on the Suez Canal. Chief of the General Staff Elazar said 7 days, Brigadier General Peled, commander of the air force, gave a different time: 2-3 days. Kissinger responded: '2 or 3 days? This is all? In Vietnam the cease-fire did not take effect at the time that had been agreed on.'" "Kissinger's hosts," M. Golan writes, "did not request further explanations. His words sounded to them like an indirect call to continue military operations." This impression, M. Golan testifies, was strengthened when the question of observance of the cease-fire was discussed. The Israelis had interpreted Kissinger's remark "as an indication that he would not be dissatisfied if combat operations had continued after the day of the cease-fire."

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It is interesting to note that in his speeches President al-Sadat frequently mentioned that the U.S. secretary of state had categorically warned him against attempts to strike at the Israeli bridgehead on the west bank of the Canal. The front was "puff-pastry." If one could speak of the encirclement of the Egyptian Army on the east bank, it could be said with sufficient justification that the tanks of Israel's General Sharon were in a similar position on the west bank of the Suez Canal--the bridgehead was in communication with the main disposition of Israel troops in Sinai via a pontoon bridge across the canal and a narrow, 6 kilometer-wide, corridor, which a number of Egyptian generals had proposed cutting off. President al-Sadat would say later that he had considerable superiority of firepower--2:1--but that he did not begin operations since H. Kissinger had declared to him that the United States would not tolerate an Israeli defeat.

As can be seen, the United States adopted an entirely different approach to the situations that had taken shape on the east and on the west banks of the canal. The pro-Israeli nature of U.S. policy was more than obvious. And this told most directly in the results of the military operations, particularly at the final stage.

Was there an advance arrangement between A. al-Sadat and H. Kissinger concerning the limited nature of military operations from the Egyptian side designed merely to "unfreeze" the conflict and provide an impetus for a settlement effected with the mediation of the Americans or did such a formal advance arrangement not exist and an accord manifest itself in the process of the war? One way or another, President al-Sadat himself repeatedly acknowledged in his speeches that military operations on Egypt's part could, were it not for "the political risk he was running," have been of a more dangerous nature for Israel. The development of events in connection with the Israeli tank breakthrough on the west bank of the Suez Canal is significant from this viewpoint. Let us turn to a description of the events given by M. H. Haykal. When the Israelis were convinced that Egypt's strategic reserves had been committed to action, Sharon gave the final order to initiate the attack across the canal, which was launched on 15 October. In the region of Deversoir and Abu Sultan there was an unguarded gap of about 40 kilometers between the Egyptian armies--Israeli amphibious troops crossed the Great Bitter Lakes and quickly gained a footing on the west bank. Astonishingly, there was still, at the point of Sharon's main crossing, an Israeli strong point on the Bar-Lev Line which had been neither liquidated by the Egyptians nor abandoned by the Israelis and which was able to give great assistance to the crossing Israeli troops.

"After the Israeli troops had set up their bridgeheads, they laid down a pontoon bridge over which their armored forces crossed and which was protected by long-range and medium-range artillery and aircraft. A first target of the attackers was Ismailia, but stiff resistance was met and they turned south and west, rapidly taking new territory." And it was here, in Haykal's opinion, that the unexpected occurred.... "On 17 October an

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extremely efficient Egyptian formation--the 182d Parachute Brigade consisting of volunteers and commandoes--was thrown against the Israelis. Units of this brigade had almost reached the Israeli crossing points and the frogmen in it were about to blow up the bridge when the order was received to draw back and maintain a line of defense with the division next to them to avoid creating a salient. The colonel commanding the brigade could not believe that the order came from Egyptian headquarters and asked for confirmation. The order was confirmed by an officer whose voice he recognized. However, attempting to gain time and insure the success of his mission, he appealed to Cairo General Headquarters for confirmation. This was also given, and with regret he withdrew his hand from the Israeli windpipe, to which it had been so close.

"The artillery of the Second Army...and a unit of artillery of the Third Army began shelling the enemy bridges, scoring numerous direct hits, before they too received the order to withdraw to avoid creating a salient." Such, according to Haykal, was the "bad side" of the Israeli Army operation to establish a foothold on the west bank of the canal, which had serious military and political results, which were reflected in the terms of the cease-fire.

At the same time the overall results of the October war influenced subsequent U.S. policy to a considerable extent. Without an analysis of them it is impossible to correctly picture the nature of the measures which Washington adopted in the military-political and diplomatic spheres.

In the first days of the war the Egyptian Army scored a number of considerable successes, having crossed the length of the Suez Canal and broken through the "impregnable Bar-Lev Line"--an enormous bank of sand with an entire network of fortifications installed by the Israelis on the east bank of the Suez Canal. The Syrian Army had reached the Golan Heights. Subsequently Israel managed to even out the military situation: its tanks broke through to the west bank of the canal and also drove a wedge through the Syrian defense in a narrow sector in the direction of Damascus, advancing approximately 20 kilometers from the boundary line which had existed prior to 6 October.

Nevertheless, the main conclusion that can be drawn from 20 days of battles (military operations actually ended only 3 days after the UN Security Council had adopted the cease-fire resolution) amounts to the failure of Israel's military doctrine. This doctrine proceeded from the fact that Israel had the possibility and capability of striking the Arab countries without perceptible losses for itself, choosing at its discretion here the time and place for armed operations and unilaterally determining the scale and degree of intensiveness of the armed encounters. Israeli military doctrine, of which the political conception of the Israeli leadership was also a continuation, proceeded from the Arabs' "inveterate incapability" of offering appreciable resistance to the Israeli military machine and, even less,

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gaining any, even "local," success in a confrontation with Tel Aviv. Israeli "strategists" essentially ruled out the possibility of the development of active Arab resistance to their expansionist plans. Simultaneously the properties of the types of arms which certain Arab armies possessed were virtually ignored.

The military operations in October destroyed a number of strategic principles of the Israeli General Staff. The Israeli Army's losses proved unexpectedly large for the Israeli leadership. The number of those killed was approximately 3,000. If we put the ratio of killed to wounded at 1 : 5 (this ratio is usually even higher in a modern war), a very considerable number of soldiers and officers was rendered hors de combat. According to Israeli figures, approximately 500 soldiers and officers were taken prisoner. Of course, the Arab countries also had big losses, but the losses in the war were particularly perceptible to Israel, considering the colossal difference in human resources between it and the Arab countries. Israel incurred big losses of military equipment: 900 tanks and approximately 250 combat aircraft, which constituted approximately one-half of the Israeli Air Force. "In the short period of time since 1967 the Arabs had considerably narrowed the 'technological' and 'qualitative gap' between them and Israel and had learned how to fight well in a modern war," was the conclusion of Nadav Safran, an eminent researcher of the Near East conflict, a former Israeli officer and now an American professor.

The October war demonstrated the indisputable fact that Israel had ceased to rule the skies. Egyptian and Syrian air defense put up effective resistance to the Israeli Air Force. The acknowledgements of the American military researcher Y. Glassman are interesting on this score. He describes the events of the 1973 war thus in a book devoted to the Near East conflict: "Although the Israelis had an idea of the types of anti-aircraft guns which the Arabs had, they were taken unawares both by their effectiveness and intensiveness of use." The author also writes about the extremely efficient use on the part of the Egyptian infantry of portable antitank guns. "Despite the fact that the Israeli armed forces knew about these guns," Y. Glassman writes, "certain tank commanders were simply staggered by their effectiveness, which had a big psychological impact on the crews of the combat vehicles. This is how, for example, a tank commander described his position: 'You are rolling along in a tank with a quiet confidence in its invulnerability and suddenly you see an individual with some kind of stick about 200 yards ahead of you. You cannot believe that one man could destroy a huge armored machine, but a few seconds later the tank is a wreck'."

It later became known that in response to sharp criticism Israeli Defense Minister M. Dayan had submitted his resignation right at the start of the war. In his notice of resignation he mentioned his "responsibility for the failure" of the system of defense. Dayan's resignation was not accepted since the Israeli leaders did not want at that time to exacerbate the internal political contradictions and attempted to consolidate the alliance of different political forces represented in the government.

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The preliminary report of the official commission set up in Israel under the chairmanship of Supreme Court Justice Agranat to investigate the reasons for Israel's failures in the October war was published in April 1974. In January 1975 the Agranat Commission submitted the final report, which attested the Israeli Command's serious underestimation of the Arab countries' military potential, the "unpreparedness" of the Israeli Army and the lack of discipline at the war's initial stages. The chief of the General Staff and the leaders of the intelligence service of the Israelis Army were dismissed even on the basis of the commission's preliminary findings.

Finally, during the October war for the first time the Arab countries made use in their own interests of such a powerful weapon as oil. As a result of coordinated measures the Arab countries announced and began to implement a slowdown in oil production. The cutback in oil production amounted to practically 30 percent compared with September 1973. Simultaneously there was a boycott of a number of Western states which supported Israel. It was imposed against the United States and Holland, and, moreover, as a consequence of the boycott of Holland, the Rotterdam oil refinery, which supplied products from Arab oil to a considerable number of EEC countries, ceased to function. A third direction of the Arab world's "oil war" was a sharp increase in oil prices. By the end of the year oil prices had quadrupled in a number of cases since the start of October.

These measures directly affected the interests of all the developed capitalist countries, but primarily the West European states and Japan, which provide for almost 80 percent of their oil requirements through imports from the Arab countries. The Arab countries' "oil measures" affected the United States to a lesser extent, although here also they intensified and aggravated the processes connected with the energy crisis.

So, as a result of the change in the correlation of forces in the Near East conflict and the exacerbation of the "oil factor" and also of the ever increasing dissatisfaction with the inflexible, shortsighted policy of the Israeli leadership considerable changes began in the international atmosphere in favor of the Arab states. For the first time the EEC countries came out with a joint political document on 6 November 1973 in connection with the events in the Near East which contained an appeal for a political settlement of the conflict in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution of 22 November 1967.

The Japanese Government also defined its position in relation to the Near East crisis. Like the EEC countries, Japan demanded the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967.

The process of Israel's international isolation intensified as a result of and after the 1973 October war. It should obviously be emphasized that the explanation of this lies by no means only in the plane of influence of the "oil factor" on the position of a whole number of Western countries in relation to the Near East conflict. As Prof Charles Yost, an important

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American expert and former U.S. representative in the United Nations, wrote, "the isolation (of Israel--Ye. P.) is only partially the result of the Arab oil power. The isolation is also caused by the spreading conviction that Israel has no moral right to occupy--as it has now done for 9 years--appreciable Arab territories taking during the "6-day war" or to deny the Palestinians the right to self-determination, a right which on legal grounds it proclaims for itself. These feelings are so strong among the countries of the third world that they support the Arabs in international forums despite the fact that the sharp upsurge of oil prices has caused them considerable harm."

Ever increasing dissatisfaction was displayed in West Europe and even in Japan in connection with the support which the United States was lending Israel. For the majority understood that the United States is ultimately responsible for Israel's capacity to pursue an extremist policy. The FRG refused the United States permission to use its territory for transporting arms to Israel; Britain and France imposed a complete ban on arms exports to the warring countries, including Israel. In practice the United States was unable to use the territory of a single one of its West European allies with the exception of the fascist regime in Portugal to transfer arms and ammunition to the Israeli Army. The American military bases on the territory of the West European NATO states were also blockaded at this time, which, as the American politicians' confessed, came as extremely unexpected for Washington. This elicited unprecedentedly sharp criticism of the West European allies on the part of American statesmen, particularly the U.S. defense secretary.

The disagreements of a number of West European countries with the United States were aggravated particularly after the United States, which had failed to consult its NATO allies in advance, put its armed forces on many bases, including those in Europe, on alert.

It was far from only a question of the "hegemonist" manner in relation to its allies in which Washington had taken this action. The United States' partners, like many others, incidentally, believed that there was no need to put the U.S. armed forces on alert worldwide and that there was no justification for this worthy of attention. The version, which failed to correspond to reality, later appeared in the American press to the effect that this U.S. measure had been caused by the reality of the USSR's unilateral interference in the Near East. In actual, fact, as many observers noted, the step taken by the White House was of a demonstrative nature and had a mainly domestic direction: at the time of the Watergate scandal and at a time of attacks on President Nixon he and his immediate entourage wished to demonstrate their "firmness" and "capability" when the United States' interests were at stake and divert the public away from the sensational Watergate exposures of the Republican Administration. Meanwhile this "diversionary maneuver" increased tension globally and gave rise to the risk of the escalation in relations between the United States and the USSR,

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which had elicited sharp opposition on the part of America's allies. The West European press wrote that the American politicians were manipulating their allies, bringing the affair, against their will, to a "critical threshold" and being guided here by domestic political considerations.

All these shifts both in the balance of forces in the Near East and in the United States' relations with its allies in connection with the Near East crisis and the threat of a hardening of Arab oil policy put considerable obstacles in the way of the implementation of U.S. policy in the Near East. The anti-Israel reaction to the events of a large part of the so-called third world operated in the same direction. By the end of October 1973 the number of African countries which had broken diplomatic relations with Israel had reached 24.

Nor could the fact that during the October war the Arab countries' solidarity had risen to a higher level have failed to have had an effect on American policy. Western literature frequently divides the Arab world into two groups and "two circles" of countries in relation to the Near East conflict. The first consists of the Arab states which participate directly in the armed confrontation with Israel. The second consists of those which are not involved in the conflict directly but which do not conceal their hostile attitude toward Israeli expansionism. During the 1973 war there was a sharp activization of the role of the "second circle," which may be seen as a new shift in the Near East situation and one that is extremely unfavorable to the Israeli leadership.

This shift was manifested in more than just the fact of coordination of oil pressure on the imperialist states. Many Arab states which had hitherto not participated directly in the confrontation with Israel sent their troops to the Syrian and Egyptian fronts: some--like Iraq--sent appreciable forces, which played a big role in frustrating the Israel attack on Damascus, while others sent symbolic forces. Certain Arab oil-producing countries allocated millions in funds to cover Egypt's and Syria's serious economic losses. Conservative Arab regimes, even those which were regarded as sufficiently strong bastions of U.S. influence, were involved in this solidarity. Saudi Arabia, for example, played an important role in the use of the "oil weapon" against the United States in October. A month later King Faysal told the U.S. secretary of state that he had been forced to act thus and he begged the United States to alter its Near East policy in order not to compel him, "a friend of the United States," to make decisions which were so difficult for him.

A number of observers noted that a further appreciable result of the October events in the Near East was the failure of the efforts of anti-Soviet elements attempting to alienate the Arab world and the Soviet Union and shunning no insinuations concerning Soviet policy for this. Thus a number of anti-Soviet myths which had been assiduously exaggerated by imperialist and also Arab reactionary elements, from fabrications concerning the quality of

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the weapons which Egypt and Syria possessed through big talk about the Soviet Union's "retreat" from its principled position of support for the Arab peoples' just struggle to liquidate the consequences of Israeli aggression, were completely dispelled during the October flareup.

A statement by al-Sadat himself is of undoubted interest in this connection. On 7 October 1973 he told the USSR ambassador in Cairo: "I cannot find words to express my profound gratitude to the Soviet leaders--Egypt's true friends. This will remain in my heart and the hearts of all Egyptians forever." Four days later he again told the Soviet ambassador: "Your position is the position of true friends who have come to our assistance in the most crucial and difficult days for us. The actions of the Soviet leadership are of historic significance and will undoubtedly have great influence not only on the course of military operations but on the future relations of friendship between our countries."

The changing relations between the United States and the Soviet Union also began to exert their influence on the American position. The military operations in the Near East in October occurred under the conditions of the process of normalization of relations between countries incorporated in the two opposite world social systems which was underway and under the conditions of the shift away from the "cold war" toward relaxation of tension. This contributed both to the localization and cessation of military operations and the progress of the subsequent measures adopted for the purpose of leading the Near East conflict in the direction of a political settlement.

For the first time in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict the UN Security Council cease-fire decision was successfully linked, with the most active role of the Soviet Union, directly with the problem of liquidation of the general causes of the conflict. A big achievement of the principled and active policy of the USSR was the formulation of a resolution, which was adopted by the UN Security Council on 22 October, in which a call for a cease-fire in the Near East was advanced simultaneously with the demand for the practical implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967. The Soviet-American resolution, which was adopted by the UN Security Council, also provided for immediate political negotiations between the parties involved under the appropriate auspices.

The Soviet Union's energetic policy continued to pave the way toward a just and lasting peace in the Middle East even after Israel's ruling circles, having given their verbal consent to the Soviet-American resolution, immediately violated it. For 2 days after the Security Council's approval of this resolution Israel was extending the bridgehead which it had taken on the west bank of the Suez Canal, which enabled it to put Egypt's Third Army, which was on the east bank of the Suez Canal, in a difficult position, having cut its food, water and ammunition supply lines. On 23 October the UN Security Council categorically repeated the demand for a cease-fire in the Near East. The USSR's active position contributed to the adoption

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on 25 October of a further Security Council resolution providing for the creation of a UN Emergency Force. At the request of the president of Egypt the Soviet Union sent a group of its representatives to this country to observe the implementation of the Security Council cease-fire resolution. In the wake of this step by the Soviet Union the United States was also forced to send its representatives to the Near East.

The combination of the Soviet Union's decisive measures in support of the Arab countries' struggle to liquidate the consequences of Israeli aggression with the constructive policy aimed at the development of the process of the relaxation of international tension also exerted a definite influence on Washington's position. Under the influence of Soviet policy and also taking account of the changes which had been revealed in the military situation in the Near East and in the political situation in other regions of the world, the United States was forced to make a number of changes to its position. These changes were also undoubtedly dictated by the Arab states' use of the "oil weapon" against the countries supporting Israel. As a result of all this certain positive, constructive features appeared in the U.S. position, which also contributed to the movement toward a political settlement in the Near East.

Of course, as has already been said, it was not a question of Washington denying Israel aid. However, under the influence of circumstances the United States was compelled to change certain aspects of its policy, which was taken into consideration during the Soviet Union's contacts with the United States on questions of a Near East settlement which had taken place in Moscow and in Washington.

How was all this reflected in the general process of a political settlement of the Near East conflict?

The convening of a peace conference on the Near East in Geneva became possible at the end of December. After a series of preliminary negotiations, including those between the Soviet Union and the United States, the conference opened on 21 December 1973 in the Palace of Nations in Geneva. Taking part in the conference from the Soviet Union was Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko, from the United States Secretary of State H. Kissinger, from the Arab Prime Minister and Foreign Minister I. Fahmi, from the Kingdom of Jordan Foreign Minister Z. al-Rifa'i and from the state of Israel Foreign Minister A. Eban. The session was opened by UN Secretary General K. Waldheim.

The next step was the signing on 18 January 1974 at the 101-kilometer post on the Cairo-Suez road of an agreement between Egypt and Israel on the disengagement of their troops. In accordance with this agreement, Israeli troops were evacuated from the bridgehead on the west bank and withdrew deep into Sinai on the east bank of the Suez Canal, up to the Mitla and Gidi passes. The numbers of the Israeli troops present up to the passes were limited. Simultaneously there was a reduction in the numbers of Egyptian troops and

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heavy military equipment on the east bank of the canal whither these troops had crossed over during the combat operations in October 1973. An 11-kilometer-wide buffer zone was formed between the Egyptian and Israeli troops in which the UN Emergency Force was stationed. Egypt and Israel undertook to refrain from all military and paramilitary actions from the time of the signing of the agreement. The agreement observed that the parties did not regard it as final and that it represented "only the first step along the path toward a final, just and lasting peace."

The start of the Geneva Conference had inspired hopes of the possibility of the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Near East. These hopes were not without foundation and were underpinned by a number of factors which actually existed or, rather, a number of new circumstances--we have already spoken of these above--which had appeared as a result of an since October 1973 and which began to be projected on the process of a political settlement, objectively contributing to its development. These new circumstances and new possibilities may be termed the "potential of a political settlement." What did this "potential" include?

First, the failure of the Israeli military-political doctrine, which, proceeding from the "inveterate nature" of Israel's military supremacy over the Arab countries and essentially denying the reality of the Arab countries' unity of action, with respect to the oil question also, had for many years blocked the path toward a lasting and just peace in the Near East. The "summary acknowledgement" of N. Goldmann, chairman of the World Jewish Congress, which he made on 2 January 1975 in an interview with the WASHINGTON POST, is very interesting: "I had an endless quarrel with D. Ben-Gurion (a father of Israel's military-political doctrine--Ye. P.). All these years I believed that time was working against Israel, while he claimed that it was working precisely for Israel. The October war and the oil situation prove, unfortunately, that I was right."

Second, the failure of the Israeli leaders' calculations that "external surroundings" would facilitate their hard, expansionist line in relation to the Arab states aimed at ultimately imposing on them peace terms which were one-sidedly favorable to Israel. The calculation was founded on the "constancy" of the support for Israeli policy on the part of the West European states and on the possibility of neutralizing the effect of the process of the relaxation of international tension, which was unfavorable to Israel's expansionist course, and preventing a manifest change in international public opinion, which was contradicting to an ever increasing extent the line being proclaimed and pursued by Israel. The relaxation of international tension had created an opportunity for direct constructive contacts between the USSR and the United States, and this had become a clear positive element for a political settlement.

Finally, third, the complete failure of the Israeli leadership's attempts to "neutralize" the Palestinian factor, erase the Palestinian problem and remove it from the category of the most important components of a Near East

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settlement had been revealed. Like its predecessors, the G. Meir government usually portrayed matters such that the fate of the Palestinians was only of concern to those Arab states in which they were currently living. This formulation of the issue not only attested the Israeli leadership's complete denial of the fact that the very Near East conflict was largely the result of the Palestinian Arabs having become a people in exile deprived of the possibility of enjoying the natural and inalienable right to self-determination but was also an active means of frustrating any realistic approaches to a just political settlement of the Near East conflict.

And, moreover, denial of the Palestinian people's right to self-determination as far as the creation of their own national state passed as an inheritance from G. Meir's government to the Israeli Cabinet of I. Rabin, which was created in May 1974. The "new faces" and the "new generation" on the Israeli political horizon (this was how the American and West European bourgeois press commented on the retirement of G. Meir and M. Dayan) took over in the form of a baton and carefully carried further the completely negative position in relation to the Palestinian problem.

Meanwhile life had inflicted crushing blows on the Israeli leadership's anti-Palestinian line. By an overwhelming majority the UN General Assembly 29th Session passed a resolution on 22 November 1974 which recognized the Palestinian people's right to self-determination, national independence and sovereignty. There was also confirmation of the Palestinians' right to return to the places of their birth from which they had been expelled. By a special resolution of the UN General Assembly the PLO was accorded permanent observer status at the United Nations. The broad international recognition of the Palestinian people's rights and their legitimate representatives improved the prospects of a solution of the Palestinian problem.

And for its part, the PLO made an appreciable contribution to the quest for a constructive solution of this problem. A session of the Palestine National Council--the highest organ of the PLO--was held in Cairo in June 1974. One of the main decisions of the session was the proclamation for the first time of the task of the creation of a "Palestinian authority" on the territory of the West Bank of the Jordan and the Gaza region following the withdrawal of the Israeli occupation forces.

Another important decision of the National Council was the recommendation that Y. 'Arafat, chairman of the PLO Executive Committee, use for the defense of the Palestinian people's national rights such forms of struggle as the diplomatic and the political. This created important conditions for the participation of the PLO, recognized as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, in the Geneva Near East Peace Conference.

It should be noted that the political resolution of the Palestinian National Council was adopted unanimously--the representatives of all the organizations, including those who even on the eve of the Cairo session were adopting a negative position, voted in favor of it. True, later the PFLP

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headed by G. Hahash, in conjunction with two other comparatively small Palestinian organizations, created a "rejection front." However, the overwhelming majority of the Palestinian movement--Fatah, al-Sa'iqah and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine--remained with Y. 'Arafat, leader of the PLO Executive Committee.

As a result of all that has been said the possibilities of a political settlement after October 1973 became considerably more favorable than, perhaps, in the entire time of the existence of the Near East conflict. However, possibilities are not reality, they have to be made reality, and a definite policy may serve as a means of this. The United States loudly declared that its "step-by-step" settlement policy was such a policy. In actual fact as a result of the implementation of this policy steps were taken in a direction away from a settlement, and the positive potential of peace which had been built up with such difficulty in the Near East since October 1973 was considerably dissipated.

In an attempt is made to analyze the American measures since October 1973, it may be concluded that they have pursued the achievement of a complex of goals:

isolation of the Arabs from the USSR;

liquidation of the military situation which was created as a result of the war in October 1973 and which was unfavorable to Israel; and

alienation of the Arab states and the frustration of efforts aimed at their unification on an anti-imperialist platform, particularly with respect to the oil question.

Perhaps the most authoritative source revealing the aims set by the American "step-by-step" policy is the secretary of state himself. On 16 December 1973 H. Kissinger, in Jerusalem, described his "general strategy" to the Israeli leadership (quoting M. Golan, who reproduces this conversation in the above-mentioned book) thus: "Kissinger explained that the purpose of the troop-disengagement negotiations was to obviate the necessity of conducting negotiations on borders and a final settlement. The success of the negotiations (in disengagement--Ye.P.) would also lead to another achievement--the lifting of the oil embargo. At the same time this would put an end to Israel's isolation, easing the pressure on it mainly on the part of the West European states and Japan. No one in Israel should entertain even fleeting doubts, Kissinger warned, that the failure of the disengagement negotiations would destroy the dam holding back pressure on Israel, this time in favor not of a partial withdrawal but of a full withdrawal to the borders of 4 June 1967."

Naturally, the Arab leaders did not hear these words from the secretary of state, but in Israel he could and had to speak absolutely frankly on this question.

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Simultaneously certain disagreements were manifested between Israel and the United States. Far from everyone in the Israeli leadership was happy with the rapprochement between the United States and Egypt which had begun or, equally, with the fact that to accelerate this rapprochement the U.S. secretary of state had begun to resort to a certain pressure (very limited, it is true, and always on secondary issues) on the Israeli side. Kissinger himself said that foreign policy is the art of unification of as large a number of interests as possible. In this case the United States was doing everything to unite the interests of a strengthening of Israel's positions with the interests of its own maneuvering in relation to Egypt, the main aim of which was to "squeeze out" the Soviet Union.

There is a significant example in this plane--the U.S. Administration's reaction to Israel's protest at the U.S. decision, adopted during President Nixon's visit to Cairo in the summer of 1974, to supply Egypt (together with Israel) with a nuclear reactor. In response to this the U.S. secretary of state sent the Israeli leadership (the government was then headed by Rabin) a telegram explaining that "Egypt needed the reactor for domestic purposes. If it does not acquire it from the United States, it will, of course, turn to Moscow. American interests, which perfectly clearly are also Israel's interests," Kissinger emphasized, "dictate a situation where Egypt depends in the question of a reactor on the United States...."

Let us examine in more detail the specific measures of American diplomacy adopted following the end of the military operations in Sinai and the Golan Heights.

Immediately after the end of the 1973 October war, the United States was in practice confronted with the following choice: make the maximum use of the situation that has been created and the new opportunities that have emerged in this connection for initiating movement toward a general compromise settlement of the Near East conflict or first "smooth out" the situation, one-sidedly neutralize the results of the war which are unfavorable to Israel and only later move in the direction of a settlement in Israel's interests. That the United States opted for the second path was immediately attested by the sharply increased supplies of arms from the United States, unprecedented in the history of American-Israeli relations. It was not even just a question of making good Israel's losses. The United States had given Israel arms worth \$1 billion during the war for this purpose. It was a question of a decision, with the consent of Congress, to grant Israel an additional \$2.2 billion for military purposes right on the eve of the convening of the Geneva Near East Peace Conference.

The hearings on this question in the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 13 December 1973 were extremely interesting. They were conducted by its chairman, Fulbright, who said, in part: "I absolutely do not understand the urgency of this (the granting of a further \$2.2 billion to Israel--Ye.P.) at precisely this moment. If the peace efforts fail and we take a different road, I will not be able to do anything on that account. This would be going

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beyond my personal competence and that of this committee, becoming, in my judgment, a purely military question. But today we are faced with a diplomatic situation, and it is precisely this committee and the State Department which bear the responsibility for it. I would wish to support them and would not want to do anything capable of complicating or rendering impossible the achievement of a settlement at the peace conference." Senator Fulbright simultaneously expressed doubt as to the expediency of granting Israel arms for such an essentially tremendous amount--from the viewpoint of the correlation of its forces with the Arab states.

It is significant that the administration's decision on unprecedented military assistance to Israel right at the very moment when the contours of joint Soviet-American efforts in the sphere of a settlement of the Near East conflict were being mapped out elicited criticism, and quite acute at that, on the part of a number of senators and those invited to attend the Foreign Relations Committee session. Senator McClure bluntly expressed concern that the colossal new American infusion into Israel's military organism "will show the Soviet Union that the United States is not averse to jeopardizing the start of the relaxation process for the sake of one-sided support of Israel." "And for what"? McClure asked. "To defend its right to occupy captured Arab land"?

"As the last war clearly showed, "Sen J. Abourezk said, "our policy of kindling the arms race in the Near East had the consequence of contributing more to the new explosion in this region than to averting it." "It seems that we have no faith in the conference (Geneva--Ye.P.) and that we are arming Israel to a level where it will not have to do anything at the conference...", the presiding Fulbright declared, responding to the statements of administration representatives--Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements, Admiral Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, Deputy Secretary of State Rush and others who with one voice defended the administration's line, which had nothing in common with real movement toward a settlement. Despite the serious criticism both in Congress and from the United States' allies, this line was pursued.

It may be considered that the granting of colossal American military assistance to Israel was the point of departure from which H. Kissinger began his diplomacy--settlement of the Near East conflict "step by step."* Taking the granting of enormous military assistance to Israel as a basis, the U.S. secretary of state began active preparations for the first disengagement of Egyptian and Israeli troops in Sinai.

*"The secretary of state is certain that the Congress's approval of the bill (on granting Israel \$2.2 billion for arms--Ye.P.) is a vital prior condition," Deputy Secretary of State Rush declared at the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee session.

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Initially the American politicians did not try to present the disengagement of Egypt's and Israel's troops in Sinai as an independent action. Fire had only just ceased. The troops in Sinai and on the west bank of the Suez Canal were really facing one another "with rifles at tilt," as they say. Under these conditions the task of the first troop disengagement, which was presented in the context of an overall settlement, made sense and was supported by the Soviet Union. At the same time the Soviet Union firmly emphasized that it was supporting not an individual, independent and isolated measure counterposed to an overall settlement but an action designed to facilitate this overall settlement and to get it moving. The Soviet side regarded the troop disengagement in Sinai both in its nature and in its methods of implementation exclusively in the overall context of a political settlement in the Near East.

It seems exceptionally important that the USSR also pursued this viewpoint on the first troop disengagement in Sinai in its contacts with Egypt, where certain signs of complicity in the American policy of partial measures in relation to the Near East conflict had begun to be manifested at this time.* For example, the following provision was carried in the communique on the stay of ARE Foreign Minister I. Fahmi in the USSR (21-24 January 1974): "The troop-disengagement agreement is of positive significance, considering that a radical settlement in the Near East on the basis of complete implementation of the Security Council decisions will follow in its wake."

However, subsequent events showed that the course of an overall settlement in the Middle East was blocked.

Upon a retrospective analysis of the American position it becomes clear that even in the first disengagement of Egyptian and Israeli troops the United States had not set itself the aim of securing the continuous nature of the process of a political settlement embracing an increasingly large number of problems of importance for the establishment of peace. American diplomacy was concentrated fully on the solution of military questions intended to exclude the very possibility of a repetition of the situation of October 1973, which was extremely unfavorable and, what is more, contraindicated for Israel.

Certain of the U.S. secretary of state's statements testify completely unequivocally to this direction of American policy. E. Sheehan cites the official record of H. Kissinger's talks with Syrian President H. al-Asad on

*"The Soviet Union's position was difficult in the extreme during Henry Kissinger's trips between Jerusalem and Aswan in 1974," M. H. Haykal wrote at the start of May 1977 in the Jordanian newspaper AR-RA'Y. "The USSR was in ignorance of what had been said and did not conceal its irritation. When we attempted to dispel its misgivings, we did less than was necessary and more slowly than was required. Others were ahead of us in briefing the USSR."

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15 December 1973 in Damascus. H. al-Asad asked: "Does the United States agree that, first, Syria cannot cede territory in a settlement, second, that there cannot be a settlement without a solution of the Palestinian problem and, third, that the purpose of a peace settlement is the solution of these two questions, otherwise it would just be a waste of time without an agreement being reached"?

H. Kissinger was more than definite in his reply to this: "We are ready to discuss with you a withdrawal of Israeli troops at the first stage and we recognize that there will have to be further troop withdrawals at subsequent stages." Troop withdrawals--nothing more. But no attention to the problems raised by the Syrian president, without which an overall settlement of the conflict is altogether impossible; no desire to seriously discuss questions connected with the Geneva Conference.

As for the terms themselves of the troop disengagement and how they were hatched and understood by the United States, E. Sheehan has a very interesting statement on this question. "It (the agreement--Ye.P.) contained" Sheehan writes in the American journal FOREIGN POLICY, "all the principal proposals of Dayan--in reality Dayan could be termed its secret father. It was assumed that the Israelis would pull back in Sinai beyond a line approximately 15 miles from the Suez Canal protected by a UN buffer force and would leave the Egyptians a narrow strip of territory on the east bank, where they would accordingly reduce their army from 60,000 to 7,000 men; the emplacement of missiles in a 30-kilometer-wide zone symmetrically along each line was prohibited. Al-Sadat did not promise to end the state of war, but nor did he receive a timetable of further Israeli withdrawals and he secretly promised the United States that he would allow Israeli nonmilitary cargoes to pass through the canal as soon as it had been cleared. Kissinger additionally conveyed to the Israelis a secret document in which the United States reported the Egyptian promise to clear the canal, restore the cities in the zone and resume peaceful activity in this region. Egypt and Israel agreed to American aerial reconnaissance in the disengagement zone: the document ended with the words "the United States will make every effort to fully satisfy Israel's requirements in arms supplies on a long-term, extended basis."

Naturally, without even knowing the origin of the package of all these measures, they could without particular difficulty be called a "Dayan creation."

Under the conditions that had been created the Soviet Union persistently waged a struggle for the speediest resumption of the work of the Geneva Conference for the immediate solution of the entire package of problems of a political settlement of the Near East conflict.

Simultaneously a great deal of attention was paid to the preparation of an agreement on the disengagement of Syrian and Israeli troops on the Golan Heights. There were compelling reasons for persistent attention to this question. Following the first troop disengagement in Sinai, there had emerged the real threat of the concentration of Israel's forces on the front with

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Syria, considering that Egypt's participation in military operations in the event of an new outbreak of war in the Near East would have been rendered difficult. Under these circumstances the disengagement of troops on the Golan Heights was an urgent necessity. At the same time Soviet diplomacy was implementing a number of active measures to exclude conditions unacceptable to the Arab side in the troop disengagement on the Golan Heights.

After prolonged preparation, which included the USSR foreign minister's trips to the Near East and his meetings with the U.S. secretary of state, final documents were signed in Geneva on 5 June 1974 determining the procedure for and time of the disengagement of Syrian and Israeli troops and also of the withdrawal of Israeli troops from part of Syrian territory which they had occupied. These documents provided for the release of territory with a total area of 663 square kilometers, including 112 square kilometers with the city of al-Qunaytirah, which was captured by Israel in 1967. In a message to the CPSU Central Committee general secretary the Syrian president emphasized that Syria "values highly the support of the Soviet Union and all friendly countries."

The opposite nature of the approaches to a political settlement of the Near East conflict on the part of the Soviet Union and the United States was shown even more distinctly following the troop disengagement on the Golan Heights. While the USSR was constantly and tirelessly calling for a resumption of the Geneva Conference with the participation of PLO representatives for a comprehensive settlement through the eradication of all the reasons which gave rise to and which maintain the conflict the United States was continuing to proceed with the "partial-measures" policy. Concealing its reluctance to agree to a resumption of the Geneva Conference, the State Department advanced the argument of the need for its careful preparation. The Soviet Union declared that there should be careful preparation, but that the discussions thereon could not serve as justification for frustrating the idea of a resumption of the conference.

At this time it became clear that the U.S. State Department was, together with other aims (we have already mentioned these: "squeezing" the USSR out of the Near East, splitting the Arab world, liquidation of the military results of the October 1973 war unfavorable to Israel and the freezing on a new basis of the "no war, no peace" situation in the Near East), linking a further task with the "step-by-step" tactic--blunting the keenness and, possibly, altogether neutralizing for a prolonged period the Palestinian problem and burying it in partial, separate agreements.

The diplomatic activeness developed around the question of the "troop disengagement" on the West Bank of the River Jordan is of interest in this connection.

Accompanying President Nixon on his trip to Israel in June 1974, the U.S. secretary of state argued the American position on this question to the Israeli leadership thus: "The choice facing Israel is not simply whether

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to negotiate or not negotiate with King Husayn. The choice is whether to negotiate with Husayn now or be forced to negotiate with PLO leader Yasir 'Arafat later. Each day without an agreement with the king of Jordan strengthens the positions of the Palestinian organizations in the Arab world."

For the reasons mentioned by the U.S. secretary of state the United States set as its priority goal the achievement of a partial settlement of relations between Israel and Jordan. Washington's contacts with Amman were developed intensively on this question. As far as the Palestinian leaders were concerned, they qualified the planned agreement on the "disengagement of Jordanian and Israeli troops" as an attempt to put part of the West Bank under the control of Jordanian administration, leaving the other part under the Israeli military authorities and thereby in practice canceling out the Palestinian people's right to self-determination.

A number of H. Kissinger's talks with the Israeli leadership was subordinated to the task of reaching an agreement on the disengagement of Israel's and Jordan's troops. This was one of the main themes during King Husayn's stay in Washington in March 1974. The American-Jordanian communique devoted to his stay in the United States contained direct support for the disengagement of Israeli and Jordanian troops.

Yet such an agreement could still not be reached. It was torpedoed at this stage by Israel, which feared that an agreement would render more difficult its struggle to annex the territories of the West Bank of the River Jordan and Gaza in one form or another.

It is highly significant that an "argument" employed by American diplomacy (claiming to "have a broader view of things than Israel" and, on this basis, "defend its interests better than Israel itself") in its attempts to win over Tel Aviv to a partial settlement with Jordan amounted to intimidating it with the "alternative" in the form of the Geneva Conference. In conversation with Y. Allon, who arrived in Washington at the end of July 1974, the secretary of state said that, given a prolonged pause in his "step-by-step" tactics, there would be no other possibility than to resume the work of the Geneva Conference "in that the Soviets are putting pressure on in this direction and that there are limits to how long they can be kept outside of the process."

The possibility of the realization of the American plan of a partial Jordanian-Israeli agreement in 1974 was finally undermined by a decision of a conference of heads of Arab states in October 1974 in Rabat. According to this decision, which was adopted unanimously (by Jordan also), the PLO was recognized as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Under these conditions Jordan could no longer act as a party in the negotiations on the fate of the West Bank, which is populated, as is known, by Palestinians.

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Israel gave the decision of the Rabat conference a hostile reception and used it for an even further hardening of its position in relation to a resumption of the Geneva Conference, putting forward the unconditional demand for the exclusion of PLO representatives from participation therein. This demand, which actually blocked the convening of the forum for a political settlement of the Near East conflict, was entirely and fully supported by the United States.

When it became clear that the maneuver related to a partial Jordanian-Israeli agreement had failed, the United States again concentrated its attention on Egypt. "Kissinger's long-term strategy," the NEW YORK TIMES wrote on 2 June 1974, "according to the statements of his associates, consists of attempts to neutralize Egypt as a factor in the Near East conflict."

In the light of all this it was obviously not fortuitous that at the end of 1974 and the start of 1975 voices intensified in a number of countries, including Egypt, saying that the Soviet Union should be involved in a settlement of the Near East conflict only at the "final" stage. This maneuver was aimed at isolating the Arab states, weakening their ability to withstand pressure on the part of imperialist circles, dragging out the process of a political settlement in the Near East ad infinitum and essentially returning to the state of "no war, no peace," which was fraught with an inevitable new explosion. Under these conditions the USSR foreign minister made a number of trips to the Near East. The Soviet-Egyptian and Soviet-Syrian communiqués issued during A. A. Gromyko's stay in Egypt and Syria in February 1975 recorded the need for the speediest convening of the Geneva Conference.

But because of the position of Israel, which was supported by the United States, the Geneva Conference was not resumed. In its place U.S. diplomacy began to strive in earnest for a second partial agreement between Israel and Egypt.

The year of 1975 began with U.S. Secretary of State H. Kissinger's trips to the Near East, during which he had intensive talks with Israel and Egypt on a second troop disengagement in Sinai. However, it was announced on 22 March that the Kissinger mission had failed. The secretary of state returned to the United States without having signed an agreement, which, in the opinion of the journalists accompanying him, was more than 50-percent ready.

After it became clear that an Egyptian-Israeli agreement would not be signed at that time, U.S. Administration circles made it understood that the Geneva Conference was to be the "next step." Thus U.S. President G. Ford said in an interview with representatives of Hearst newspapers on 28 March 1975: "I do not believe we now have any other choice than a return to Geneva." Simultaneously the American press was writing about the U.S. Administration's displeasure with Israel's "inflexible" policy. It was reported that President Ford had ordered a review of U.S. Near East policy. There were also hints of the possible abandonment of planned arms supplies to Israel. But it soon became clear that Washington was not thinking of changing course. It was obvious that the American tactic of a "step-by-step" settlement in the Near East could continue.

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In addition, certain Near East experts advanced the supposition according to which the "failure" of American efforts in March had been "programmed." In their opinion, the demonstration of "inflexibility" was favorable at that time for a strengthening of the position of the ruling groups both in Egypt and in Israel. One way or another, immediately following the "failure" of the Kissinger mission American diplomacy continued efforts to prepare a second troop disengagement in Sinai.

In August of the same year Kissinger again flew to the Near East and again began his "shuttle diplomacy." On 4 September 1975 Egypt and Israel signed a new agreement, which recorded a certain pull-back of Israeli troops, the handover to the Egyptians of a substantial part of the two passes--Mitla and Gidi--the expansion of the UN buffer zone and the setting up in the passes of an early-warning service with American personnel. In accordance with this agreement, Egypt also acquired the Abu Budays oilfields, which, in the testimony of many experts, had been predatorily worked by Israel during the occupation and which were no longer of serious value as a result of their sharply diminished resources. At the same time Egypt undertook to allow nonmilitary cargo for Israel through the Suez Canal.

In accordance with the new agreement, Egypt secured the return of only a small part of the territory of Sinai, more than 90 percent of it remaining Israeli-occupied. The second troop-disengagement agreement introduced a new element into the Near East situation: the United States had unilaterally stationed its personnel in Sinai, acquiring in practice the possibility of viewing and listening to all Egyptian territory.

The Egyptian-Israeli Sinai agreement aroused serious opposition in the Arab world. A Syrian Ba'ath Party statement, which says that the Egyptian-Israeli agreement omits all mention of the other Arab territories under Israeli occupation and completely bypasses the problems of the Palestinian Arab people, is typical in this respect. The Ba'ath Party emphasized that this ignores the integrity of the Arab problem and creates the danger of a slide toward the methods of separate actions. The statement also observed that the American presence in the region and the United States' inclusion in the struggle as a direct party at a time when Arab efforts have been aimed at excluding the United States from the struggle ensue from the Egyptian-Israeli agreement.

The Egyptian-Israeli agreement on a second troop disengagement in Sinai also elicited sharp criticism from the majority of other Arab countries and the PLO.

It has already been mentioned that E. Sheehan called Sayan the "father" of the first agreement on troop disengagement in Sinai. This observation certainly applies even more to the second Egyptian-Israeli agreement. And, moreover, linking the idea of troop disengagement between Israel and Egypt with the name of Dayan is not a rhetorical exercise. This link reflects actual reality.

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Matti Golan writes in the book we have already cited that in 1970 disagreements emerged in the Israeli leadership concerning the tactics with respect to Egypt. After August 1970, when agreement had been reached on extending the cease-fire in the Suez Canal Zone for the next 3 months, Dayan, fearing a resumption of the "war of attrition," which had cost Israel dearly, proposed a partial agreement: a pull-back of the Israeli troops to the line of the Mitla and Gidi passes in Sinai with a negligible presence of Egyptian troops on the east bank. In September 1970 these proposals appeared in the press with a reference to "sources close to Dayan." The defense minister himself gave as the reason for his proposal the "optimal nature" of this solution for Israel, considering the situation that had taken shape, meaning, naturally, "optimal" from the viewpoint of the plans for holding on to as much as possible of the territory captured by Israel. Dayan asserted that "the Israeli presence on the canal is a far from ideal solution from the military and political viewpoints.... His first argument was strategic: the Mitla and Gidi passes are a far better line of defense than the canal. The second argument was psychological and practical: Egypt would never agree to Israel sitting on the bank of the canal." The events of October 1973 showed that these arguments were not without foundation.

In December 1973, during talks with Kissinger, Dayan familiarized the secretary of state with his "personal" plan, which "was almost identical" to the proposals which he had put forward back in 1970. According to M. Golan, the secretary of state initiated "the process of converting Dayan's personal position into the official position of preparing for negotiations." This process, with certain modifications, culminated in the signing of the second partial agreement between Egypt and Israel.

In addition to the negative results of the agreement mentioned in the Ba'ath Party statement quoted above it would be possible to cite one further result of the second Sinai troop-disengagement agreement which is extremely negative for the Arabs: considering the change in the correlation of forces which was manifested in October 1973, Israel obtained more than favorable terms from the military standpoint. The transfer of the passes to Egypt was to a large extent nominal. In the Gidi pass the Israelis retained a strategically important height along the northern parameter and certain hills which dominate the locality, only slightly bending their line westward between the passes. At the same time, with the continuing occupation of Arab, including Egyptian, land, Israel secured itself with the help of the American early-warning station against all "surprises" in a confrontation with the militarily strongest Arab country--Egypt--which in practice found itself neutralized for an indefinite length of time.

"The second Sinai agreement," E. Sheehan wrote, "was Israel's principal tactical triumph. It gave up the slight (in the admission of several Israeli generals) strategic value of the passes (and, as the facts show, not even that entirely--Ye.P.) and obtained from the United States moral, financial and military support enjoyed by no other state."

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Whereas Dayan's "authorship" had secured the purely military terms of the second Sinai agreement favorable to Israel, there was obviously no less significance in the pluses which this agreement guaranteed Israel in the military-political sphere. On 3 December 1974 the Israeli prime minister gave an interview to the newspaper HA'ARETZ which struck many people by its frankness. Rabin declared that "Israel's main aim is to gain time"--only 7 years approximately, according to the prime minister, during which Europe and the United States will have succeeded in freeing themselves from dependence on Arab oil. Rabin said that during this "pause" Israel could deal with partial agreements, but that it should "avoid" a total settlement until the time when the United States, relieved of all oil commitments, would cease to fight for terms which Israel considers "unsuitable."

In other words, Rabin was advocating a new round of "no war, no peace" in the Near East. For a guarantee of such a period Tel Aviv put forward a demand for Egypt's abandonment of the state of war with Israel. The Egyptian leadership declared that it could not agree to this until a final settlement of the Near East conflict, however, in practice the second Sinai agreement implied a guarantee that Israel was entering a new period of "no war, no peace" in relations with Egypt. "You have obtained all the military elements of a cessation of the state of war," the U.S. secretary of state said, addressing the Israeli leaders. "You have obtained 'a renunciation of the use of force'."

The talks which the U.S. secretary of state held with the Israeli leadership are of great cognitive value. The contents of the "irritable," "strained" talks of 22 March 1974, during which Kissinger, who already knew of the impending interruption of several months in his mission, presented his arguments in a deliberately unbridled form, are particularly important for a characterization of the second Sinai agreement. In response to Allon's additional demands and complaints H. Kissinger said: "The agreement is intended to afford the United States, as before, the opportunity of controlling the diplomatic process. Compared with this, the position of a line 8 kilometers nearer or farther does not, frankly, seem very important."

The secretary of state interpreted this proposition by the "rule of contraries" method, painting a hypothetical picture of what would emerge in the event of there being no second agreement: "We have no illusion. The Arab leaders who have counted on the United States would be discredited. You put obstacles in the way of "step-by-step" diplomacy first for Jordan and then for Egypt. We will lose control. We now see how the Arabs are creating a united front. Great emphasis will be put on the Palestinians, and there will be a link between movement (of a settlement--Ye.P.) in Sinai and the Golan. The Soviets will again appear on the scene. The United States will lose control over events, and we will have to adapt to this reality. The Europeans will be forced to broaden their relations with the Arabs.... There will be attempts to drive a wedge between Israel and the United States not because we wish this but because such will be the dynamics of the situation. Let us not deceive ourselves."

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It is difficult to resist quoting one further "explanation" of the secretary of state to the Israeli leadership during these "difficult talks": "We (that is, the United States--Ye.P.) attempted to reconcile support for you (that is, Israel--Ye.P.) with our other interests in the Near East in such a way that you did not have to make a decision right away. Our strategy was aimed at saving you right off from all sources of pressure. If we had wanted the 1967 borders, we could have achieved this with the support of world public opinion and an appreciable section of the American public. The strategy was aimed at protecting you against this. We avoided the formulation of an overall plan of global settlement. Compared with the pressure on us, which is increasing, to compel a return to the 1967 borders, 10 kilometers (it is a question here of the Israelis' demand that the second boundary in Sinai then being planned be brought 8-10 kilometers closer to the Suez Canal --Ye.P.) is nothing."

You could not, as they say, have it any clearer than that.

All these aims and interests of Israel were secured by the second agreement, which was signed, as has been said, after a certain interruption in Kissinger's Near East mission. But there is more than this. An analysis of the second agreement on troop disengagement in Sinai is completed by an examination of a secret appendix thereto called, on the Israelis' insistence, a "Memoranda of Agreements Between the Governments of Israel and the United States." As a result of the internal political struggle in the United States these Memoranda were made public. Despite H. Kissinger's reluctance to familiarize the broad public with them, the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee decided to make public the documents submitted by the State Department in connection with the proposal on stationing troops in Sinai. In accordance with this decision, on 3 October 1974 the press was handed a number of materials constituting the Memoranda of Agreements Between the Governments of Israel and the United States: American-Israeli Assurances and the Memorandum of Agreement on the Geneva Peace Conference (both these documents were signed by Y. Allon and H. Kissinger) and also additional U.S. Administration Assurances to Egypt, of which Israel had been informed.

The following points may be highlighted in these documents:

1. The United States undertook "on a permanent and long-term basis to respond to Israel's military equipment requirements," including those for "the latest weapons." It was specified in an additional assurance that the United States would supply Israel with "such latest types of military equipment as the F-16 aircraft" and also "examine for its positive solution the question" of supplies to Israel of ground-to-ground and Pershing missiles with non-nuclear warheads.
2. The United States undertook to increase economic assistance to Israel in consideration of "Israel's additional expenditure on oil imports to make up for the oil which, under ordinary (?) conditions, would have been obtained from the Abu Rudays and Ra's al-Sidr oilfields (4.5 million tons in 1975)."

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3. The United States also assumed considerable commitments in the political sphere: "not to participate in any efforts by other countries which in its opinion and the opinion of Israel (it thus acquired the right to "veto" American actions not favoring its policy--Ye.P.) harm Israel's interests; not to recognize the PLO; and to consult with Israel and coordinate with it 'its position and strategy at the Geneva Conference'." In a separate clause the United States proclaimed Israel's "right" to prevent any state, group or organization (read: PLO--Ye.P.) at any subsequent stage of the conference participating therein.

4. The United States guaranteed Israel the implementation on time and in full on the part of Egypt of all the measures not settled in the troop-disengagement agreement, regardless of any actions, acts or circumstances occurring between other Arab states and Israel. In other words, the United States "guaranteed" Egypt's isolation and its exclusion as an active force from the pan-Arab struggle for liquidation of the consequences of the Israeli aggression.

The United States even made the start of implementation of the agreement on Israel's part directly conditional on Egypt's authorization for "the delivery of /all/ (my emphasis--Ye.P.) Israeli cargo via the Suez Canal."

Israel insisted on this, and the United States undertook this with the help of President al-Sadat: Egypt agreed in advance with all the clauses recorded in the secret memoranda. It was bluntly written: "The United States informed the Government of Israel that it had obtained the Egyptian Government's consent to all the above."

The Memoranda of Agreements Between the Governments of Israel and the United States were, as E. Sheehan put it, "virtually the equivalent of a marriage contract." Thus ended the extensively publicized "review" of American policy in the Near East.

Assessing the advantages which the by no means disrupted but, on the contrary, "flourishing" relations with the United States gave Israel, Prime Minister Rabin declared on 18 May 1978 in an interview with the newspaper DIE WELT: "70 percent of our arms are supplied by the United States. A further touchstone is financial assistance for arms purchases and also economic aid. A few figures: from 1948 through 1973 we received just under \$2.5 billion altogether. According to President Ford's preliminary estimates, from 1974 through 1977 we will have received \$7 billion. In the two budget years of 1976 and 1977 we are to receive \$4 billion, that is, more than half of that which we received in all 29 years up to 1977."

"Should relations between states be judged on the basis of the reports of a few correspondents or on the basis of the assistance granted Israel to achieve its national goals"? Rabin answered thus the "doubts" of those who believed in the reality of a review of U.S. policy to Israel's detriment (not in words but in reality).

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Naturally, American policy would not have succeeded in achieving an anti-Arab result had it not been able to count on taking advantage of anti-Soviet trends. The axis of power in Egypt shifted to the right after al-Nasir's death. The so-called new comprador bourgeoisie, whose principal source of income is commission and business profits obtained from cooperation with foreign capital, strengthened its positions. The small-trader circles have gained the most from the "new economic policy" pursued in recent years. They have taken advantages of the lifting of restrictions on imports and the virtual liquidation of state control of foreign trade. Approximately 500 million Egyptian pounds have been spent annually in recent years in Egypt on imports of luxury items. And this has all occurred under conditions where the growth rates of production and capital investment have been manifestly inadequate and consumption has exceeded the total national product. This picture reflects the process of the rapid enrichment of a negligible stratum of the population with the intensifying process of the impoverishment of the bulk of the Egyptian people. "One-tenth of the population consumes 45 percent of the national product. Of this 10 percent, 2.5 percent consumes 23 percent of the product. Al-Sadat administers in the interests of this minority. He forgets about the remaining 90 percent," Lufti al-Khuli, former chief editor of the journal AL-TALI'AH (VANGUARD), declared in an interview with MATIN DE PARIS.

President al-Sadat's decrees have given largely uncontrolled access to Egypt to foreign capital. A ban on its activity in many spheres of the economy has been lifted. From June 1974 through the start of 1977 more than 150 decrees and enactments were adopted defining the interests of foreign investors of capital. Foreign capital has been granted access to industry, agriculture and finance. Some 25 foreign and mixed banks, that is, almost as many as there were in 1956, on the eve of the nationalization of the credit and banking system, were operating in Egypt at the start of 1977. Egypt's economic policy in recent years, providing guarantees for foreign companies, has actually led to the point where foreign capital is authorized to deal directly with local firms without any controlling role on the part of the state. A considerably lighter taxation practice has been introduced in relation to foreign capital: it is not liable to nationalization, and the unrestricted export of profits abroad is permitted.

The private sector has acquired scope for its development. The state sector has been cut down and, following the liquidation of the general organizations, it has virtually lost those of its planning principles which were introduced in its operation under al-Nasir. As a result the state enterprises act in the market as private commercial entities. A revision of the provisions of the 1962 National Charter in the part which regulates the mutual relations of the state and private sectors is essentially underway.

A number of decrees has been directed at strengthening the economic positions of the landowner and rich peasant. They acquired the right to expel from the land the peasant tenants who could not keep up with the increased rents.

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Liquidation of the system of peasant cooperatives has begun. They are being replaced by so-called village banks; according to the Cairo press, these "banks" extend credit and sell seed and fertilizer to landowners on the same terms as to the poor peasants.

Egypt's economy has run into the most serious problems. The course which had found concentrated expression in the so-called open doors policy has led to an intensification of the pro-West orientation of the country's entire economic life. This has increased the pernicious influence on Egypt of the inflationary processes developing in the capitalist world. According to official figures, the level of inflation at the end of 1976 compared with 1973 constituted 35 percent. The London journal THE ECONOMIST believes this figure to be much higher--close to 50 percent.

The reorientation toward the West has contributed to the growth of the balance of trade deficit. According to available estimates, with a gross national product of \$11 billion, the balance of trade deficit in 1976 constituted \$2.5-3 billion, while the foreign debt (including current liabilities) amounted to \$18 billion. The country is consuming far more than it is producing. Egypt's debts are growing constantly. In order to pay off the interest on loans from the Arab oil-producing countries and, to an appreciably lesser extent, from Western sources Egypt has additionally been forced into increasingly heavy borrowing.

A number of researchers believes that a departure from a socialist orientation toward a restoration of capitalism as the basic structure occurred in Egypt in the mid-1970's. It is not fortuitous that this departure has been accompanied by an increase in social conflicts. There has been an increase in the number of strikes. Mid-January 1977 was marked by a real social upheaval which extended to all of Egypt. There were demonstrations involving thousands in the streets of Cairo, Alexandria and other Egyptian cities; strikes erupted at a number of major enterprises like the Helwan Metallurgical Combine; and workers, students and artisans took to the streets. The protest demonstrations followed a government decision to raise the prices of basic necessities. Police units and army subunits were sent in against the demonstrators. In AL-AHRAM's estimate, 65 people were killed and 800 injured. The security organs arrested more than 2,000 people. But, despite all these punitive actions, the Egyptian leadership was still forced to retreat under the people's pressure and cancel the decision to raise the prices of consumer goods.

It is significant that the Egyptian Government is attempting to attribute all its internal difficulties, which are the inevitable result of the "open doors" policy, to the "machinations" of Marxist groups inside the country or the policy of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

The author does not consider it his job to illustrate in detail in the book the considerable changes in Egypt in the social, economic and political

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spheres. It is worth emphasizing, however, that these changes have been largely supported, sometimes inspired and, in any event, always willingly utilized by American policy.

The culmination of the anti-Soviet actions was al-Sadat's unilateral decision to end the USSR-ARE Friendship and Cooperation Treaty on 15 March 1976. Many newspapers have written of the connection between his decision to denounce the treaty and U.S. policy. According to Algeria's AL-MOUDJAHID, the ARE president was acting the role of persistent petitioner of the United States and Saudi Arabia, which set his pursuit of an anti-Soviet policy as their terms for extensive economic assistance to Egypt. The U.S. secretary of state, whether in an aspiration to influence the U.S. Congress, stimulating its approval of economic aid to Egypt, or in the interests of personal prestige, particularly under the conditions where the failure in Indochina had struck at his reputation, declared for all to hear that he had known for 6 days about al-Sadat's intention of denouncing the Soviet-Egyptian treaty.

The struggle concerning a political settlement of the Near East conflict by the time of the appearance of this book is still far from over. But it is already perfectly clear that the American "step-by-step" tactic has absolutely failed to promote the establishment of lasting and just peace in the Near East.

As Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, said, "there are those, apparently, who would like to propose to the Arab peoples something in the nature of a soporific in the hope that they will calm down and forget about their demands for the restoration of justice and the complete liquidation of the consequences of aggression. But a soporific deadens the senses for only a short time, after which the person wakes up and finds that he is confronted with the same real life with its problems.... All this indicates that there is no substitute for a real, lasting peace settlement. And to delay it is impermissible, if we do not wish to display a complete disregard for the fate of the countries and peoples of the Near East (including, it stands to reason, Israel, whose people can hardly be interested in living endlessly under the conditions of a country which has been converted into a military camp) and the fate of universal peace."

It is significant that a sober, realistic attitude toward the problems of a settlement had begun to show through in the United States by the mid-1970's. The paper "Toward Peace in the Near East," which was compiled at the end of 1975 by a Near East study group of the Brookings Institution, attracted attention in this plane. The group included the following prominent representatives of U.S. political science: Morroe Berger (Princeton University), Robert Bowie (Harvard University), Zbigniew Brzezinski (Columbia University), John Campbell (Foreign Relations Council), Malcolm Kerr (University of California, Los Angeles), William Quandt (University of Pennsylvania), Nadav Safran (Harvard University), Charles Yost (Brookings Institution) and others. "This paper merits the attention of the American public and the U.S. Administration," Kermit Gordon, president of the Brookings Institution, writes in a foreword.

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The group of Americans, who, according to K. Gordon, "know the Near East and want the United States to help this region achieve peace," concluded that the "Sinai agreement, as before, essentially leaves untouched the basic elements of the Arab-Israeli conflict. If attention is not paid to these elements very soon, the acute tension in this region will lead to the increased risk of forcible actions. We believe that the best method of a solution of these problems is the achievement of an all-embracing agreement."

Another of the study group's conclusions is also of a fundamental nature: "The main basis for a settlement should be the conclusion with mutual consent of an accord taking into consideration both the Israeli demand for peace and security and the Arab demand for evacuation from the territories occupied in 1967 and the granting of self-determination to the Palestinians."

The group advocated the provisions of an all-embracing peace agreement providing for a whole number of commitments being implemented in stages, which "should be firmly determined in the agreements." "International corroboration and guarantees are, undoubtedly, the next requirement." The group of American researchers emphasized that here "the United States should act in conjunction with the USSR."

Certain recommendations or the wording of these proposals give rise to doubts or appear simply unacceptable. However, together with this, the main point catches the attention: many prominent representatives of American academic circles are coming to the conclusion that the methods of "partial steps" are unacceptable and that what is needed is an overall settlement, which cannot be achieved without the withdrawal of Israeli troops to the line of 4 June 1967, without the Palestinian people being given the right to self-determination and, which is also of considerable importance, without the active participation in a settlement of the Soviet Union.

However, there is still a gap between these conclusions and the practical deeds of the U.S. Administration. It was not closed even after certain of the Brookings Institution authors crossed over to the state apparatus: Brzezinski became President Carter's assistant for national security, and Quandt headed the Near East desk in the National Security Council.

Chapter VI. Regularities of the Transitions to the Crisis Stage

We have examined the causes engendering and maintaining the permanent status of the Near East conflict. These same causes, upon their sharp exacerbation--either simultaneously, in a complex, or a part of them--have formed the basis of the conflict's development into the stage of an international-political crisis. Thus it was in 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973. And, moreover, the hierarchy of factors causing the conflict's growth into crisis stages has changed depending on the correlation of forces of the parties to the conflict, the situation in the Near East, the specific interests of the imperialist powers, the degree of development of the national liberation process in the Arab world and the international situation as a whole.

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Each transition to the stage of an international-political crisis has thus presupposed its own hierarchy of "stimulating factors" characteristic of it alone. However, their collection has not gone and does not go beyond the framework of the general causes of the Near East conflict--Israel's policy in relation to the Arab Palestinian people, which has led to the latter being deprived of the right to self-determination; the contradictions between Israel and the neighboring Arab states caused by the Israeli leadership's expansionist policy; and the use of the Near East conflict by a number of imperialist states in the interests of their own policy.

Let us examine the concrete instances of the Arab-Israeli conflict's transition to the crisis stage.

The 1948 Palestine War

In 1948, immediately following the creation of the state of Israel, the armies of a number of Arab countries entered the territory of Palestine, and the first Palestine war began. What was the basis of this transition to crisis?

1. The policy of the imperialist states. "There are few who now remember," the Israeli researcher Uri Davis wrote, "that armies participated on the Arab side in the war in 1948 which were armed and trained by the British and even partially led by British commanders. Great Britain, having lost its Palestine mandate in connection with the 1947 UN plan and Israel's subsequent proclamation of independence, perfectly obviously aspired to establish its control in this region as a result of the victory of the Arab countries."

Simultaneously imperialist circles, in this case no longer British but chiefly American, were gambling on the Zionist movement's victory over the Arabs and the strengthening of Israel, thinking of the possibility of utilizing it as a base for the implementation of their own policy in the region. G. Shocken, publisher and editor of the Israeli newspaper HA'ARETZ has written frankly about the motives for this gamble on Israel's victory over the Arabs: "The West was not delighted with its relations with the countries in the Near East. The feudal regimes in the region were having to make concessions to the nationalist movements, which sometimes adopted a socialist, left-leaning slant, which was leading to these regimes supplying Britain and the United States with their natural resources and making territory available for military bases with ever increasing reluctance.... Thus the strengthening of Israel would help the Western states maintain equilibrium and stability in the Near East. Israel was to become the watchdog. There were no fears that Israel would take any aggressive steps in relation to the Arab countries if this were contrary to the wishes of the United States or Britain. However, if for some reason or another the Western states were to sometimes prefer to close their eyes to this, Israel could link itself with the administering of a punishment to one or several neighboring states whose disobedience to the West was going beyond the permitted limits."

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Thus during the first Palestine war the imperialist circles backed both parties to the conflict and urged on both these parties to step up their actions. Perhaps at that time Britain was to a large extent acting to strengthen its own positions and had subordinated to this not only sympathies and antipathies but also actual involvement in the process of the growth of the Near East conflict into the crisis stage. As far as the United States was concerned, "global questions" connected with the aspiration to strengthen the positions of the entire capitalist world (under U.S. hegemonism, naturally) in the struggle against national liberation movements and the world revolutionary process as a whole occupied an increasingly large place as the basis of its policy in 1948.

2. Israel's expansionist policy. We have said previously that the Zionist and, subsequently, Israeli leadership set as a principal goal the preparation of conditions for the state's territorial expansion. It was shown how this policy was even being implemented on the eve of the first Palestine war and, moreover, how plans were being constructed for the further expansion of the territory of Israel. The Arab countries knew of these plans, and this also could not have failed to have played its role, creating the psychological climate right for orders for the armies of a number of Arab countries to enter the territory of Palestine.

3. The policy of the Zionist circles aimed at squeezing out the Palestinian population from the land on which it lived. This line, which was directly implemented or underpinned by forcible measures, gave rise to armed resistance on the part of the Palestinian population supported by the governments of certain Arab countries. The Zionist movement's anti-Palestinian policy played its role in the creation of the political and psychological climate right for the decision by a number of Arab countries, urged on by Britain, to commit their troops to the territory of Palestine.

4. The extremism of certain Arab circles whose goal was liquidation of the state of Israel. Negativism in relation to this state took the form of rejection of the UN General Assembly resolution on the partition of Palestine.

In aggregate all these causes, which intensified on the eve of the proclamation of the state of Israel and became connected with one another, formed the basis of the sharp exacerbation which led to the first Palestine war of 1948.

The 1956 Tripartite Aggression Against Egypt

The 1956 crisis fell not only in appearance but also in essence even further into the category of international-political crises. The following were the cause of it:

1. The imperialist policy of Britain and France. Immediately after Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, these two West European countries, with definite coordination with the dominating power in the capitalist world--

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the United States*--began to prepared an armed action against the al-Nasir regime. This preparation, as shown earlier, proceeded in parallel with political-diplomatic measures aimed at depriving Egypt of the victory it had won through nationalization of the Suez Canal Company.

2. The policy of Israel, which was aimed at ousting the al-Nasir regime, which had shown at this time its possibilities for uniting the anti-imperialist forces in the Arab world and organizing resistance to Israel's expansionist policy.

Each participants in the tripartite aggression was pursuing goals whose amalgamation into a single complex insured the Near East conflict's transformation into the crisis stage in 1956.

A realistic analysis of the causes of the Near East conflict's development into the crisis stage of 1956 reveals the utter groundlessness of the two pseudotheories that 1) the conflicts of "Britain and France against Egypt" and "Israel against Egypt" simply coincided in time and were "superimposed" on one another and did not represent a unified whole--a direct conspiracy of three of Egypt's enemies; and that 2) Israel was fighting for its security and had made the goal of removing the threat to its existence on the part of Egypt and the Palestinian fedayeen of paramount importance.

Both these pseudotheories became widespread both in Western, not to mention Israeli, literature and in the pronouncements of a number of statesmen, particularly of Britain and Israel. Thus the British foreign secretary declared on 31 October 1956 in the House of Commons that "there was no prior agreement" between his country and Israel, which had attacked Egypt. On 20 December 1956 A. Eden, prime minister of Great Britain, went further, emphasizing that his country had altogether "no advance data to indicate that Israel might attack Egypt."

These statements utterly falsified reality. Britain and France had begun to work on the "military alternative" immediately after Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. At the end of June both the British and French governments instructed their war ministers to prepare detailed plans of military operations against Egypt. At this time Eden sent U.S. President Eisenhower a telegram which said, in part: "My colleagues and I are certain that we must be prepared in the last resort to use force to make al-Nasir listen to reason. For our part, we are ready to do this. This morning I gave instructions to the chiefs of staff to prepare the corresponding military plan."

U.S. Secretary of State Dulles arrived in London on 1 August. While not supporting the immediate use of military force against al-Nasir Dulles nevertheless uttered a sacramental sentence which immediately reassured Eden: "We must find a means of forcing al-Nasir to choke on what he is trying to swallow."

*The U.S. position on the eve of and during the 1956 crisis was discussed in detail in the previous section.

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This day and the next the French advocated the speediest use of military force against Egypt. The British General Staff objected that it would take at least 6 weeks to prepare an operation for Anglo-French forces to restore international control over the canal zone. A group of Anglo-French experts began to prepare the operation on 5 August. The initial outline of the plan was ready on 8 August, accepted by Eden on 10 August and later confirmed by French Premier Guy Mollet. The question of the base for the attack was soon solved. The British weekly THE ECONOMIST wrote on 24 November 1956: "At a very early stage the idea of an attack on Suez from the base in Aden was rejected as impracticable; the idea of an attack on Alexandria from Libya was also rejected, although a rumor concerning this plan had, it seems, reached President al-Nasir insofar as on 30 October he sent his best tank brigade to Alexandria. Cyprus is the closest base to Egypt, and the chiefs of staff claim it is essential." Malta was chosen as another base.

Following the choice of bases for the invasion, the extensive mobilization of reservists of the recovery service, signallers and personnel of the ordnance supplies and clothing service began. The transfer of military combined units to the islands of Cyprus and Malta was accelerated. On the second day after the London conference of 22 states on the question of the Suez Canal, on 25 August, the DAILY MAIL testified that for the past 3 weeks British troops, tanks and armaments had been setting off almost daily for the Mediterranean. The French Command was officially authorized to billet its armed forces at the British bases in the East Mediterranean. The accelerated transfer for French troops to the island of Cyprus began.

The slight delay in the start of operation "Musketeer"--this was the code-name of the Anglo-French plan for the attack on Egypt--was also connected with the position of the United States. For a whole number of reasons, which we discussed earlier, it did not openly join the "club" which was preparing an attack on Egypt. Prof H. Thomas believes that the United States was trying "to postpone the military operations at least until the presidential election in November 1956. This delay was unacceptable to British and France, which thus decided to use Israel's long-standing desire for a preventive war as the fuse for their own operations."

The chief of the Israeli Army General Staff later said that a "political alliance" had been concluded between the three countries. In actual fact it was not only a question of a political but also a military alliance and of the complete military coordination of the three countries which carried out the attack on Egypt. And this alliance did not come about spontaneously and on the eve of the start of the war but considerably earlier.

Israel's contacts with France, which were established shortly after the accession to power of the Guy Mollet government (January 1955), were the prelude to the alliance. One of the first persons he received as premier was S. Peres, the representative of Israel's Defense Ministry. By this time Peres already had good relations with the new French Defense Minister Bourges-Maunoury, which had been established during the latter's time spent as

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interior minister in the previous French Government. Relations between the Israeli and French defense ministries became closer than they had ever been formerly, and France promised to secretly supply Israel with all the arms it needed. To cover up this secret Tel Aviv resorted to disinformation: Israeli diplomats in a number of Western capitals continued to demand arms deliveries to their country, claiming that it had no sources of arms supply.

"There was an important meeting between Israeli (headed by Shimon Peres) and French military and political figures on 28 July in the Bois de Bologne," H. Thomas writes. "From the start of August the Israelis obtained from France almost all the types of weapon they had requested. French sources pay particular attention to one further Franco-Israeli meeting, which was held on 7 August in Paris. The French familiarized Israel with the military plans which had been drawn up in conjunction with Great Britain. Thus, as General Dayan's published diaries make clear, the Israeli chief of staff knew the details of operation "Musketeer" (and, presumably, the possible date of its commencement) by 1 September. He also knew that the Anglo-French threat had forced al-Nasir to withdraw one-half of his army from Sinai, including a tank brigade."

At this time Bourges-Maunoury and his entourage embarked on the direct coordination of their military plans with Nishry, the Israeli military attache in Paris. On 17 September Dayan gave his staff the job of examining variants of an invasion of Sinai in connection with the Anglo-French plans for the use of military force against Egypt. A. Thomas, head of the secretariat of the French Defense Ministry, and [Mangin], assistant French defense minister, flew to Tel Aviv the following week. Shimon Peres flew to Paris on 24 September. Commenting on the coordination of military plans with France which was underway, Ben-Gurion declared at a session of his party's leaders: "We will soon have a true ally."

There were impressive grounds for these words. And it was not just a question of Israeli-French contacts, moreover. Secret meetings were already being held at that time in Paris on a tripartite level--with the participation of British military representatives. It was decided to abandon the initial intention of carrying out an Anglo-French assault landing in Alexandria. The choice of Port Said as the site for the landing was connected with the fact that the Anglo-French intervention had already now been linked operationally with the Israeli invasion of Sinai. "The plan of the Anglo-French Joint Command, according to which the attack would be launched via Port Said in the canal zone, had been formulated by 26 September. The French proposal for an airborne assault landing, which was expressed contrary to British opinion, was rejected. They settled for a massed amphibious assault landing combined with vigorous air support."

Peres again flew to Paris on 29 September, but this time with M. Dayan, Foreign Minister G. Meir and Transport Minister M. Karmel. The next day Dayan and Peres met with Pineau, Bourges-Maunoury and his assistants.

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Meetings were continued with Ely, chief of the French Army General Staff, who sent generals Challe and Martin and Colonel Simon to Israel to definitively learn the Israeli Army's arms and ammunition requirements. After his trip to Israel, General Challe flew to the United States and then got down to working out the strategic plan of coordination of the operations of the Israeli Army and the armies of the allies. General Beaufre--later commander of the French forces during the tripartite aggression--was working with his staff not only on the "winter plan" which had been submitted by the British but also on linking it with the problems posed by the "hypothetical situation" of Israel initiating action.

Ben-Gurion was also extensively informed via Paris of the Anglo-French contacts which had taken place without Israeli representatives participating. However, he needed direct confirmation from the British concerning the joint operations, a direct link with London obliging Britain, as he believed, to implement the coordinated plans, despite the "special" position of the United States. Immediately after the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, Julian Amery, secretary of the "Suez group" in the British Parliament, "who had suddenly become persona grata in the British Foreign Ministry," formed an association with Peres. The following words of British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd to his Canadian colleague Lester Pearson on 7 September also had a promising ring for Ben-Gurion: "If everything continues as before, you know that Israel might take advantage of the situation and move against Egypt. Frankly speaking, I would not condemn them for this."

But all this was still not enough for Ben-Gurion. He wanted greater certainty. London also apparently wanted greater certainty. An embittered anti-Jordan campaign was kicked up in Israel at the start of October. Its instigators emphasized that the danger for Israel was coming from the bases of Palestinian fedayeen on Jordanian territory (it is known that the boundary with Egypt was generally "quiet" at that time). Matters were not confined to a campaign of words. On 10 October the Israeli military carried out a piratical raid against the Jordanian village of Qalqiliyah. To the surprise of many people, there was an angry reaction to this act by London, which warned Israel against a repetition of such attacks. In addition to attempts to play--this did not cost anything!--on the feelings of the Arabs and mollify the anti-British sentiments in the Arab world,* Britain aspired to confirm Israel in its intention of concentrating entirely on preparing the attack against Egypt. It has already been mentioned that the Egyptian-Israeli boundary was very quiet at that time and that the Israeli leadership had absolutely no grounds for anxiety concerning Israel's security.

*"Britain had been given prior notice of the possibility of this raid (of Israel against Jordan--Ye.P.) by the French and used it as an opportunity to demonstrate the pro-Arab trend of British foreign policy," the work "Controlling Small Wars" by Bloomfield and Lees says.

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In his memoirs Eden describes the 16 October meeting in Paris, where he and S. Lloyd held talks with Guy Mollet and Pineau. After a brief discussion of the events in connection with Israel's incursion into Jordan on 10 October, it was decided, according to Eden, that "in the event of Israeli intervention, it would be better, from our viewpoint, if this were to be against Egypt." Ben-Gurion was, as they say, quick to grasp this signal. Rejecting all talk of "the threat of the fedayeen operating from Jordanian territory," in his Knesset speech on 17 October he declared, surprisingly for many Western researchers even: "The most serious danger confronting Israel is an attack (?) by the Egyptian dictator."

On 22 October Ben-Gurion, Dayan and Peres flew to Paris. The final series of secret meetings, in which Guy Mollet, Pineau and Bourges-Maunoury participated on the French side and S. Lloyd and Patrick Dean, who had arrived in Paris secretly, on the British, prior to the invasion began in the French capital. Ben-Gurion advocated that Britain and France undertake to blockade the Egyptian airfields and destroy the Egyptian Air Force at the time of the Israeli intervention. S. Lloyd's stay in France was extremely short; he left behind Dean, who prepared in triplicate a document for three signatures. Evidently, Ben-Gurion was not happy with Dean signing on behalf of Great Britain, and the document was sent to London for "a more reliable signature, which, evidently, was forthcoming."

Pineau also flew to London, while Ben-Gurion and those who had traveled with him from Israel awaited his return in Paris. According to A. Nutting, minister of state of Great Britain, S. Lloyd told him that Pineau would leave London with assurances for Ben-Gurion: "He has no need to fear that he will be left in the lurch."

The two operations--"Musketeer" and "Kadesh" (the codename of the Israeli plan for the invasion of Sinai)--which were locked together, were initiated on 29 October. Israel was entrusted with the role of leading the operation. Its paratroops were dropped into the Mitla Pass. Israel's mechanized units rushed into Sinai and, overcoming Egyptian Army resistance, began to advance toward the Suez Canal. The offensive was carried out under an umbrella formed by the French Air Force.

A few hours after the Israeli attack, in the morning of 30 October, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden convened a session of the full cabinet. French Premier Guy Mollet and Foreign Minister Christian Pineau arrived from Paris on the same day. At 0400 hours GMT Egypt and Israel received an ultimatum to immediately pull back their troops 10 miles from the Suez Canal. Britain and France demanded that Egypt also "authorize" the occupation of the key positions of Port Sa'id, Ismailia and Suez. They were given 12 hours. Israel, as was to have been expected, agreed instantly to the demand for the withdrawal of troops 10 miles from the canal. Properly speaking, its mission--that of leader of the operation--had been accomplished. Egypt, however, for perfectly natural reasons, refused to accept the ultimatum of Britain and France, which mortally jeopardized the country's sovereignty.

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The Anglo-French troops entered the war against Egypt on 31 October. The next stage of the operation--Anglo-French armed operations against Egypt--had begun.

They may be split into two stages. The first consisted of preparatory operations by the air forces to gain air supremacy and blockade the Egyptian airfield. It lasted from 31 October through 4 November. Day and night the Anglo-French light and medium bombers carried out raids against peaceful Egyptian cities, attempting to sow panic among the population. The second stage was occupation of the canal zone. By 4 November a large number of ships with an amphibious assault-landing force had been concentrated near the island of Cyprus. To secure the landing an airborne assault landing was carried out at dawn on 5 November in the region of Port Sa'id. Before the drop and during it the Anglo-French aircraft carried out massed raids against the city. The residential quarters of Port Sa'id were brutally shelled by on-board artillery of the French battleship "Jean Bart," a cruiser, a destroyer and several escort ships. The Anglo-French marines landed in the Port Sa'id region on 6 November. Having fought their way south, the interventionists occupied a number of points in the Suez Canal Zone.

Immediately following Israel's attack on Egypt, a UN Security Council session was convened. A resolution was submitted for discussion demanding an immediate cease-fire and the withdrawal of the Israeli interventionist troops from Egyptian territory. The resolution contained a call for a renunciation of the use of force or the threat of force. A vote was taken. Of the 11 Security Council members, seven voted "for." Britain and France voted "against." Using the Security Council permanent member's right of veto, they rejected the resolution preventing realization of the criminal conspiracy against Egypt.

In response to this a number of delegates demanded the convening of an emergency session of the General Assembly. Here again Britain and France tried to prevent the United Nations examining the question of the attack on Egypt. However, this was no longer within their powers. Insofar as one UN body's proposal to transfer a question to another is a procedural matter, Security Council unanimity was not obligatory in this case. Despite the fact that Britain and France voted against, the Security Council submitted the decision on the convening of an emergency session to the UN General Assembly.

The emergency session opened on 1 November at 1730 hours New York Time. After 10 hours of stormy debate, during which the representatives of many countries angrily denounced the aggressors, a resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire and the withdrawal of troops was put to the vote. Some 65 votes were cast in favor of the resolution, six delegations abstained and five voted against (Britain, France, and Israel and also two British dominions--Australia and New Zealand).

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Thus from the very start the actions of Britain, France and Italy were sharply and universally condemned in the broad international forum. This demonstrated that striking moral-political isolation subsequently confirmed by two further resolutions of the emergency session--of 4 and 7 November on an immediate cease-fire and the withdrawal of the interventionist troops from Egypt--adopted by an overwhelming majority of UN members. The open refusal of Britain, France and Israel to submit to the UN decisions aroused the profound anger of the entire international community. The United States did its utmost to prevent the adoption by the General Assembly and Security Council of resolutions which would not only have contained appeals for peace-ableness but also envisaged concrete practical measures capable of putting an end to the intervention. Under these conditions the Soviet Union demanded sanctions against the aggressors. Simultaneously the Soviet Government sent the British, French and Israeli governments messages containing the most serious warning. The Soviet Government, one of them said, is fully resolved to use force to crush the aggressors and restore peace in the Near East.

On 7 November Britain, France and Israel were forced to cease fire in Egypt.

The 1967 "6-Day War"

In 1967 the following represented the hierarchy of causes* which engendered the transition to an international-political crisis:

1. Israeli policy, which was aimed at ousting or sharply weakening the regime of al-Nasir, who by this time had acquired the real features of a leader cementing unity in the Arab world and gathering around him increasingly capable anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist forces.

An "offshoot" of this Israeli policy was the course aimed at changing the nature of the regime in Damascus, which, given the military alliance which had been formed with Egypt, had become a most dynamic Arab force fighting against the policy of the Israeli leadership.

On 13 May Prime Minister Eshkol publicly stated that Israel "itself would choose the time, place and means" for military operations. Addressing a military audience, Rabin, chief of the Israeli Army General Staff, directly linked the struggle against "Fatah raids" with the struggle to overthrow the Syrian Government. "Both these statements had a shock effect in the Arab world," the book "Controlling Small Wars" says.

2. Israel's policy aimed at suppressing the Palestine resistance movement. This motive was directly present in the plans of the Israeli leadership, which was preparing for a war against its Arab neighbors.

*The events characterizing the transition of the conflict to the crisis stage of 1967 are, like the position of the United States in this period, examined in detail in the previous section.

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Israel's policy was being pursued against a background of methods of military-political pressure employed by Egypt to achieve the end of limiting Israel's expansion and imposing on it a number of conditions favorable to the Arab side. Israel made deft use of this Egyptian policy to unleash military actions.

The Israeli leadership did not doubt that the steps being taken by Egypt would not go beyond the framework of a military demonstration and that in practice al-Nasir did not want war. On 22 December 1967 HA'ARETZ carried an interview with the then chief of staff of the Israeli Army, Y. Rabin, who acknowledged: "There is a difference between a concentration of troops for the purpose of starting a war and a movement which could end in war but which is not geared to war and represents something different. I believe the latter was at the root of al-Nasir's thinking."

The assertions of a number of Israeli leaders and the press that Israel had begun "a defensive war against the threat of genocide" have nothing in common with reality. Israel's Gen M. Peled, who took part in the 1967 war and who later became a professor history, observed that in May 1967 there was no danger of Israel's destruction: "The Egyptians had concentrated 80,000 soldiers, while the Israelis had mobilized hundreds of thousands of people against them." General Peled later declared in an interview with MA'ARIV: "I am sure that our General Staff just never informed the government (of Levi Eshkol) of the absence of anything serious in the way of a military threat to Israel.... All these old wife's tales about the tremendous danger hanging over us in connection with our small territory and these arguments which arose when the war was over were never part of our calculations until the start of military operations. At the time when we ordered total mobilization, no one in his right mind could have believed that all these forces were necessary for our 'defense' against the Egyptian threat. These forces were needed to smash the Egyptians on a military level once and for all.... The idea that the Egyptian troops concentrated on our borders could have threatened Israel's existence casts doubt on the mental capabilities of anyone capable of analyzing the situation thus."

What, in the light of this, is the value of the big talk of the "hordes" of Egyptians ready to "fall on tiny Israel"!

3. U.S. policy, which supported Israel's expansionist leadership. This support, examined earlier, was an obligatory element of the kindling of the tension which predetermined the military eruption in June 1967 in the Near East. Without American support the Israeli leadership would not have dared attack Egypt, Syria and Jordan. Emphasizing the United States' total interest in Israel's "lightning victory" in 1967, the American magazine NEWS-WEEK wrote: "The combination of Israeli muscle and American sweet talk produced an extremely satisfactory result for Washington."

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The October 1973 Crisis

In 1973 the causes of the transition to the crisis stage proved more blurred. The Arab countries--Egypt and Syria--initiated extensive armed operations in October 1973, and these armed operations caught the Israeli leadership un-awares, moreover. Proceeding from this, many Western researchers, not to mention the pro-Zionist press, have formulated the question such that the transition of the conflict to the crisis stage was on this occasion the result of actions originating on the Arab side. Such a definition of the causes of the emergence of the 1973 crisis appears incorrect. It is essential to examine the situation prior to the start of the military operations, paying attention to the qualitative changes therein which had occurred or were imminent before October 1973. Only such an analysis makes it possible to reveal the real, profound causes of the new transformation of the conflict into the crisis stage.

It is known that by the start of the military operations in the Near East Israel had stepped up its policy aimed at consolidating the results of the aggression against the Arab countries perpetrated in June 1967. The "planned" implementation of measures to assimilate the Arab land taken during the "6-day war" not only continued but there was a qualitative shift in this policy at the start of September 1973. Under the conditions of the election struggle which had developed in Israel the Moshe Dayan group, which included a number of "hawks," strove for the official consent of the Labor Party, which headed the government coalition, to the authorization of the sale and purchase of land on the occupied Arab territories. The corresponding document was adopted on 3 September. This document not only defined the principles of the trade in Arab land on the territories occupied in 1967 but also outlined a vast 4-year program for the creation of new Jewish settlements in the Rafah region, on the southern approaches to the Gaza Strip, in the southern part of the River Jordan valley, on the Golan Heights and in the region south and east of Jerusalem. It was planned to accelerate the rate of purchase of Arab land through government channels with the simultaneous financing of the "settlement of refugees," primarily in the Gaza region.

At this same time, that is, on the eve of the conflict's development into the crisis stage, Israel stepped up its attempts to fully liquidate the capability of the Arab countries and the Palestinian movement of resisting Tel Aviv's expansion. Attacks on the territory of Israel's neighboring Arab countries, chiefly Syria and Lebanon, were made for this purpose. Not only the air but also the ground forces of Israel took part in them. Together with this, sabotage raids in depth were carried out aimed at liquidating Palestine resistance movement bases and personnel. One such raid was carried out in Beirut in the night of 9-10 April 1973, during which the Israeli saboteurs killed a number of PLO leaders and blew up the information center of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Fatah office, the PLO office and a number of other buildings in Beirut. The Israelis exerted concentrated psychological pressure on the Arabs aimed at forcing the Arab states to agree in advance with the idea of their military impotence and

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incompetence and thereby fully exclude the possibility of decisive retaliatory actions from the Arab side. Israel, according to the American weekly NEWSWEEK, made it "clearly understood that its air force would not stop short at devastating Egyptian territory in the event of war."

It is significant that this psychological pressure included demonstrative statements of the Israeli leadership to the effect that under no circumstances did Israel intend to quit a whole number of territories taken in June 1967. Thus on 24 May General Dayan declared on French television: "At all events, Israel must retain Sharm al-Shaykh and the Golan Heights on occupied Syrian territory. If agreement were to be reached with Egypt, the Israeli armed forces could withdraw from the canal, but then the border would run between the Suez Canal and the former cease-fire line between Israel and Egypt up to the '6-day war'."

The Israeli leadership made no secret of the policy which it had already adopted in relation to the Palestinian problem. Asserting that in the event of a political settlement of the Near East conflict the Palestinian question would automatically be transferred to the jurisdiction of Jordan, to which "certain of the occupied territories" would be returned, on the eve of October 1973 the Israeli leadership had essentially removed the Palestinian question from the agenda.

The conclusions reached by Nahum Goldmann with respect to the causes of the 1973 war are interesting. "The Yom Kippur war," he writes in his book "Whither Israel?" was from the historical viewpoint the result of the negative consequences of the 1967 war. Israel had come to feel such confidence in its superiority that it imagined that the status quo which it had created would last for a long time and that the Arabs would not demonstrate total insanity and would not commit suicide by venturing to embark on a new war; the psychological, military and many other spheres of Israeli life were under the influence of this victory, and the result was the war of 1973, which in a few days radically changed the entire situation. In the years between the two wars Israel's policy had been unrealistic. It had set as its goal preservation of the status quo in the hope that the Arabs, like the great powers, would reconcile themselves to this situation."

The expansionist line was pursued by the Israeli leadership under the conditions of continuing support on the part of the United States, which was expressed in 1973, as before, chiefly in the form of arms supplies from the United States to Israel. Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir visited Washington at the end of February-start of March. Her visit was mainly connected with negotiations on arms supplies. According to a NEW YORK TIMES reports, the United States undertook to additionally supply Israel with 48 fighter-bombers and light ground attack aircraft and to assist in the production in Israel of a new fighter-bomber.

A qualitatively new feature was observed here also. The United States had begun to pay particular attention to the development of the military industry in Israel. "American technical assistance in the production of

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military aircraft in Israel is no less important than the promises relating to additional supplies of aircraft by the United States," the Israeli newspaper HA'ARETZ wrote on 15 March 1973. The world press also emphasized that the measures to build up Israel's military potential were being implemented by the United States under conditions where supplies in accordance with deals concluded earlier had not even been completed.

Speaking of the U.S. role in the growth of the conflict into a new crisis stage in 1973, N. Goldmann wrote: "The Israeli leaders concluded that the United States would actually support their policy of rejecting any agreement unless it satisfied all Israeli requirements and try to vindicate positions of strength, guaranteeing observance of the status quo for many years. If there is anyone responsible for the Yom Kippur war, it is primarily the United States."

The situation created by Israel's policy, with the actual support of the United States, had led to the point where there had been a marked increase in the economic and political difficulties in the Arab countries on the eve of the 1973 October war. Egypt had been forced to maintain a mass army and spend approximately 1 billion Egyptian pounds annually on military needs; 60 percent of the Syrian state budget went for defense purposes. Many observers noted that the deal in settling the Near East crisis threatened these two Arab countries with an acute internal crisis. "The pain of defeat could cause an explosion within the country, and Israel would not even have to fire a single shot insofar as it would then secure the status quo in Sinai, in the Gaza Strip, on the West Bank of the Jordan, in Jerusalem-- everywhere; and this would mean that the issue was closed," the Egyptian president declared on 1 May 1973.

Summing up, it may be concluded that Israel's policy was aimed at preventing a settlement of the Near East conflict on a just basis despite the appeals and demands of the international public and UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions and insuring the preservation and stabilization of the results of the 1967 aggression. Tel Aviv continued in practice to reject all initiatives which could have "unfrozen" the conflict and solved it by political means in the interests of all the peoples living in this region. The Israeli leadership and American politicians, who supported it, gambled on the fact that preservation of the "no war, no peace" situation would contribute to a general shift to the right in the Arab world, the progressive weakening of revolutionary-democratic regimes and the deepening of the fissures between different Arab countries; facilitate the opportunities for maneuver of the openly reactionary and rightwing nationalist Arab forces; and intensify the chauvinist and ultra-Islamic trends, which in a number of cases had manifestly acquired an anti-Soviet and anticommunist character.

For a whole number of reasons this policy of "freezing" the conflict in the Near East had to be and was hopeless. Moreover, this Israeli policy also acquired the nature of a detonator, which triggered the embittered military actions in the Near East in October 1973.

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The Soviet Union had warned repeatedly of the dangerous nature of the development of events in the Near East. The final occasion was literally on the eve of the October war, when in the UN General Assembly the USSR foreign minister again pointed out that events in the Near East were taking an extremely dangerous turn. At this time, in September, there were numerous reports coming from the Near East of a concentration of Israeli troops on the east bank of the Suez Canal and in the Golan Heights region. At the start of October Israel called up some of its reservists, thereby inflaming the situation to the utmost.

Under these conditions military operations began in the Near East on 6 October 1973.

To judge by everything, the Israeli leadership proceeded from the fact that the Arab side would not venture to "unfreeze" the conflict at that time. Certain Israeli figures aspired to impress upon the world public the idea that the situation in the Near East would in time acquire a certain stability and that preservation of the situation characterized by continued Israeli occupation of vast Arab territories allegedly did not only not represent a serious threat to peace but, on the contrary, was creating some kind of new "approaches to a settlement." In an interview that the London THE OBSERVER the Israeli foreign minister, for example, claimed that the situation in the Near East arena "is losing its intensity" as a result of the fact that "the cease-fire has its own dynamism."

Arguments about a decline in "tension" in the Near East had nothing in common with reality. The causes which had brought the situation in the region to crisis point and which had created a constant threat of the spread of the conflict continued to operate. Israel had not retreated from its aggressive, expansionist policy in relation to its Arab neighbors, increasing pressure on the Arab states and attempting to impose capitulationist settlement terms on them. All this was the basis of the transition of the Near East conflict to the crisis stage in 1973.

An investigation of the "stimulating factors" which predetermined in each specific instance the development of the Near East conflict into the crisis stage leads to the conclusion that only the liquidation of all the causes forming the basis of the Near East conflict can frustrate the dangerous development of the conflict situation threatening not only peace in the Near East but also universal peace. This conclusion emphasizes once again the extreme urgency of the neutralization of the whole complex of causes which have engendered and are maintaining the Arab-Israeli conflict. And this can only be done in the process of an overall settlement.

The need for such an overall, all-embracing settlement has also become increasingly urgent because the Arab-Israeli confrontation has brought to life or, in any event, imparted an acute nature to and impeded the settlement of a whole number of other conflicts in the Near East, evidence of which were the 1975-1976 events in Lebanon.

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In Place of a Conclusion

The Path to Peace: The Soviet Viewpoint

The Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community are struggling consistently for a peaceful, political settlement of the Near East conflict in the interests of all the peoples living in this region. What fundamental features characterize the USSR's position on the question of the Arab-Israeli conflict?

It is obviously necessary to first of all say how the USSR evaluates the nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Soviet Union regards this conflict not in the form of a "clash of two nationalisms" but as a manifestation of the confrontation of imperialism on the one hand and the national liberation movement on the other. The essence of the conflict lies precisely in this antagonism, despite the fact that this does not always appear sufficiently rectilinearly and straightforwardly on the surface.

This understanding of the nature of the Near East conflict has predetermined the USSR's political position, which is expressed in assistance to and support for the Arab states and the Palestinian people, who have fallen victim to Israel's expansionism and aggressiveness. The decree of the CPSU Central Committee 21 June 1967 Plenum "The Soviet Union's Policy in Connection With Israel's Aggression in the Near East" emphasized: "Israel's aggression is the result of a conspiracy of the most reactionary forces of international imperialism, primarily the United States, directed against a detachment of the national liberation movement.... The Soviet Union, the other socialist countries and all progressive anti-imperialist forces are on the side of the Arab peoples in their just struggle against imperialism and neocolonialism and for the inalienable right to decide all questions of their domestic life and foreign policy themselves."

Thus the Soviet Union's position in relation to the Near East conflict was and is now constructed on the basis of proletarian internationalism and support for the national liberation struggle of the peoples.

The Soviet Union's attitude toward the Near East conflict is at the same time a consequence of its general approach to the problems of international relations and of its many years of struggle for their improvement and for the reorganization of the system of interstate relations on the basis of the principles of peace, mutual respect, strict observance of sovereignty and noninterference in internal affairs.

In this plane the Soviet Union's interest in a just and lasting peace in the Near East has acquired particular import in the 1970's. The development and materialization of the relaxation process and the imparting of an irreversible character to this process have come to depend largely on the liquidation of hotbeds of international tension, of which the Near East is one of the most dangerous. Under the conditions of the transition from

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the "cold war" to the relaxation of international tension which has begun the policy of intolerance of aggression and a firm stand against any possibility of the acquisition of territory through aggressive actions have become particularly important and urgent. Merely the exclusion of a development of events where the aggressor triumphs and receives dividends for his actions would create an opportunity to reorganize the system of relations between states on the basis of peace, justice, equality, mutual advantage and general progress.

Addressing the plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly 29th Session, USSR Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko declared: "Some people try to depict the Soviet Union's position as one-sided and as corresponding merely to the interests of the Arab states. Yes, we support and will continue to support the Arabs' legitimate demands. But it is wrong to see just this aspect in our position. When we strive to insure that territory acquired by force should not be a bonus for the aggressor, in its content this demand goes beyond the framework of the Near East. It reflects an intolerance of aggression in general. Thus this is a question of an important international principle, a question of the consistency of policy."

The USSR's aspiration to lead events in the Near East to a lasting and sure peace is also connected with the fact that this region is directly adjacent to the USSR's southern borders. Naturally, the lack of stability and the danger preserved therein of a military eruption is directly contrary to the USSR's interests.

Precisely by virtue of all that has been said, the proposition on the need for the concentration of the efforts of the peace-loving states on the liquidation of the remaining military hotbeds, primarily the accomplishment of a just and lasting settlement in the Near East, is an organic part of the system of the most urgent and important measures envisaged by the Peace Program adopted by the 24th CPSU Congress and the Program of Further Struggle for Peace and International Cooperation and the Freedom and Independence of the Peoples adopted by the 25th CPSU Congress.

The Soviet Union's position in relation to the Near East conflict thus shows that its policy of the relaxation of international tension and of the exclusion of wars as a means of solving disputed questions between states not only does not contradict but, on the contrary, is organically linked with the principled line of support for the national liberation forces subjected to imperialist attacks.

How to achieve peace in the Near East? First of all, the Soviet Union has proceeded and continues to proceed from the fact that the path toward it lies only through the liquidation of the consequences of the Israeli attack on the Arab countries in 1967--the so-called 6-day war. If the status quo which took shape after 1967 is preserved, the situation in the Near East will be constantly explosive. This conclusion is of fundamental significance since certain Western politicians have proceeded and are continuing to

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proceed from the fact that the situation may gradually "lose its acuteness" and that there will be a decline in the intensity of the threat of the Near East crisis to world peace. The Soviet Union has always rejected such a conclusion. The Soviet leaders declared this both prior to (including on the eve) and after October 1973.

In its definition of the path toward peace in the Near East Soviet policy proceeds from the fact that there is a complex of causes at the basis of the Arab-Israeli conflict: Israel's occupation of Arab territory, the deprivation of the Palestinian Arab people's inalienable rights and the continuing state of war. Soviet diplomacy has consistently and unswervingly pursued a policy of liquidation and neutralization of all these causes in a complex. Only such a solution will lead matters toward a just and stable peace in the region. This, for example, is how the key aspects of this problem were revealed in the Soviet Union's proposals on a Near East settlement and the Geneva Peace Conference published on 2 October 1976:

1. The withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab territory occupied in 1967.
2. Realization of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian Arab people, including their right to self-determination and the creation of their own state.
3. Guarantee of the right to independent existence and security of all the states which are directly party to the conflict--the Arab states neighboring Israel on the one hand and the state of Israel on the other--and the granting to them of the appropriate international guarantees.

4. Cessation of the state of war between the corresponding Arab countries and Israel.

The Soviet Union put forward these aspects of a settlement for examination as the agenda of the Geneva Peace Conference, emphasizing that this agenda "takes into consideration the legitimate rights and interests of all the parties directly involved in the conflict--the Arab states, the Palestinian Arab people and the state of Israel."

The Soviet Union has struggled and is continuing to struggle unswervingly and in keeping with principle against Israel's expansionist, aggressive policy. At the same time in 1948 the Soviet Union recognized and supported the right of the Jewish population of Palestine to self-determination. The invariability of the Soviet line on this question is obvious. For example, a statement adopted at the USSR Supreme Soviet July (1970) Session says: "The USSR Supreme Soviet believes that each state of the Near East has a right to independent national existence, independence and security."

There is something else that is obvious at the same time: one people cannot have self-determination at the expense of deprivation of the right to

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self-determination of another people--the Palestinian Arab people. For this reason the Soviet Union not only recognizes Israel's right to existence as a state but is also waging a principled struggle for satisfaction of the Palestinian people's legitimate rights, even their creation of their own national state. Failing this, a peaceful settlement of the Near East conflict is impossible since the unsolved nature of the Palestinian problem is blocking the path to a just and lasting peace in the region.

"The Near East needs a lasting and just settlement which would not infringe the vital rights of a single state and a single people. Of course, Israel has a right to state independence and a secure existence. But the Palestinian Arab people have the same right," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev declared in Tula on 18 January 1977.

So a comprehensive solution of the problems of the Near East conflict is the sole realistic course of its settlement. Is this conclusion identical to a denial of a stage-by-stage approach in the solution of problems? By no means. The Soviet Union does not in principle reject interim measures which could affect individual questions. Thus, for example, in his speech at the 16th Trade Unions Congress Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized that the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all occupied territories could be accomplished in stages over several months, for example, within a strictly determined time frame. The main thing is that "stage-by-stage" measures be organic components of a universal settlement and that they be regarded and implemented in the context of this overall, comprehensive settlement of the Near East conflict.

For a whole number of years the Soviet Union has consistently played an active role in the attempts to achieve a peaceful, political settlement of the Near East conflict, aspiring to formulate acceptable principles of the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions. Whether during meetings and talks with the leaders of Arab countries and the PLO and consultations with the great powers which are members of the UN Security Council or during bilateral consultations with representatives of the U.S. Administration, the Soviet Union has always actively pursued a policy of support for the struggle of the Arab countries to liquidate the consequences of Israeli aggression and to establish a just and stable peace in the Near East in the interests of all the peoples living in this region.

On the basis of a sober analysis of the situation in the Near East and in consideration of the positions of the parties to the conflict and also the bilateral and quadripartite consultations within the UN framework on questions of a Near East settlement, back in 1969 the Soviet Union put forward realistic and constructive proposals for a political solution of the crisis. The Soviet plan was correspondingly submitted to the interested countries and was amplified and supplemented in 1970.

It should be emphasized that all the USSR's proposals on a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the Soviet peace plan for the

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Near East proposed in 1969, have not been pious wishes for peace but a developed system of measures to achieve and guarantee it. We have already emphasized above the interlinking nature of the problems and, consequently, the comprehensive nature of the Soviet approach corresponding to the interests--not imaginary and invented but genuine--of all peoples inhabiting the Near East. Thus the 1969 Soviet settlement plan proposed concrete measures with an indication of the times of the withdrawal of Israeli troops connected with the establishment of new, peaceful relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors. It was envisaged, for example, that this approach would be implemented in two stages. According to the Soviet plan, the borders of the Near East states could have been guaranteed through the two sides' assumption of concrete commitments. These would have included consent to the establishment of demilitarized zones along both sides of the border which would afford neither side advantages, and, moreover, the modus operandi of these zones would contain restrictions of a purely military nature; to the commitment of UN troops to a number of points; and to direct guarantees on the part of the four powers which are permanent members of the Security Council or guarantees of the Security Council as a whole.

Now, glancing retrospectively at the events in the Near East which occurred in the first half of the 1970's, it can be said with certainty that the adoption of the Soviet plan could have spared the peoples of this region many sacrifices and brought them to the point of peaceful coexistence. Unfortunately, this was not the case. The Soviet plan encountered stubborn resistance both on the part of Israel, which hoped that it would be successful in preserving the "no war, no peace" situation, and the United States, which supported the Israeli leadership.

Under the conditions which took shape in the Near East after the October 1973 war the Soviet Union put forward and firmly defended the idea of the convening of the Geneva Peace Conference for the solution of the questions of a comprehensive settlement. As is known, this conference began its work in December 1973 and then recessed. The USSR has constantly insisted on a resumption of its work, believing it to be the most suitable forum for the solution of the problems of an overall settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This idea was emphasized once again with all justification in the Soviet Union's proposals on a Near East settlement and the Geneva Peace Conference presented to the governments of the United States, Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Israel and the PLO leadership at the start of October 1976.

This document put forward for examination not only the proposal on the agenda but also questions of the organization of the conference and the idea that it be conducted in two stages, the first of which could definitively agree on the agenda and determine the procedure for the examination of specific aspects of a settlement. At the second stage it was proposed to concentrate on the formulation of an accord in essence. It was emphasized that the conference should culminate in the adoption of a document (or documents) of a treaty nature. The Soviet Union has never regarded the idea of the convening of the Geneva Conference as an end in itself, believing that the

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main thing lies in the fruitful and equitable results of its work, and in this connection has emphasized the need for the thorough preparation of the conference. At the same time the Soviet Union has opposed attempts to postpone the conference and to drag out the preparation of it ad infinitum, believing that its convening is of vital significance for the normalization of the situation in the Near East.

There is particular significance in the fact that the Soviet Union insisted on the PLO's equal participation in the Geneva Peace Conference. This emphasis was particularly important because without the participation of the real and generally recognized representatives of the Palestinian people it is impossible to solve the Palestinian problem, and there can be no overall settlement of the Near East conflict without its solution. The Soviet Union has persistently pursued the line of PLO participation in the Geneva Conference under conditions where Israel, with U.S. support, has attempted to circumvent the Palestinian problem, leave it on the sidelines of the settlement process or replace the Palestinian people's representation, which is capable of defending their legitimate rights, with a Quisling-type "representation."

As is clear from the statements of its leaders and from the concrete measures which have been adopted, the Soviet Union has not only always attached tremendous significance to the problem of a settlement of the Near East conflict but has proceeded from the conviction of the real possibility of the liquidation of its causes and of an all-embracing accord on the establishment of a just and lasting peace in this long-suffering and uneasy region--the Near East.

In his speech at the 16th Trade Unions Congress Comrade L. I. Brezhnev again put forward realistic, clearly balanced proposals capable of bringing matters to a settlement in the Near East. The Soviet Union has emphasized the need for the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by wars and the right of all states of this region to independent existence and security to be made the basis of a final document (or documents) on peace in the Near East. Of course, the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to self-determination and the creation of their own state, must be secured.

The peace documents must provide for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab territory occupied in 1967. The corresponding lines of the borders between Israel and its Arab neighbors who are party to the conflict must be precisely determined. These borders must be declared definitively established and indissoluble.

Following the completion of the withdrawal of Israeli troops, the state of war between the Arab states which are party to the conflict and Israel will cease and relations of peace will be established. Here all parties will assume mutual commitments to respect one another's sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability and political independence and to settle their

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international disputes by peaceful means. The conference's final documents should evidently also contain a clause on freedom of passage for the ships of all countries, including Israel (after the cessation of the state of war), along the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba and also a declaration from Egypt on the passage of ships along the Suez Canal, which is entirely under Egyptian sovereignty.

The proposals on a Near East settlement presented by the CPSU Central Committee general secretary pay particular attention to questions of practicable guarantees of a just peace, whose terms will be recorded in the final document. Demilitarized zones--without one-sided advantages for anyone--could be created, with the consent of the corresponding states, of course, along both sides of the established borders. Either a UN emergency force or UN observers would be stationed for some clearly defined period of time within these zones.

"Implementation of the terms of a peace settlement could, in our opinion, be guaranteed, if so desired by the contracting parties, by the UN Security Council and, possibly, individual powers such as the Soviet Union, the United States, France and Britain, for example. The guarantor states could have their own observers in the UN contingents in the corresponding zones," Comrade L.I. Brezhnev declared.

The international community gave a highly favorable welcome to the joint Soviet-American statement on the Near East issued on 2 October 1977, which says: "The Soviet and American sides believe that all concrete questions of a settlement, including such key questions as the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the territories occupied at the time of the 1967 conflict, the Palestinian question, including a guarantee of the Palestinian people's legitimate rights, the cessation of the state of war and the establishment of normal peaceful relations on the basis of mutual recognition of the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence, should be solved within the framework of an all-embracing settlement of the Near East problem."

At the same time the comments of the world press emphasized that not all the provisions of this statement form the basis of practical American policy--the United States has continued to maneuver, aspiring chiefly to strengthen Israel's positions.

This, generally, was the situation in the fall of 1977.

When this book was completed, events in the Near East were continuing to disturb the world. For many decades of its development the Near East conflict has been a textbook example of acute and complex international situations threatening the peace and security of the peoples. Thousands of people have fallen victim to them in four wars and several hundred clashes. And, moreover, life has still not put an end to the score--neither of wars

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and armed clashes nor the thousands of victims and the tremendous destruction. If this book has helped the reader even somewhat to determine the real causes of the long-standing Arab-Israeli conflict and has shown him that these causes, while as yet not extirpated, will contribute again and again to the conflict's development into the stage of dangerous international crises, if the book has contributed to an understanding of the essence of the policy of the capitalist countries, which are intensifying the conflict and impeding its settlement and if it has provided illustrative material explaining in even greater depth the Soviet position and setting off the USSR's constructive role in the establishment of a just peace in the Near East, the author considers his task accomplished.

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